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THE RISE OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT:  HOW 
DODD-FRANK WILL LIKELY IMPACT PRIVATE 
EQUITY REAL ESTATE 
Seth Chertok* 
This paper argues that the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to prevent 
against systemic risks in response to the financial crisis of 2008, but poses 
over-regulation dangers on private equity real estate, which the regulators 
acknowledged weren’t the cause of the financial crisis.  The author 
examines private equity real estate along three axes of systemic risk 
contributors, aggregate industry size, financial connections, and 
synchronization with other schemes and markets. It further compares 
private equity real estate funds to hedge funds, which have been viewed by 
some as posing systemic risks.  The unraveled evidence strongly suggests 
that private equity real estate doesn’t give rise to systemic risk concerns, 
yet the Dodd-Frank Act threatens to subject private equity real estate 
advisers to tightened regulations, which impose considerable compliance 
costs and particularly burden small and/or start-up firms.  To assist private 
equity real estate advisers with their new paths through the regulatory 
landscape, this article provides a complex compliance framework that 
could potentially help them restructure their funds to minimize the impact 
of the Dodd-Frank on their compliance burdens.  This article argues that 
the SEC should accept these new paths as part of the new regulatory 
landscape for private equity real estate, given the policy reasons expressed 
in this article.  It further recommends that the regulators not apply the 
Volcker Rule against private equity real estate.  Recognitions of these new 
paths and limiting the application of the Volcker Rule would increase 
transactional certainty for private equity real estate, foster their freedom of 
choice to select the best regulatory path, and most importantly, avoid the 
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dangers of over-regulation for private equity real estate.    
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act" or "Dodd-Frank" or “the 
Act”).
1
  Dodd-Frank was a sweeping financial legislation that, among other 
things, drastically altered the regulatory landscape for private equity and 
subjected many private equity advisers to much tighter regulation. 
Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity 
investment advisers had been largely unregulated under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”)
2
 and the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”).
3
  During the years leading up the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity flourished.  As of March 
2012, private equity funds’ global assets under management, including dry 
powder (capital commitments not employed in investments) totaled 
approximately $3 trillion.
4
  Note, however, that private equity real estate 
(also “PERE”) funds, which are the subject of this article, have a much 
smaller industry size, evidenced by the fact that there were, as of the third 
quarter of 2013, only “468 private equity real estate funds (targeting assets 
rather than other funds) seeking an aggregate of $154 [billion] in capital 
commitments.”
5
 
Looking deeper, one may also postulate that the freedom of private 
equity investment strategies lies inherently in the free regulatory pass that 
many private equity advisers and private equity funds received prior to the 
inauguration of the Dodd-Frank Act.  For example, it is widely known that 
Yale University’s private equity investments from 1973 to 2006 had a 
 
1.   Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 2.  The Advisers Act is a body of federal securities laws that regulates “investment 
advisers.” 
 3.  The Investment Company Act is a body of federal securities laws that regulates the 
funds with which investment advisers work. 
 4.  See Global Private Equity Report 2012, BAIN & COMPANY, INC., iii, (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.bain.com/bainweb/pdfs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_20
12.pdf (explaining that there was nearly $1 trillion dollars in dry powder and nearly $2 
trillion dollars of assets in private equity for 2011). 
 5.  John Mather, Private Equity Real Estate Funds – Q3 2012 Fundraising Update, 
PREQIN (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.preqin.com/blog/101/5823/re-q3-fundraising-update.  
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greater than 30% rate of return overall.
6
   Many scholars attribute such 
impressive, above-market returns to the fluidity of private equity funds’ 
investment strategies. 
Admittedly, some studies suggest that private equity, as an industry at 
large, does not generate above-market returns.
7
 Yet, many successful 
individual private equity players who outperform in one fund have been 
observed to persistently outperform in future funds.
8
  Thus, the fluidity of 
private equity, at a minimum, provides many talented private equity 
advisers with the possibility of consistently outperforming the market, 
which may be advantageous for investors. 
In light of these economic benefits, private equity advisers clearly 
have solid grounds for viewing private equity as an important tool for 
society, especially for investors.  Private equity advisers may therefore 
likely consider less regulation as a significant contributing factor for the 
success of private equity, and hence the success and growth of investors’ 
wealth and the national economy. 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, stampeded by poor mortgage 
lending practices, regulators across the country reached a heightened state 
of alert.  This motivated Congress to enact the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, 
primarily to address systemic risk concerns: 
 
Congress [held] hearings on systemic risk in response to the . . . 
subprime mortgage crisis and its impact on the mortgage-backed 
securities and commercial paper markets.  The U.S. Federal 
Reserve, the European Central Bank, and other monetary 
agencies worldwide . . . likewise expressed concern about this 
crisis and its potential systemic effects, dramatically illustrated 
by the collapse of the investment bank Bear Stearns.  
Governments also [were] concerned about the potential for 
systemic failure stemming from hedge-fund collapses, originally 
raised by the near-failure of Long-Term Capital Management and 
more recently prompted by the unregulated spread of hedge funds 
as a favored investment tool.
9
 
 
 6.  Josh Lerner, Private Equity Returns: Myth and Reality, HARV. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/Session%20III%20-%20Lerner%20FINAL.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
 7.  See, e.g., Steve Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, 
Persistence and Capital Flows, CHI. BOOTH 2, http://www.chicagobooth.edu/news/2004-11-
12kaplan/pereturns-1.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013)(“On average, LBO fund returns net of 
fees are slightly less than those of the S&P 500; VC fund returns are lower than the S&P 
500 on an equal-weighted basis, but higher than the S&P 500 on a capital weighted basis.”).  
 8.  See id. (“General partners (GPs) whose funds outperform the industry in one fund 
are likely to outperform the industry in the next and vice versa.”). 
 9.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 194-96 (2008) (internal 
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The financial crisis of 2008 clearly had the potential to bring down the 
economy.  However, private equity did not contribute to this financial 
crisis.  The legislative history for the Volcker Rule
10
 notes, “The erosion of 
lending standards and the Federal Government’s poorly conceived efforts 
to subsidize mortgage lending caused the financial crisis . . . .”
11
 The 
massive mortgage defaults and the resulting decline of mortgage-backed 
securities (“MBS”) eventually caused the collapses of several major 
financial institutions in September 2008, signaling how mortgage defaults 
and MBS could give rise to systemic risk concerns.  The subprime 
mortgage crisis threatened to trigger a systemic collapse by weakening 
large financial institutions:  
Governments responding to the financial crisis initially 
concluded that these financial institutions were “too big to fail.”  
[However, after 2008,] [m]any government officials believed 
that, because of the interconnectedness of each firm with the rest 
of the American and global economy, the failure of the financial 
institutions could cause the entire global financial system to 
collapse.
12
 
This prompted Congress to take preventative measures against systemic 
risks, as a prudent doctor is apt to prescribe preventative medicines against 
potential heart and kidney damage for a patient with a diagnosed liver 
disease.  Accordingly, the Dodd-Frank Act imposed substantial rules that 
regulated the financial system beyond mortgage lending practices. 
The primary goal of the Dodd-Frank Act was to cure the problem of 
poor mortgage lending practices and the subsequent issues of the MBS 
markets.  The Act “enact[ed] numerous provisions intended to reform the 
mortgage lending industry with an eye towards consumer protection.  Many 
of these provisions are contained within Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
[and] the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (the 
‘Mortgage Act’ . . . ).”
13
  In addition, 
 
citations omitted). 
 10.  The Volcker Rule, a part of the Dodd-Frank Act, prohibits banks from sponsoring 
or owning private equity funds exempt under Sections 3(c)(1) and (3)(c)(7) of the 
Investment Company Act. 
 11.  Examining the Impact of the Volcker Rule on Markets, Businesses, Investors and 
Job Creation, Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 2 
(2012) (Statement of Spencer Bachus, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.). 
 12.  Lindsay C. McAfee & Nichole Johnson, Major Financial Institutions in the Crisis: 
What Happened and Governments’ Responses, THE U. OF IOWA C. OF L. 1, 3 (Mar. 2010), 
http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/sites/default/files/Part_5_4.pdf. 
 13.  Bradley K. Sabel, Mortgage Lending Practice after the Dodd-Frank Act, posting in 
The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 
WEBLOGS AT HARV. L. SCH. (Nov. 16, 2010, 10:03 AM), 
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Congress passed comprehensive mortgage reform legislation 
beginning in 2007 including the Secure and Fair Enforcement for 
Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 1501 et seq., “SAFE 
Act”).  The Mortgage Act continues these legislative efforts by 
amending provisions of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 
1601 et seq., “TILA”) in order to reform consumer mortgage 
practices and provide accountability for such practices.
14
 
Even though the Dodd-Frank Act was intended to fix the cause of the 
financial crisis, two portions of the Act substantially impact the private 
equity industry, which was not the cause of the crisis.  The two portions are 
Title IV and the Volcker Rule.  Title IV amends the registration regime of 
the Advisers Act in a way that forces many private equity advisers, who 
were previously unregistered, to register thereunder.
15
  The Volcker Rule 
prohibits banks from sponsoring or owning private equity funds exempt 
under Sections 3(c)(1) and (3)(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act, but 
the Dodd-Frank Act grants the joint agencies the discretion to also apply 
the Volcker Rule directly against non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds.
16
 
The legislative history for Title IV notes that Title IV requires many 
previously exempt advisers to register in order to monitor hedge fund 
systemic risks: 
While hedge funds are generally not thought to have caused the 
current financial crisis, information regarding their size, 
strategies, and positions could be crucial to regulatory attempts to 
deal with a future crisis.  The case of Long-Term Capital 
Management, a hedge fund that was rescued through Federal 
Reserve intervention in 1998 because of concerns that it was 
“too-interconnected-to-fail,” indicates that the activities of even a 
single hedge fund may have systemic consequences.
17
 
The legislative history thus indicates that Title IV seeks to apply the 
Advisers Act against hedge funds and other types of “private funds” that 
may give rise to systemic risks. 
The legislative history for the Volcker Rule begins by noting that the 
Volcker Rule prohibits banking activities “that are high-risk or which 
create significant conflicts of interest between these institutions and their 
 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/11/16/mortgage-lending-practice-after-the-dodd-
frank-act/. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Information about general issues regarding investment adviser jurisdiction, 
registration, statutory floors, exemptions, and compliance under the Advisers Act and the 
Dodd-Frank Act can be found in a companion article.  Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 1, § 
619(a)(2)(B). 
16.   Id. § 619(h)(2). 
 17.  S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38 (2010). 
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customers,”
18
 such as “the possibility that firms will favor inside funds 
when placing funds for clients.”
19
  “When losses from high-risk activities 
are significant, they can threaten the safety and soundness of individual 
firms and contribute to overall financial instability.  Moreover, when the 
losses accrue to insured depositories or their holding companies, they can 
cause taxpayer losses.”
20
  An additional point in the legislative history of 
the Volcker Rule is that “[t]he prohibitions also will reduce the scale, 
complexity, and interconnectedness of those banks that . . . have hedge 
fund or private equity exposure.”
21
  Clearly, the primary focus of the 
Volcker Rule is to prevent systemic risks to the economy as a whole. 
Following the Dodd-Frank Act, all private equity advisers, including 
hedge fund advisers, are now subject to new, burdensome regulation.  This 
new regulation seems inconsistent with the historical reasons for private 
equity’s regulatory free pass as well as the fluidity of private equity funds’ 
investment strategies.  In particular, regulators felt duty-bound to take 
preventative measures and increase oversight of private equity investment 
advisers in order to minimize potential systemic risks; although, as 
discussed above, the legislators recognized that private equity funds were 
not the cause of the financial crisis. 
Increased regulation of private equity potentially presents dangers, 
considering that “[o]ver-regulation of economic markets acts as a drag on 
investment and entrepreneurial enterprise”
22
 and that “over[-]regulation 
will suffocate the economy and deepen the crisis.”
23
  Moreover, “over-
regulation may prevent financial institutions from doing business in a cost-
effective manner and drive financial activity to other, more favorably 
regulated markets.”
24
  In particular, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
threatens to subject private equity real estate advisers to the Advisers Act, 
will impose considerable compliance costs, which could be particularly 
burdensome for small and/or start-up firms.  For example, one fund “took 
about 2,000 hours to prepare its first Form PF filing.  Another . . . fund 
[had] about 140 employees, eight to ten of whom work[ed] full time on 
regulatory compliance.”
25
  In addition, “[c]ompliance is very expensive for 
 
18.    Id. at 8. 
19.    Id. 
20.    Id.   
21.    Id. 
 22.  Rodney A. Smolla, Reflections on the Rule of Law America’s 400th Anniversary at 
Jamestown — Foreword: Contemplating the Meaning of the “Rule of Law,” 42 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2007). 
 23.  Chelsea P. Ferrette, The Myth of Investor Protection: The Dodd-Frank Act and the 
Office of the Investor Advocate, 12 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 61, 67 (2011). 
 24.  Eric J. Pan, Structural Reform of Financial Regulation, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 796, 812 (2011). 
 25.  Lloyd Dixon, Noreen Clancy & Krishna B. Kumar, Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, 
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[small] firms because they either have to dedicate some of their small staff 
to compliance or pay to outsource the compliance to another firm.  At the 
same time, these firms are pressured by their investors to reduce fee-related 
expenses.”
26
  Additionally, too much regulation could potentially cause 
private equity funds that cannot cope with the compliance costs and efforts 
to relocate to jurisdictions where regulation is less intense, which is not 
advantageous for the U.S. economy. 
On the side of the Volcker Rule, applying the Volcker Rule against 
PERE would cut off a significant source of capital to PERE funds, even 
though banks are not a gigantic percentage of PERE’s investors.  This is 
problematic, since PERE has had a significant role in paving the way to the 
recovery of the real estate markets after various financial crises.
27
  Further, 
PERE funds that invest in land should help lead the way to recovery of 
development activities for the country’s GDP, which is also particularly 
important. Cutting off that source of capital might also put PERE in the 
United States at a competitive disadvantage with global PERE funds. 
Given that the Dodd-Frank Act took preventative measures beyond 
mortgage lending practices, and even beyond subjecting hedge funds to 
tightened regulations, there is a great possibility of over-regulation dangers 
- just as taking medicines before multi-organ failure could ultimately 
damage a patient’s health. 
In the face of these changes, this paper predicts that private equity 
advisers will not only comply, but also adapt. This article predicts that 
traditional private equity investment advisers, who largely advise about 
investments in non-real estate securities, will have a very limited ability to 
adapt to the Dodd-Frank Act, and will have to comply in a rather 
straightforward way. 
The lack of adaptability for traditional private equity investment 
advisers derives, foremost, from the fact that such advisers focus on 
investments in “securities,” and, according to the Advisers Act, they fall 
into the category of “investment advisers.”  The Advisers Act defines 
“investment advisers” as “any person who . . . engages in the business of 
advising others . . . as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.”
28
  Consequently, traditional 
 
and Dodd-Frank: The Road Ahead, RAND CORP. 5, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF308/RAND_CF30
8.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013)[hereinafter Dodd-Frank: The Road Ahead].  
 26.  Id. 
27.   DAVID M. GELTNER, ET. AL, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS AND 
INVESTMENTS 148 (Sara Glassmeyer et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014) (“As in the 1990s, the recovery 
[after the financial crisis of 2008] in the commercial property market was once again led by 
private equity funds and REITs seeking to buy distressed assets at bargain prices or to place 
capital into safe, income-generating and potentially inflation-hedging assets.”).  
 28.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006).  
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private equity investment advisers will have no ability to sidestep the 
Advisers Act. 
In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes new, additional regulations 
on investment advisers to funds exempt under Sections 3(c)(1)
29
 and 
3(c)(7).
30
  One such regulation is the filing of Form PF, required of 
investment advisers who manage one or more “private funds” if the adviser 
or its related persons, collectively, “have at least $150 million in private 
fund assets under management as of the last day of [the adviser’s] most 
recently completed fiscal year.”
31
  Another such regulation is the Volcker 
Rule, which prohibits banks from sponsoring or owning Sections 3(c)(1) 
and 3(c)(7) exempt funds.  Traditional private equity funds typically have 
no choice but to rely upon the Investment Company Act’s Sections 3(c)(1) 
and 3(c)(7) exemptions.  This is because several important non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) 
exemptions are primarily aimed at unconventional funds, which invest in 
non-securities or real estate.  As a result, traditional private equity advisers 
will be unable to sidestep the new regulations of the Dodd-Frank Act, most 
notably the Volcker Rule and Form PF, which apply to advisers who advise 
Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exempt funds. 
However, this article predicts a more flexible adaptive approach for 
private equity real estate investment advisers, rather than rigid compliance 
with the new rules.  In order to alleviate over-regulation dangers for private 
equity real estate, especially in light of the fact that private equity real 
estate does not pose systemic risk concerns and possesses typically only 
moderate investment risks, this paper sets forth new paths for private equity 
real estate advisers through the new regulatory landscape.  This paper 
shows how private equity real estate investment advisers will likely forge 
new strategies in the new regulatory landscape following Dodd-Frank, 
which will lighten their compliance and administrative costs.  It is 
important to realize that such trailblazing possibilities are beneficial to 
society; private equity real estate should not bear substantial costs because 
it does not generate systemic risks.  Otherwise, the Dodd-Frank Act will 
 
The interpretation of Section 202(a)(11) is subject to considerable nuance. 
 29.  Section 3(c)(1) generally exempts from the definition of “investment company,” 
“Any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially 
owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not 
presently propose to make a public offering of its securities.”  Investment Company Act of 
1940 § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006). 
 30.  Section 3(c)(7) generally exempts “[a]ny issuer, the outstanding securities of which 
are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are 
qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make a 
public offering of such securities.”  Id. § 80a-3(7)(A). 
 31.  SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF 1, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) 
(emphasis in original). 
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over-regulate private equity real estate. 
Private equity real estate advisers will naturally feel inclined to 
navigate the regulatory landscape in the most advantageous way possible, 
given their liberal view that light regulation is essential for faster economic 
growth and given the considerable compliance costs Dodd-Frank would 
otherwise impose on them.  This paper attempts to provide the groundwork 
for regulatory navigation and to explain why this behavior will help avoid 
the dangers of private equity over-regulation, since private equity real 
estate does not pose systemic risk concerns. 
In regards to the Advisers Act generally, private equity real estate 
investment advisers might be able to sidestep the Act by avoiding 
investment advice about “securities.”  In addition, private equity real estate 
advisers might be able to sidestep the Volcker Rule or other new additional 
regulations applicable to advisers to (c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds, by 
restructuring their funds into non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds.  As discussed 
above, many important non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act 
exemptions are aimed at funds that invest in non-securities or real estate. 
This article posits that these new paths will be acceptable to the 
regulators, given the long-standing tradition of regulators’ classifying non-
securities real estate investments as falling outside the scope of the 
Advisers Act, and given both the absence of systemic risk concerns as well 
as the typically merely moderate investment risks of private equity real 
estate in general.  The absence of systemic risk concerns posed by private 
equity real estate is further evidenced by the fact that the finalized version 
of Form PF mandates certain registered investment advisers to report risk 
exposure statistics but there is no indication that it applies to private equity 
real estate funds that utilize non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions. 
More specifically, Part II expounds the policy analysis for the 
legitimacy of these side roads through the new regulatory landscape, given 
the lack of systemic risk concerns posed by private equity real estate.  It 
explains the meaning of systemic risks and presents strong evidence for the 
low systemic risks posed by private equity real estate.  With respect to the 
Advisers Act, the author argues for the validity of the private equity real 
estate advisers’ intention to be exempt from the Advisers Act by 
exclusively investing in non-securities, which regulators have 
acknowledged as falling outside the scope of the Advisers Act.
32
  
Regarding regulations applicable to investment advisers of “private funds” 
(i.e., (c)(1)/(c)(7) funds), the author postulates that it was likely the 
 
 32.  See Regulation of Investment Advisers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N 3 (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf [hereinafter 
Regulation of Investment Advisers] (“The SEC staff has stated that advice about real estate, 
coins, precious metals, or commodities is not advice about securities.”). 
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regulators’ intention to have left non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions in the hands 
of private equity real estate to bypass such regulations, since, for example, 
the SEC’s finalization of Form PF did not apply to private equity real estate 
funds utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions. 
Regarding the Volcker Rule, this paper provides compelling evidence 
that the regulators should not use their discretion to apply the Volcker Rule 
against private equity real estate advisers utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) 
exemptions, since private equity real estate does not generate systemic risk 
concerns and possesses typically only moderate investment risks.  The 
author strongly urges the joint agencies charged with issuing a final ruling 
on the Volcker Rule not to apply the Volcker Rule against private equity 
real estate utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds.  Further, it would not 
be in the best interest of society to apply the Volcker Rule against private 
equity real estate, given that private equity real estate has had a central role 
in the recovery of the real estate markets following the financial crisis of 
2008. 
In order to assist private equity real estate advisers with the new 
regulatory landscape, this article sets forth the compliance framework for 
how private equity real estate advisers could determine whether they are 
advising about “securities” under the Advisers Act.  Part III of this article 
begins by explaining how private equity real estate investment advisers, 
who would otherwise fall within the definition of an “investment adviser” 
and be subject to U.S. jurisdiction,
33
 may structure their operations so as 
not to be subject to the Advisers Act - or potentially even to applicable 
state law.
34
  Avoiding advising about “securities” would theoretically 
prevent private equity real estate investment advisers from having to 
register with the SEC, and would likely prevent them from being subject to 
relevant Advisers Act regulations, both of which they would otherwise find 
burdensome.  In principle, this type of structuring would also likely permit 
the funds that private equity real estate advisers advise to bypass the 
Investment Company Act and the Volcker Rule, since these funds would 
become non-securities funds, and thus usually not “investment companies” 
within the meaning of the Investment Company Act. 
However, the downside of this type of structuring is that it could 
severely limit the types of investments about which a private equity real 
 
 33.  The analysis in Part I of this article assumes that a real estate investment adviser is 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction.  See Seth Chertok, A Comprehensive Guide to Title IV of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and the Rules Promulgated Thereunder, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 125 
(2012) for a discussion of how investment advisers become subject to U.S. jurisdiction.  
One way of avoiding the issues raised by this article is to structure the investment adviser so 
that it is not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in which case the Advisers Act would not apply. 
 34.  The definition of “investment adviser,” according to most states’ securities laws, is 
similar to that found in the Advisers Act. 
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estate investment adviser could provide investment advice.  Many types of 
real estate investments potentially have a securities aspect to them, such as, 
without limitation, passive entity investments, mortgage-backed securities 
and mortgage participation interests.
35
  This limitation might be workable 
for many types of private equity real estate advisers, since most types of 
private equity real estate funds really strive to engage in operating and 
developing real properties, and don’t target securities investments. 
Nonetheless determining whether a real estate investment is a security 
often entails resolutions of complex, fact-specific securities questions under 
federal and state law, although hopefully the guidance provided by this 
article will ease some of that burden.  Inexperienced investment advisers 
may want to consult with experienced counsel to recognize and address 
these issues. 
Part IV considers how, in the event that a private equity real estate 
investment adviser could not shed the title of an “investment adviser” as 
defined by the Advisers Act, the adviser may want to restructure its real 
estate funds to benefit from non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act 
exemptions.  The Dodd-Frank Act contains several provisions that regulate 
investment advisers to “private funds,” including, without limitation, Form 
PF and the Volcker Rule.
36
  “Private funds,” a term added to the Advisers 
Act by the Dodd-Frank Act, includes an investment fund “that would be an 
investment company, as defined in Section 3 of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that 
Act.”
37
  By only advising funds that are non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds, 
such as funds exempt under Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 
3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) of the Investment Company Act, private equity real 
estate advisers may benefit in two ways.  The advisers may (1) be able to 
avoid provisions under the Advisers Act created by the Dodd-Frank Act 
that regulate “private funds” and (2) possibly bypass the Volcker Rule, 
should the joint agencies limit their discretion by not applying the Volcker 
Rule against non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds.  The author strongly 
recommends that the joint agencies limit their discretion in this regard, 
 
 35.  See infra Part II for a discussion of when these investments are considered to 
involve securities. 
 36.  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 404, 415-16, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1571, 1578-79, 1620 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of 
U.S.C.)(limiting investment advisers to “private funds”). 
 37.  Dodd-Frank Act § 402(a).  The definition of an “investment company” is beyond 
the scope of this article, but subject to certain exceptions, the term generally includes, 
without limitation, most types of companies that (i) invest more than forty percent of their 
total assets (excluding government securities and cash) in securities on an unconsolidated 
basis or (ii) hold themselves out as primarily engaged in the business of investing in 
securities. Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(A), (C)(1940).  The interpretation of these 
requirements is very complex and subject to considerable nuance. 
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which is what they have proposed to do. 
Last, in Part V, this article analyzes the complex securities structuring 
considerations for private equity real estate funds seeking to rely upon the 
exemptions in Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 
3(c)(9) of the Investment Company Act.  Traditionally, many private equity 
real estate funds have relied upon Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the 
Investment Company Act due to the fact that the exemptions under 
Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) require a 
more complicated securities analysis.  Relying upon the Section 3(a)(1), 
3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) exemptions would therefore 
entail considerable compliance hurdles.  By laying down the compliance 
groundwork for private equity real estate investment advisers seeking to 
rely upon non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions, the author hopes to ease the 
burdens of the complexity of the relevant securities analysis.  Private equity 
real estate investment advisers seeking to avoid their funds being deemed 
“private funds” will have to balance the burden of these compliance hurdles 
against any potential benefits under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
I. POLICY ANALYSIS 
 This article focuses on two major aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
impact on private equity real estate regulation: (1) the Advisers Act 
registration; and (2) the portions of the Dodd-Frank Act that regulate 
investment advisers to “private funds,” most significantly, but not limited 
to, the Volcker Rule and Form PF.  If private equity real estate advisers are 
able to sidestep the Advisers Act, they will avoid the Advisers Act 
registration and regulatory impact created by the Dodd-Frank entirely 
(including very likely the Volcker Rule).  If this cannot be accomplished, 
the private equity real estate advisers could still seek alternative solutions, 
such as seeking non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act exemptions, to 
sidestep the portions of the Dodd-Frank Act pertinent to “private funds” 
investment advisers. 
As summarized in the introduction, the author argues for the 
legitimacy of the advisers seeking to sidestep both (1) and (2) mentioned 
above, because of the liberal stance taken by the SEC toward non-securities 
real estate investments and because of the SEC’s finalization of Form PF, 
which does not apply to private equity real estate funds utilizing non-
(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions. 
Furthermore, the author believes that regulators likely intended these 
new side paths, since private equity real estate does not generate systemic 
risk concerns. 
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A. Systemic Risk Concerns of Private Equity Real Estate 
Before tackling new routes to navigate through the rocky regulatory 
landscape, one must ask whether adapting to regulation is positive for 
society from a policy perspective.  This article answers in the affirmative.  
In order to arrive at this answer, it is necessary to recap the legislative 
history of Title IV and the Volcker Rule of Dodd-Frank. 
As discussed in the introduction, the legislative history for Title IV 
notes that Title IV requires many previously exempt advisers to register 
with a primary intention to monitor hedge fund systemic risks.  The 
legislative history for the Volcker Rule suggests that Congress sought to 
apply the Volcker Rule to (1) banking investments that might be too risky, 
(2) banking investments that might threaten American financial stability or 
give rise to systemic risks and (3) banking investments that might result in 
the need for another bank bailout at the expense of taxpayers. 
This section will ultimately show that none of the concerns of Title IV 
or the Volcker Rule applies to private equity real estate.  However, in order 
to show that this is true, we must first understand the exact meaning of 
“systemic risks.” 
1. Systemic Risks Defined 
“There is . . . a great deal of confusion about what types of risk are 
truly ‘systemic’ – the term meaning ‘[o]f or pertaining to a system’. . . .”
38
  
“As a result, the ‘very definition [of systemic risk] is still somewhat 
unsettled.’”
39
  This is problematic for society.  “If a problem cannot be 
defined, it cannot be solved – or, at least, it cannot be efficiently solved – 
because confusion over the nature of the problem can obscure attempts to 
provide solutions.”
40
 
In his 2008 paper “Systemic Risk,” Professor Schwarcz sorts through 
the different threads of “systemic risk” definitions to create a synthesized 
definition that functions for regulatory purposes.  The article begins by 
noting: 
A common factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is 
that a trigger event, such as an economic shock or institutional 
failure, causes a chain of bad economic consequences – 
sometimes referred to as a domino effect.  These consequences 
could include (a chain of) financial institution and/or market 
failures.  Less dramatically, these consequences might include (a 
 
 38.  Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 196. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 197. 
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chain of) significant losses to financial institutions or substantial 
financial-market price volatility.  In either case, the consequences 
impact financial institutions, markets, or both.
41
 
Schwarcz describes the most serious direct consequences of systemic 
failure as the failure of banks and other financial institutions, which, 
“[E]specially in large numbers, can deprive society of capital and increase 
its cost.”
42
  While Schwarcz’s ideas are very helpful, they do not provide a 
tool to assess whether an investment scheme generates systemic risks. 
One simple analogy to the financial systemic effect is a physical 
network of nodes, composed of metal balls and linked by metal chains, 
where the vibration of one node is violent enough to break the whole 
network of chains and balls.  The physical property of the network is such 
that three characteristics of its components would determine the 
breakability of the whole network: (1) The weight of a given ball, relative 
to the total mass of the network; the heavier it is, the larger percentage of 
its weight is in the total weight of the network, the more likely its vibration 
will lead to the breakage of the network; (2) The strength of a given ball’s 
connections to the rest of the nodes along the chains; the stronger its 
connections to the other nodes, the higher the chance is for it to exert a 
systemic impact on the whole network; (3) The resonant tendency between 
a given ball and other balls across the chains; the more closely the ball’s 
oscillations match the system’s natural frequency of vibration, the more 
likely that its own violent motions may lead to a catastrophic collapse of 
the whole system, a phenomenon known in physics as “resonance disaster.” 
So, what significance does a physical chain of nodes carry for the 
financial systemic effect of our interest?  Interestingly, many financial 
phenomena operate under similar laws as physical phenomena in life.  The 
translation of the above three characteristics into economic terms would be: 
(1) The industry size of an investment scheme or group of financial 
institutions, relative to the markets in which they operate, and possibly 
other markets that might subsequently be affected by them; (2) The 
financial and operational connections between one investment scheme and 
other markets as well as the causal relationship between them; (3) The 
synchronization between one investment scheme’s gain/loss and other 
types of schemes’ gain/loss across the markets, with or without possible 
time delays. 
A classic example of financial institution systemic failure often 
referred to by economic scholars is “a ‘bank run,’ in which the inability of 
a bank to satisfy withdrawal-demands causes its failure, in turn causing 
 
 41.  Id. at 198. 
 42.  Id. 
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other banks or their creditors to fail.”
43
  If a bank cannot pay all 
withdrawal-demands, it will default and ultimately fail, possibly causing a 
“chain of subsequent failures [to] occur because banks are closely 
intertwined financially.  They lend to and borrow from each other, hold 
deposit balances with each other, and make payments through the interbank 
clearing system . . . .”
44
  This example suits the aforementioned second 
characteristic of a financial network component that is prone to generate a 
systemic effect on the whole network. 
2. Why PERE Itself Poses No Direct Systemic Risks 
Unlike banks, private equity real estate does not seem to suit any one 
of the three characteristics mentioned above.  First, it constitutes a very 
small industry size in comparison to many other types of investment 
schemes, such as hedge funds and banks.  PERE likely has less than one-
tenth of the assets of the private equity industry as a whole, and a tiny 
fraction of the trillions of dollars in assets that banks possess.
45
 
Second, the financial connections between private equity real estate 
and markets are significantly weaker than, say, hedge funds and banks.  
Hedge funds have exposure to a wide variety of markets via derivatives 
transactions and their broad investment strategies, but PERE strategies are 
much narrower and they don’t do much with derivatives.  Banks have 
inherent exposure to many markets via derivatives transactions and 
interbank lending, among other things. 
In terms of synchronization, PERE has often desynchronized 
investment returns with other investment schemes.  David Geltner, Norman 
G. Miller, Jim Clayton, and Piet Eichholtz observed stocks, real estate 
long-term bonds, and t-bills, concluding: 
[T]he four major asset classes . . . do not all “move together” in 
their investment performance.  That is, they do not always tend to 
all do well at the same time, or all do poorly at the same time.  
The correlation among their periodic returns is generally only 
moderately positive.
46
 
Therefore, it is unlikely that private equity real estate will pose 
systemic risks through its sheer industry size, its financial connections or 
the synchronization of its investment returns with other investment 
schemes’ returns across the markets. 
 
 43.  Id. at 199. 
 44.  Id.  
45.   See infra Part I.A.3.a. 
 46.  DAVID M. GELTNER, ET AL., COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE: ANALYSIS AND 
INVESTMENTS 137-38 (Sara Glassmeyer et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014). 
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3. Comparisons Between Hedge Funds And Private Equity Real 
Estate Funds 
Private equity real estate funds are a type of “private funds,” meaning 
funds exempt from the Investment Company Act, just like hedge funds.  It 
is important to compare hedge funds and private equity real estate funds, 
which are, in many respects, regulated similarly and thus tend to be seen by 
inexperienced financial or legal personnel as imposing the same level of 
risks, either on their investments or on the capital markets as a whole.  It is 
worth noting that the risk of a particular type of investment is different 
from the risk it imposes on the whole financial system; the former is 
investment risk, and the latter is systemic risk. 
Some view the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act as not only a cure 
for poor mortgage lending practices but also as providing necessary 
preventative measures against any systemic risks posed by hedge funds, 
especially because a parallel could be drawn between bank systemic risk 
and the kind of risk posed by hedge funds.  For example, in either instance,  
market shocks triggered institutional failures which in turn led, or 
could have led, to a chain of institutional and market failures. . . . 
Both also were transmitted through linkages in a chain of 
relationships: in bank systemic risk, the linkages are interbank 
borrowings and the interbank clearing system for payments; in 
LTCM, the linkages arose from its derivatives-based hedging 
strategy with other institutions, which, in turn, had linkages with 
yet other institutions and markets.
47
 
Such a view is possibly further strengthened by additional explanations for 
why hedge funds might give rise to systemic risk: (1) derivatives trades, (2) 
the size of industry, (3) runs on prime brokers, (4) short selling, (5) usage 
of leverage, (6) illiquidity, (7) mortgage-backed securities exposure, and 
(8) lack of adequate information.
48
  Of course, not everyone agrees that 
hedge funds do give rise to systemic risks, but if they were to generate 
systemic risk concerns, the foregoing explains why they might do so. 
But the same systemic risks concerns are not applicable to private 
equity real estate funds, which have a much smaller industry size, as well 
as far fewer financial connections and the absence of synchronization.  
Private equity real estate funds have several key structural differences from 
hedge funds. 
 
 47.  Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 201 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 48.  See generally Lloyd Dixon, Noreen Clancy & Krishna B. Kumar, Hedge Funds 
and Systemic Risk, RAND CORP. 63, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1236.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2013) (identifying “six areas of concern regarding hedge funds’ potential 
contribution to systemic risk . . . .”). 
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a. Derivatives Trades 
Compared to hedge funds, which many believe carry a large-size 
exposure to other institutions and market participants by virtue of their 
derivatives activities,
49
 the real estate derivatives market for private equity 
real estate is very slim in the United States. 
Before the financial crisis, 
In the U.K., [real estate] derivatives trading has been growing, 
with GBP 3.9 billion, or about $7.9 billion, in trades in the first 
six months of this year matching the total for all of 2006.  In 
contrast, the U.S. market has struggled to take off.  While there 
are no formal data, experts suggest that trades total in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars rather than billions.
50
 
This is a tiny fraction of the notional value of U.S. total derivatives, which 
was estimated estimated as $182.2 trillion in 2008.
51
  While it might be 
possible in the future that private equity real estate could be sufficiently 
exposed to derivatives, we are an extremely long way off from such an 
occurrence. 
It should also be noted that Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act subjects 
OTC derivatives (i.e., one counterparty faces another counterparty), “even 
hedges executed by non-financial end users,” to “regulatory oversight and 
new requirements.”
52
  That should plug the regulatory gap in derivatives.  
Title VII, combined with the very tiny size of the real derivatives market, 
makes it highly unlikely for private equity real estate to pose systemic 
risks. 
 
 49.  See Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 203 (“In [Long-Term Capital Management], the 
potential for systemic risk existed not by reason of its intrinsic status as a hedge fund but by 
the sheer size of its exposure to other institutions and market participants.”). 
 50.  Molly Dover, Real-Estate Finance: How Derivatives Give Shelter – Financial-
Market Uncertainty May be Catalyst for Big Boost in Instruments in U.S., U.K., WALL ST. 
J., Sep. 26, 2007, at B7. 
 51.  OCC Reports Second Quarter Bank Trading Revenue of $1.6 Billion, OFFICE OF 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/news-releases/2008/nr-occ-2008-115.html [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER] (“[T]he notional amount of derivatives held by insured U.S. commercial 
banks increased by $1.8 trillion in the second quarter, or 1 percent, to $182 trillion.”). 
 52.  Dodd-Frank’s Title VII – OTC Derivatives Reform: Important Answers for Board 
Members as Companies Begin the Road to Reform, ERNST & YOUNG 1, 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Key_questions_board_members_should_ask_a
bout_Title_VII/$FILE/Americas_FAAS_Dodd_Frank_derivatives_reform.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2013). 
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b. The Size of Industry 
Given the small real estate derivatives market, the size of private 
equity real estate’s exposure to other institutions and market participants is 
most likely to be minimal.  The small exposure of private equity real estate 
is further supported by the small industry size of private equity real estate 
compared to the size of hedge funds.  As mentioned previously, as of the 
third quarter of 2013, there were “468 private equity real estate funds 
(targeting assets rather than other funds) seeking an aggregate of $154 
[billion] in capital commitments].”
53
  Compare that number to hedge funds.  
As of late 2012, “[g]lobal hedge funds now [oversaw] $2.2 trillion in 
assets. . . .”
54
  Even hedge funds as an industry represent a relatively small 
size.  “As of September 30, 2010, the global mutual fund industry managed 
$23.7 trillion in assets, and the top 50 U.S. bank holding companies alone 
had $14.4 trillion in assets.”
55
 
In addition, hedge funds account for a very large percentage of trading 
activity in many markets.  “A 2007 study found that hedge funds accounted 
for 25 to 60 percent of the turnover in the markets examined.”
56
  Private 
equity real estate, however, accounts for only a small percentage of 
transactions in the real estate markets.  Even Public Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (“REITs”), which potentially carry a much bigger industry market 
capitalization (approximately $603.4153 billion
57
 in 2012) than private 
equity real estate, “control only a fraction of all commercial property 
investment.  In real estate, it is not uncommon for individual or institutional 
investors to effectively own the underlying productive assets directly, with 
no corporate-level entity involved in the investment decision-making 
process.”
58
  It is  estimated that “[t]he [“pure-play”] real estate asset class 
total value [is] approximately $17 trillion . . . [including] residential as well 
as commercial property. . . .”
59
 
Therefore, the industry size of private equity real estate is quite small, 
compared to that of other types of industries and investment schemes.  The 
small size of private equity real estate gauged from several different 
 
 53.  Mather, supra note 5.  
 54.  Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Hedge Funds Reach Record Size Thanks to Recent Strong 
Returns, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2012, 10:59 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/18/us-hedgefunds-flows-
idUSBRE89H0XT20121018. 
 55.  Dixon et al., supra note 48, at 14. 
 56.  Id. at 14-15. 
 57.  Historical REIT Industry Market Capitalization: 1972-2012, REIT.COM, 
http://www.reit.com/DataAndResearch/US-REIT-Industry-MarketCap.aspx (last visited 
Sep. 20, 2013). 
 58.  GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 287. 
 59.  Id. at 136, n.16. 
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perspectives suggests that it doesn’t generate systemic risks. 
c. Use of Prime Brokers 
Hedge funds may have contributed to systemic risk during 2008 
partially because “hedge fund managers withdrew tens of billions of dollars 
in assets from prime brokers and their parent investment banks.  These 
withdrawals were essentially a run on the bank, analogous to bank runs by 
individual depositors during the Great Depression, and contributed to the 
financial crisis.”
60
  “Prime brokers provide a centralized securities clearing 
facility, handle a hedge fund’s collateral, and may provide financing to 
hedge fund clients to facilitate trades.”
61
  However, not all believe that 
hedge funds contributed to significant losses at prime brokers.  “[T]here is 
little indication that hedge fund losses led to significant losses at prime 
brokers and other creditors.  It appears that prime brokers and other hedge 
fund creditors required adequate margin and collateral to protect 
themselves against hedge fund losses.”
62
 
It is also worth mentioning that: 
The reforms go a long way in addressing factors that can lead to 
hedge fund runs on prime brokers.  Dodd-Frank contains 
provisions that protect the margin that hedge funds post with 
prime brokers on their derivatives positions.  A prime broker 
must segregate these assets from its own account for certain types 
of swaps and give a party the option of segregating the assets for 
others.  These new provisions should reduce the incentives for 
hedge funds to withdraw funds from their prime brokers at the 
first sign of trouble.
63
 
In contrast to hedge funds, private equity real estate funds typically do 
not use prime brokers, so another potential avenue of systemic risk would 
not occur in the case of private equity real estate. 
d. Short Selling 
Short selling (or “shorting”) is a central part of many hedge fund 
investment strategies, and hedge fund shorting has been blamed for 
contributing to the financial crisis.  The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
 
 60.  Dixon et al., supra note 48, at xviii. 
 61.  Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: 
Regulating Prime Brokers will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 283, 290 (2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1297188. 
 62.  Dixon et al., supra note 48, at xv-xvi. 
 63.  Id. at xx. 
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Commission’s (SEC’s) ban on shorting financial stocks between September 
19 and October 8, 2008, indicates that at least some in government were 
concerned about the impact of short selling.
64
 
Concern remains that short selling by a large hedge fund or multiple 
hedge funds can result in an unjustified fall in stock prices or can cause a 
decline in the real value of the firm.  The decline might be so rapid that 
there is no opportunity for the firm to dispel rumors about its financial 
health or for investors to provide additional capital before the firm 
collapses.  Such collapses can pose a risk to the financial system and 
reduce the level of economic activity.
65
 
However, “[a]lthough some studies identify short selling as a 
significant contributor to the financial crisis, the bulk of research does not 
conclude that short selling played a major role.”
66
  Nonetheless, the Dodd-
Frank Act does contain provisions to regulate short selling. 
Whatever the merits of this position, private equity real estate funds 
invest the vast majority of their funds in real estate properties, for which 
there is no real short selling market.  As Geltner et al. pointed out, “[i]n real 
estate, short sales are impossible in reality. . . .”
67
  While it is possible that 
private equity real estate funds might do some short selling of mortgage-
backed securities, redirecting private equity real estate toward the non-
(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions, several of which are aimed at funds that invest in 
non-securities and real estate investments, would generally limit the 
amount of mortgage-backed securities that a private equity real estate fund 
could invest in, and would consequently limit the amount of mortgage-
backed securities short sales. 
e. Usage of Leverage 
“The use of debt to finance an equity investment creates what is called 
‘leverage’ in the equity investment, because it allows equity investors to 
magnify the amount of underlying physical capital they control (which may 
also magnify the risk and return performance of the equity).”
68
  “Leverage 
affects the ex ante equity risk premium in just such a way that the benefit of 
the additional expected return is exactly offset by the cost of the additional 
risk, as evaluated by the capital market.”
69
 
King and Maier, who discussed the potential systemic risks posed by 
hedge fund leverage, explained: 
 
 64.  Id. at xvii. 
 65.  Id. at xxi. 
 66.  Id. at xvii. 
 67.  GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 711, n.6. 
 68.  Id. at 287. 
 69.  Id. at 296. 
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A direct channel occurs when a collapse of a hedge fund (or 
group of hedge funds) leads to forced liquidations of their 
positions at fire-sale prices.  The impact on asset prices may be 
amplified through the use of leverage – whether created directly 
using margin or indirectly using derivatives.  If the positions are 
large, relative to the liquidity of the asset, a disorderly unwinding 
could generate heavy losses to counterparties, and ultimately 
contribute to financial distress at one or more systematically 
important financial institutions.
70
 
Their article further noted that “[i]n the indirect channel, forced hedge fund 
liquidation exacerbates market volatility and reduces liquidity in other 
financial markets, potentially leading to contagion.”
71
 
In contrast, the typical leverage used by private equity real estate 
funds is generally very moderate, which would decrease the risk of forced 
liquidations.  Ernst and Young reports that in 2007, private equity real 
estate funds averaged leverage in the 65%-75% range, while their 2011 
trend averaged leverage in the 60%-70% range.
72
  In practice, though, many 
private equity real estate funds utilize even lower leverage than that.  
“Traditionally core investment funds employed little or no financial 
leverage, but by the 2000s they were often using modest amounts of debt, 
up to 20%-30% loan-to-value ratios (LTVs).”
73
  “Perhaps most 
significantly, the value-added style traditionally allows considerably more 
financial leverage than the core style, with typical LTVs in the 
neighborhood of 50 percent or slightly more.  This is still conservative by 
the standards of many real estate investors . . . .”
74
  In contrast, for hedge 
funds, one recent article noted that “hedge fund managers reported leverage 
of 3.4 [i.e. 340%], on average.”
75
 
This said, Dixon et al. suggested that even hedge funds don’t 
necessarily even pose systemic risks on account of leverage:  “[I]t appears 
that hedge funds typically have a much lower rate of leverage on average 
(two to three times leveraged) than other segments of the financial sector 
 
 70.  King & Maier, supra note 61, at 286.  
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Trends Facing Real Estate Private Equity: Changes to Fund Structuring Terms, 
ERNST & YOUNG, http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Industries/Real-Estate/Trends-facing-real-
estate-private-equity—-Changes-to-fund-structuring-terms (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) 
[hereinafter Changes to Fund Structuring Terms].  
 73.  GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 680. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Katya Wachtel, Unstructured Finance: Hedge Funds Love Affair with Leverage 
Still on Hiatus, for Now, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/unstructuredfinance/2012/10/05/hedge-funds-love-affair-with-
leverage-still-on-hiatus-for-now.  
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(investment banks are often leveraged between 14 and 40 times).”
76
 
Therefore, given that private equity real estate fund leverage is 
typically very moderate, it further supports the argument that private equity 
real estate doesn’t generate systemic risks. 
f. Illiquidity 
Recent academic research suggests that it is increasingly important to 
pay attention to the liquidity of hedge fund investments, and regulators 
should realize that, even if no one hedge fund may be large enough to pose 
a systemic risk to the financial system, negative shocks can cause hedge 
funds as a group to unwind their positions at the same time, with 
ramifications cascading through the economy.
77
 
In other words, the concern is that “the buildup of highly leveraged, 
illiquid hedge fund portfolios and massive deleveraging when prime 
brokers or investors withdraw credit and capital in response to a financial 
shock.”
78
  As noted above, “If the positions are large, relative to the 
liquidity of the asset, a disorderly unwinding could generate heavy losses to 
counterparties, and ultimately contribute to financial distress at one or more 
systematically important financial institutions.”
79
 
Although private equity real estate investments may also be illiquid, 
meaning that they might be difficult to easily sell without a substantial loss 
in value, given the tiny size of the industry, and the fact that it accounts for 
only a fraction of the activities that occur in the real estate markets, it is 
highly unlikely that the illiquidity of its investments would pose systemic 
risks.  As discussed in the introduction, the weak financial connection and 
absence of synchronization would also support the argument that private 
equity real estate doesn’t generate systemic risks. 
g. Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Some argue that hedge funds give rise to systemic concerns because 
“hedge funds invested in the mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”s) and 
collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”s) that contributed to the buildup of 
the housing bubble.”
80
  However, others also argue that hedge funds did not 
contribute to systemic risks in this respect: 
[B]y shorting subprime mortgages and banks that were heavily 
 
 76.  Dodd-Frank: The Road Ahead, supra note 25, at 2.  
 77.  Dixon et al., supra note 48, at xxiii.  
 78.  Id. at xxv. 
 79.  King & Maier, supra note 61, at 286. 
 80.  Dixon et al., supra note 48, at xvi. 
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exposed to subprime debt, hedge funds called attention to the 
growing bubble.  They also provided funds to this market at the 
trough of the crash, possibly limiting further declines.  In light of 
these opposing factors, no strong case can be made that hedge 
funds were a significant contributor to the financial crisis through 
the buildup of the housing bubble.
81
 
Whatever the merits of the above arguments, despite the possibility of 
private equity real estate funds investing in mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities, it is highly improbable that private equity real estate 
would lead to systemic risk by virtue of its investments in mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities.  This is because the Dodd-Frank Act should 
cure any problems with poor mortgage lending practices and the resulting 
problems with mortgage-backed securities.  In addition, by redirecting 
private equity real estate funds toward non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions, 
several of which are aimed at funds that invest in non-securities and real 
estate, it would further limit the ability of private equity real estate to 
become involved in mortgage-backed securities.  Finally, it’s unusual for 
private equity real estate funds to focus on investing in mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities.  Instead, the vast majority of their investments 
are in various types of real properties. 
h. Lack of Information 
“Following the LTCM collapse and during the financial crisis, 
regulators complained about the lack of transparency in hedge fund 
positions, leverage, and asset valuation and were frustrated by their 
inability to collect data on hedge funds.”
82
  Form PF “aggressively 
addresses gaps in the information available to regulators on hedge fund 
operations, investment strategies, and investment positions.  The legislation 
will also result in far more information being available on derivatives 
trades, trades that were at the heart of the financial crisis, and short sales.”
83
  
The regulators have already finalized Form PF, and they haven’t sought to 
apply it against private equity real estate.  As shown above, private equity 
real estate doesn’t engage in many derivatives trades, and engages in no 
short sales.  Further, as demonstrated through all the evidence presented 
above, private equity real estate doesn’t generate systemic risks.  Therefore, 
a lack of information concern doesn’t apply to private equity real estate. 
i. Summary of Comparisons Between Hedge Funds and Private 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at xviii-xix.  
 83.  Id. at xix. 
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Equity Real Estate Funds 
The table below summarizes the key differences between the two 
types of funds, in terms of the systemic risk concerns of either fund.  It is 
worth noting that the systemic risk concerns of hedge funds don’t 
necessarily indicate that they really do give rise to systemic risks, but only 
reflect some scholarly opinions that they may raise concerns about such 
potential risks. 
 
 HEDGE FUNDS 
(HF) 
PRIVATE EQUITY 
REAL ESTATE 
FUNDS (PEREF) 
SYSTEMIC RISK 
CONCERNS 
HF PEREF 
SIZE OF 
INDUSTRY  
Relatively 
Large 
(~2.2 trillion)
84
 
 
Relatively Small 
(~$154 billion)
85
 
 
Yes No 
DERIVATIVES 
MARKET 
25-60%
86
 Very Small
87
 Yes No 
USE OF PRIME 
BROKERS 
Relatively 
Large Exposure 
Tiny Exposure Yes No 
SHORT 
SELLING 
Yes  No Yes No 
USE OF 
LEVERAGE 
Moderate to 
High 
(Average is 
~340%)
88
 
Low to Moderate 
(Average is ~60-
70%)
89
 
Yes No 
ILLIQUIDITY Yes Yes Yes Unlikely
90
  
 
84.   Herbst-Bayliss, supra note 54. 
85.   Mather, supra note 5. 
86.   Dixon et al., supra note 48. 
87.   Even for REITs, which are a type of public real estate investment trusts that 
potentially carries a much bigger industry market capitalization (approximately $603.4153 
billion in 2012) than private equity real estate, according to Geltner, “REITs control only a 
fraction of all commercial property investment. In real estate, it is not uncommon for 
individual or institutional investors to effectively own the underlying productive assets 
directly, with no corporate-level entity involved in the investment decision-making 
process.”   Geltner et al., supra note 46, at 287.  Geltner, et al. estimate that “[t]he [“pure-
play”] real estate asset class total value [is] approximately $17 trillion … [including] 
residential as well as commercial property….”  Id. at 136. 
88.   Wachtel, supra note 75. 
89.   Changes to Fund Structuring Terms, supra note 72. 
90.   Due to small size, lack of connections and no synchronization. 
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MORTGAGE-
BACKED 
SECURITIES 
INVESTMENT 
Yes Very Limited  Yes No 
LACK OF 
INFORMATION 
Yes (before 
Dodd-Frank) 
No Yes No 
4. Indirect Systemic Risk Concerns of Banking Investments in PERE 
We have just shown that PERE itself poses no direct systemic risk 
concerns.  Let’s now do the following thought experiment.  Suppose that 
the markets are a body of water, which consists of streams, rivers, lakes, 
seas and oceans, and suppose that the banks are rivers feeding into the seas 
and oceans, and that PERE is a stream.  We already know that the stream 
itself has minimal effects on the whole water body, and therefore must not 
be directly connected with the big oceans in any major way.  But still, even 
though the stream doesn’t join the oceans by itself, the stream is still 
connected to the rivers, which feed into the seas and oceans.  Thus, 
although PERE itself poses no systemic risk concerns, could banking 
investments in PERE induce failures of banks, which would in turn give 
rise to a different form of systemic risk? 
Let’s consider a flow chart that demonstrates our problem at hand: 
 
Economy   Market   Banks   PERE   Real Estate Investments 
 
As we mentioned earlier, because of the strong connections between 
banks and various other financial entities in the markets, banks carry 
inherent systemic risks.  If we were to determine the possibility of a risk 
“ripple effect” across the flow chart illustrated above, namely, the back 
propagation of banks’ inherent risks through the market via potential 
contributing factors of PERE, what would be the factors we considered? 
Obviously, the inherent risks of PERE investments could potentially 
feed backward to the banks and propagate along the whole chain of the 
financial markets.  Most comfortingly, thus far our analysis of systemic 
risks has ruled out any direct systemic risk concerns of PERE itself.  But 
what about the investment risks of such funds, which conduct real estate 
investments? 
Last, but not least, recall one of the points in the legislative history of 
the Volcker Rule, which concerns the prohibitive effect of the Volcker 
Rule to “reduce the scale, complexity, and interconnectedness of those 
banks that . . . have hedge fund or private equity exposure.”
91
 What are the 
 
91.   S. Rep. No.  111-176, at 8 (2010).   
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nature and strength of PERE’s connection with the banks?  In the ensuing 
subsections, we will examine these factors, one by one. 
5. The Typically Moderate Investment Risks of Private Equity Real 
Estate. 
The portfolio of each PERE fund varies from case to case, but in 
general, most PERE funds largely invest in operational real estate 
(including improvement properties), and then moderately in land.  
However, many types of PERE funds don’t invest in land at all. The local 
investment risks of these real estate investments are examined below. 
6. Risk Assessment of Real Estate Investments 
One point that greatly favors real estate as an investment target is that, 
like most investments that carry a cyclical characteristic, it is historically an 
investment with a low to moderate risk profile in comparison with many 
other types of investments.  A book entitled Commercial Real Estate 
Analysis and Investments provides a table on the stereotypical 
characterization of major investment asset classes. 
INVESTMENT 
CONCERN 
STOCKS REAL 
ESTATE* 
LONG-
TERM 
BONDS** 
CASH(T-BILLS) 
Risk High Moderate to 
Low*** 
Moderate to 
Low*** 
Lowest 
Total Return High Moderate Moderate Lowest 
Current Yield Low High Highest Moderate 
Growth High Low None None**** 
Inflation 
Protection 
LR. 
Good 
Good Bad Best (if 
reinvested) 
 
* Unlevered institutional quality commercial property (fully 
operational, “stabilized”). 
** Investment grade corporate or government bonds. 
*** Low risk for investors with long-term horizons and deep pockets, 
so they can hold the assets to maturity or until prices are favorable.  
Moderate risk for investors fully exposed to asset market price volatility. 
**** Unless the investment is rolled over (reinvested), in which case 
there is no current yield.
92
 
 
The authors of this book go on to note: 
 
 92.  GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 137. 
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 [I]n the risk and return dimensions, unlevered investment in real 
estate tends to fall between stocks at one extreme and cash (or 
short-term bonds such as T-bills) at the other extreme.  In this 
regard, real estate is much like long-term bonds.  Unlike bonds, 
however, real estate provides some capital growth and relatively 
good inflation protection.
93
   
In addition, this table demonstrates that an asset class with low to moderate 
risks, fully operational unlevered institutional quality commercial property 
real estate offers an excellent combination of total return and current yield. 
The authors of the book make an additional observation:  They studied 
both the average annual total return from 1970-2010 as well as the annual 
volatility from 1970-2010 and noted that real estate had approximately an 
11% annual volatility level, while stocks had approximately an 18% annual 
volatility level.
94
  The authors note that volatility “is a basic way to measure 
the risk in an investment, because it indicates the range of variability in the 
investment performance outcomes across time.”
95
  On the side of the 
average annual total return, real estate had approximately a 10% return 
level, while stocks had an approximately 12% return level.
96
  While stocks 
exhibited volatility that was approximately 63.64% greater than real estate, 
they only appeared to generate returns that were 20% greater.
97
  That 
suggests that real estate likely delivers excellent risk-adjusted returns. 
Of course, the chart discussed above evaluates the characteristics of 
real estate on an unlevered basis.  But even in the leveraged case, the fact 
that PERE typically uses moderate leverage keeps the risks of leverage 
relatively moderate.  The observation that PERE funds averaged leverage 
in the 60-70% range in 2011,
98
 combined with the generally low volatility 
of the real estate markets, suggests only a moderate risk of leveraged assets 
for PERE investors.  The architects of the Volcker Rule were likely 
concerned about the amount of leverage used by hedge funds.
99
  One article 
noted that Long Term Capital Management (“LTCM”), a hedge fund that 
collapsed during the late 1990s, “had borrowed . . . a leverage factor of 
 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
97.   Id. 
 98.  Changes to Fund Structuring Terms, supra note 72. 
99.   Study and Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT 
COUNCIL 56 (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20fin
al%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf. 
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roughly thirty to one.”
100
  Of course, today hedge funds don’t typically 
borrow at that level.  One recent article noted that “hedge fund managers 
reported leverage of 3.4, on average.”
101
  It is therefore apparent that even 
the most leveraged variety of PERE funds are typically much less 
leveraged than hedge funds. 
Furthermore, when the volatility of PERE investments is computed 
with the consideration of leverage, leverage appears to increase the 
volatilities of PERE funds by a moderate amount.  For example, when a 
side-by-side comparison was made between the cumulative total returns 
(income plus capital appreciation) from 2000 through early 2012 as tracked 
by the NCREF Property Index (NPI)
102
 and by two institutional investor 
fund-level indices published by NCREIF in cooperation with the Townsend 
Group (an institutional investment consultancy),
103
 the NPI had quarterly 
volatility of 2.9%, the core funds index had quarterly volatility of 4.0% and 
the value-added funds index had quarterly volatility of 5.6%.
104
  This 
suggests that even compared to the unlevered commercial property 
investments, private equity real estate funds carry only moderately higher 
risks.  Given all this, one may view PERE as a relatively safe investment 
tool, even with the consideration of leverage.
105
 
The chart also only evaluates the investment characteristics of 
institutional quality commercial property, rather than other types of real 
estate investments.  Many private equity real estate funds invest in 
institutional quality commercial property, but some may invest in land or 
properties to be improved, which not only is riskier, but also carries the 
potential for greater returns that are commensurate with the additional 
risks.  As noted above, value-added funds, which invest in some property 
improvements, still exhibit moderate volatility. 
Land as an investment class is considerably riskier than other types of 
naked real estate investments.  Under the call option model of land value, 
“land is viewed as obtaining its value through the option it gives its owner 
 
100.   Alison K. Gary, Creating a Future Economic Crisis: Political Failure and the 
Loopholes of the Volcker Rule, 90 OR. L. REV. 1339, 1380 (2012) (internal citation omitted). 
101.   Wachtel, supra note 75. 
 102.  The NCREIF Property Index (NPI), available at http://www.ncreif.org/property-
index-returns.aspx, is a quarterly time series composite total rate of return measure of 
investment performance of a very large pool of individual commercial real estate properties 
(unlevered) acquired in the private market for investment purposes only. 
 103.  Unlike the NPI index, the NCREIF / Townsend indices are private equity real 
estate fund-level indices, which exemplify an “attempt to track the performance actually 
realized by investors in funds that invest in properties, rather than the performance achieved 
directly by the underlying properties.”  GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 679.  
 104.  Id. at 680. 
105.   Occasionally, a private equity real estate fund could use higher leverage that raises 
the investment risks, but the industry doesn’t trend in that direction. 
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to develop a structure on the land.  The land owner can obtain a valuable 
rent-paying asset upon the payment of the construction cost necessary to 
build the structure.”
106
  It’s worth noting that land effectively adds leverage 
to the funds’ investments.  When investing in land, the, 
[P]ortfolio of investments includes a long position in the 
underlying real estate asset (the forward commitment) and a short 
position in the construction costs (the leverage).  The 
combination of short and long cash flows is inherently levered 
because the cash outflows do not occur at the same time and 
because the construction costs are not perfectly and positively 
correlated with the value of the underlying asset.
107
 
Although land effectively adds leverage, “the option enables the landowner 
to avoid much of the negative consequences of the downside outcome of 
future market volatility, while still retaining the ability to profit from the 
upside.”
108
  Nonetheless, land has a risky side to it, since the decision to 
hold off on developing the land involves risks about what the future might 
bring. The value of the land option depends very sensitively on the 
difference between the construction costs and the value of what can be 
built.  “As investments, call options are much more risky than their 
underlying assets (in this case, the usage value of the built property), and 
hence require a much higher expected return.”
109
 
Despite the fact that land investments might significantly increase the 
risks of PERE, a footnote in the above chart noted that real estate is lower 
risk “for investors with long-term horizons and deep pockets, so they can 
hold the assets to maturity or until prices are favorable.”
110
  This is 
auspicious news for PERE, since PERE usually does have long-term 
investment horizons.
111
  The long-term horizon of PERE will clearly help 
offset short-term real estate market fluctuations, and therefore help ease the 
risks of land investments, even though land investments are still relatively 
risky.  Keep in mind, however, that many types of PERE funds have 
nothing to do with land investments. 
Another point worth noting is that Dodd-Frank requires 
banks to develop in-depth internal ratings methodologies to 
assess investment risk. As a result, regulators and boards will 
likely have higher expectations for the investment due diligence 
 
106.   GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 707. 
107.   Matthew S. Flowers, Show Me the Money: A Study of Real Estate Development 
Returns (July 31, 2008) (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 
available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/58645/315888415.pdf. 
108 .   GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 709. 
109.   Id. at 96. 
 110.  Id. at 137. 
 111.  Id. 
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processes banks and their external service provides have in place. 
Banks without the resources to develop these internal processes 
may be forced to significantly limit their investment opportunity 
set, possibly limiting earnings and diversification potential in the 
securities portfolio.
112
   
As a result, there is every reason to expect that banks will be reasonable 
about limiting their investments in PERE with higher investment risk 
profiles. 
During the financial crisis of 2008, it is highly likely that mortgage-
backed securities were even more toxic as an asset class than real estate 
itself.  During the crisis, banks had many trillions of dollars in exposure to 
toxic mortgage assets. In contrast, the PERE industry focuses primarily on 
operating and developing real properties, and not on investing in mortgage-
backed securities.  Furthermore, banks already have so much exposure to 
mortgage-backed securities that it is highly improbable that any secondary 
exposure from rare types of PERE funds would “tip the scales” and raise 
systemic risk concerns. 
There is more favorable news for PERE. One of the investments that 
arguably made hedge funds high risk was derivatives.  For PERE, the real 
estate derivatives market is currently very slim in the United States. While 
there is no formal data, experts suggest that trades total in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars rather than billions.
113
  This is obviously an extremely 
tiny fraction of the notional value of U.S. total derivatives, which was 
estimated to be $182.2 trillion in 2008.
114
 
Another source of risk for hedge funds that makes them very risky is 
short selling. “In real estate, short sales are impossible in reality . . . .”
115
  
That fact is also comforting. 
Some naysayers might argue that the financial crisis of 2008 was 
caused by the fact that banks were exposed to real estate investments.  
However, while real estate did suffer a particularly sharp decline after the 
financial crisis of 2008, that was an anomalous drop.  No other real estate 
crises since 1969 resulted in a drop of an even remotely comparable 
magnitude.  Figure 1 below shows the history of U.S. commercial real 
estate from December 1969 until December 2009. 
 
 
112.   Sabrina C. Callin and Justin J. Ayre, Rethinking Best Practices for Bank Investment 
Portfolios, PIMCO (May 2012), http://pimco.com/EN/insights/pages/rethinking-best-
practices-for-bank-investment-portfolios.aspx.   
113.   Dover, supra note 50. 
114.   OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, supra note 51. 
115.   GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 711. 
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FIGURE 1. The U.S. Institutional Commercial Property Prices over Recent 
Decades. 
More importantly, the sharp decline in the real estate markets after the 2008 
financial crisis was caused primarily by poor mortgage lending practices, 
which had both induced the real estate bubble and then burst it.  But the 
inauguration of the Dodd-Frank Act was intended to solve the root of these 
problems.  If the Dodd-Frank succeeds in its goals, in light of the history of 
real estate as an asset class and its characteristically low volatility, there is 
no reason to anticipate real estate will perform inconsistently with its 
historical characteristics.  However, if by any chance, the sweeping 
financial legislation suffers from an incomplete success and the nation 
encounters another large-scale market crash, it would be extremely difficult 
to envision real estate investment as the leading culprit of the potential 
crisis, given the fact that it wasn’t real estate investment itself but poor 
mortgage lending practices that triggered the 2008 financial crisis and that 
real estate has typically been one of the lower risk investment types in the 
nation’s financial history.  Keep in mind that if there were ever a future real 
estate crisis, banks would suffer great exposure to real estate risks via their 
mortgage practices, and any secondary exposure to real estate from PERE 
would be minimal.  Thus, the regulators should focus on the root of the 
problem, toxic mortgages, and avoid over-regulating PERE. 
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7. The Interconnectedness of Banks with PERE Funds and Other 
Investment Schemes 
Given the scope and magnitude of banks’ connections with other 
financial institutions as well as investment schemes, the connection 
between banks and PERE, depending on its strength, could potentially 
exaggerate the risks of PERE through bank’s multi-channeled connections 
with the whole financial market. But would such a connection be so strong 
that systemic risks could stem from such a typically moderate-risk 
investment scheme as PERE, or even from a higher risk investment scheme 
if a PERE fund were to invest in land? 
In order to answer this question, we will first inspect the percentage of 
banks’ investments in PERE relative to their whole investment portfolio, 
and then examine the fund contributions of banks to PERE. 
Overall, much evidence supports that BHCs are not too heavily 
invested in PERE.  First of all, below is a pie chart (Fig. 2) that illustrates 
the distribution of various investment targets in BHC investment portfolios. 
BHC investment portfolios, as of the end of 2011, accounted for $2.85 
trillion, which amounted to 21% of BHC total assets.
116
 
 
 
116.   Callin & Ayre, supra note 112. 
Agency MBS 
46% 
Agency 12% 
Foreign 10% 
Muni  8% 
Non Agency 
RMBS / CMBS  
8% 
Str Prod / ABS 
6% 
Treasuries 6% 
Corporate 3% 
Other 1% 
Banking investment portfolio 
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FIGURE 2. The distribution of investment targets in banks’ investment 
portfolios 
As the reader can see, 8% of banks’ investment portfolios are exposed 
to non-agency mortgage-backed securities, which aren’t guaranteed.  That 
gives banks exposure to real estate, regardless of their exposure to PERE. 
Outside of their investments, banks are also very often exposed to real 
estate through their mortgage lending practices.  In addition, banks invest 
3% of their portfolios in corporations and 10% of their portfolios in foreign 
securities.  Among all types of investment activities of banks, PERE is by 
no means the “frontrunner” of all others. 
Secondly, out of the “1% Other” banking investments shown above, 
only a small fraction of it has been invested in PERE.  Preqin has noted that 
“[b]anks accounted for 11% ($115bn) of the total capital invested in private 
equity funds in 2008, whereas this figure fell to 8% ($110bn) in 2011.”
117
  
This figure accounts for banking investments in all types of private equity 
funds.  The PERE industry is significantly smaller than the private equity 
industry.  Bain Capital recently noted that in 2012, the global private equity 
industry had “[a]lmost $2 trillion worth of assets on general partners’ books 
. . . .”
118
  One article notes that, as of Q3 2013, there were “468 private 
equity real estate funds (targeting assets rather than other funds) seeking an 
aggregate of $154 [billion] in capital commitments].”
119
  Thus, it appears 
that the aggregate size of PERE is less than 10% of the aggregate size of 
private equity as a whole.  In turn, that suggests that if banks have $110 
billion invested in private equity, they may only have as little as $10 billion 
invested in PERE.  Given that the investment assets of BHCs are likely 
around $2.85 trillion, that means that PERE may likely constitute as little 
as one-third of one percent of the investment assets of banks.  As a result, 
the connections between banks and PERE are very weak, and thus the 
potential for systemic risk is very low. 
Compare this figure to the level of banks’ exposure to mortgage loans 
and mortgage-backed securities.    Clearly, banks had and continue to have 
trillions and trillions of dollars in combined mortgage and MBS exposure.  
Banks as of 2012 had “two and a half trillion dollars in residential 
mortgage exposure” alone on its balance sheets.
120
  In 2009, “banks and 
 
 117.  Preqin Special Report: Banks as Investors in Private Equity, PREQIN 3, 
https://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/Preqin_Special_Report_Banks_as_Investors_in_Privat
e_Equity.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
118.    Global Private Equity Report 2012, supra note 4. 
119.    Mather, supra note 5. 
120.   Examining the Impact of the Proposed Rules to Implement Basel III Capital 
Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Insurance, Housing & Community 
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thrifts [held] about $1.7 trillion of commercial mortgages.”
121
  Commercial 
banks as of 2011 had $1.3 trillion in MBS exposure as well.
122
  Another 
article noted that banks probably lost “around half a trillion dollars” on 
“subprime mortgages.”
123
   Thus, banks were exposed to various mortgage 
dangers in an amount which exceeded banks’ exposure to PERE by a great 
many orders of magnitude. 
Currently banking investments in PERE is very low, but will this trend 
change over time, if regulations remain lenient?  The answer is that it is 
unlikely.  First off, as discussed above, banks in 2008 only invested $115 
billion in private equity funds as a whole.  There is every reason to think 
that, in spite of the Volcker Rule, banks will continue to allocate their 
private equity investments to a certain amount of non-real estate private 
equity, since the Volcker Rule contains a quite generous de minimis carve-
out on banking investments in non-real estate private equity.   Because of 
that carve-out, the connections between banks (the river) and traditional 
private equity funds (other streams) aren’t dammed, so there’s no reason to 
expect that the upstream waters from all the banking funds previously 
allocated to private equity funds would flood into PERE. 
 Thus, even in the unlikely event that PERE went up from one-third of 
one percent to, say, hypothetically, one percent of banking investments, 
that still wouldn’t be a large enough exposure to create systemic risk 
concerns. 
Moreover, it’s important to remember that if banks were prohibited 
from investing in PERE, they would delegate their extra funds to other 
investment revenues, which most likely carry equal levels of investment 
risks as PERE, if not greater.  As we know from the experiences of water 
navigations, when damming one watercourse downstream, the upstream 
stretch of water would reroute and flow into different brooks or rivers, 
which could carry flood risks themselves.  Therefore it’s important to study 
the whole map of tributaries and understand the risks of all alternative 
waterways before plugging the connection between the estuary and a 
particular stream, if such a measure is absolutely necessary.  However, in 
the case of PERE, as we discussed earlier, it poses no systemic risks and 
typically only moderate investment risks.  Accordingly, from a regulatory 
perspective, there is no reason to believe that other choices of banking 
 
Opportunity and the Subcomm. On Financial Institutions & Consumer Credit of the H. 
Comm. of Financial Services, 112th Cong. 2 (Nov. 29, 2012). 
121.   Heard on the Street / Financial Analysis and Commentary, WALL ST. J.,, Apr. 24, 
2009, at C12. 
122.   Yali, N’Diaye, Fitch Warns of Rising Rates, Slower MBS Prepay Risk, MARKET 
NEWS INT’L, Apr. 15, 2011, available at LEXIS.  
123.   Felix Salmon, The Downside of CDS Demonization, UPSTART BUS. J. (Oct. 15, 
2008), http://upstart.bizjournals.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/11/06/the-downside-
of-cds-demonization.html?page=all, 
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investment targets, which take up much bigger proportions of banking 
funds, carry less investment risks than PERE and should be placed as more 
optimal investment options than PERE. 
In conclusion, banks investing in PERE might create some 
interconnectedness between banks and PERE, but this interconnectedness, 
in light of the small percentage of PERE investment relative to the banks’ 
whole investment portfolio and the insubstantial capital contribution of 
banks to PERE, should not give rise to systemic risk concerns. 
Furthermore, it’s unlikely for these connections to become strengthened in 
the future. 
 
8. Conflicts of Interest 
 
Besides preventing systemic risk problems, the Volcker Rule sought 
to avoid conflicts of interest between banks and their clients.  Even if banks 
are not permitted to sponsor their own PERE funds, they might still have 
conflicts of interest when placing clients funds with outside PERE.  For 
example, a bank could have any number of relationships with outside 
PERE funds, which might cause a bank to suffer from a conflict of interest 
when placing client funds.  Furthermore, conflicts of interest in the 
securities context are a prevalent phenomenon in the market.  Although the 
solutions for this problem vary from case to case, the general principle 
from a regulatory viewpoint is not to eliminate the financial activity that 
entails conflicts of interest, but to disclose the conflicts to the parties 
involved, so that both the financial freedom of the institutions and the 
customers’ rights could be protected. 
Given that the Volcker Rule presents over-regulation dangers for 
PERE, the better solution would be to require banks to disclose their 
conflicts of interest, especially considering the minimal systemic risk 
concerns of banking investments in PERE. 
9. The Dangers of Too Quickly Concluding that Private Equity Real 
Estate Funds Give Rise to System Risk Concerns 
Discretion should be exercised in deciding whether there are systemic 
risks.  It is important to understand that normal market swings do not 
translate into systemic risk.
124
  Rather, normal market swings are an 
example of “systematic risk.”  Obviously, private equity real estate 
investments will be subject to normal market swings, but that doesn’t 
 
 124.  Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 204. 
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translate into systemic risk.  Schwarcz cautioned that “it is important not to 
constrain market freedom in ways that deter systematic risk, which 
facilitates market equilibrium and curbs excessive interest rates or periods 
of inflation.”
125
  He also cautioned that systemic risk “is an economic, not a 
political definition.”
126
  Thus, one must take care not to conclude too 
quickly that private equity real estate may give rise to systemic risk 
concerns for political reasons, as some might be inclined to do in the face 
of a heightened state of alert.   
 
10. The Regulator’s Perspective 
It is highly likely that the SEC agrees with the view that private equity 
real estate doesn’t generate systemic risks.  The fact that the SEC recently 
finalized Form PF, but did not require private equity real estate advisers to 
file Form PF, is a strong indication that the regulators don’t believe that 
private equity real estate poses systemic risks.  It is also promising, as 
discussed above, that the joint agencies in their proposed rule didn’t plan to 
apply the Volcker Rule against private equity real estate advisers utilizing 
non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions. 
 
II.  THE ABILITY OF A PRIVATE EQUITY REAL ESTATE ADVISER TO 
SIDESTEP THE ADVISERS ACT 
 
The Advisers Act, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, exposes many 
“investment advisers” within the meaning of the statute to registration and 
regulation under the Advisers Act.  Private equity advisers who are 
mandated to register under the Advisers Act may feel overburdened by the 
requirement to file a public disclosure document, Form ADV, with the 
SEC.  Part 1 of Form ADV, among other things, requires registered 
investment advisers to disclose information about the number of their 
employees, the number and types of their clients, compensation structures, 
assets under management, types of advisory services provided, the scope of 
business activities in which the adviser engages, financial industry 
affiliations, conflicts of interest, custody, control persons, and disciplinary 
history.  Part 2 of Form ADV, among other things, requires information 
about services provided, fees, portfolio manager selection and evaluation, 
information about clients provided to portfolio managers, restrictions on 
clients’ ability to contact portfolio managers, information about the 
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background, business activities and conflicts of interest of supervised 
persons (officers, partners, directors and employees).
127
 
Private equity advisers who are mandated to register may also likely 
have concerns about being subject to the full scope of regulation as 
registered “investment advisers” under the Advisers Act, which will 
impose compliance and administrative costs on their operations.  The 
regulations under the Advisers Act are complex enough that private equity 
real estate advisers would have to invest in considerable compliance 
resources in order to be in a position to comply, which might burden their 
operations, especially for private equity real estate advisers that are not 
very large.  For example, as mentioned in the introduction, a small fund 
delegated eight to ten of their total 140 employees to work full time on 
regulatory compliance.
128
  This is problematic from the perspective of the 
society as well.  Scholars have noted that regulations are currently so 
complex and numerous that society is generally inundated with a great deal 
of good faith non-compliance.
129
 
The Advisers Act defines an “investment adviser,” subject to certain 
exceptions, generally to include any person (including a natural person or 
an entity) who (1) for compensation; (2) is engaged in the business; (3) of 
providing advice to others or issuing reports or analyses regarding 
securities.
130
  “Historically, these elements have been broadly construed . . . 
.”
131
 
The SEC staff “has traditionally taken an expansive view of what 
activities” will be considered “in the business.”
132
  “Generally speaking, 
this element will be satisfied if a person gives specific advice about 
securities other than in rare, isolated, and non-periodic instances.”
133
  A 
person could potentially qualify as an investment adviser even though 
giving investment advice is not his primary or even major business 
activity.
134
  In determining whether a person is an investment adviser, “the 
SEC staff looks at all the circumstances surrounding a person’s 
 
127.   SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv.pdf (last visited Dec. 23 2013).  
 128.  Dodd-Frank: The Road Ahead, supra note 25.  
 129.  See J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of 
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 766-768 (2003) (noting 
that “the sheer number or mass of rules” may hinder compliance and that “‘good faith 
noncompliance’ does indeed incur . . . .”). 
 130.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006). 
 131.  See THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
§ 1:3 (Westlaw 2013). 
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activities,”
135
 including, without limitation, the following factors:  “whether 
the person represents or otherwise holds himself out to the public as an 
investment adviser . . . whether the person receives compensation for 
rendering investment advice . . . [and] the frequency or regularity of the 
investment advice given.”
136
 
“Security” is defined under the Advisers Act as: 
Any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in 
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, 
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit 
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any 
security (including a certificate of deposit) or on any group or 
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the 
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege 
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign 
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, 
guaranty of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of 
the foregoing.
137
 
What is a security under the Advisers Act can also be ascertained from 
relevant case law and SEC staff no-action letter positions.  A private equity 
real estate investment adviser who advises about “securities” is usually 
considered to be in the business of providing investment advice and is 
therefore an “investment adviser” within the meaning of the Advisers Act.  
That is why private equity real estate investment advisers may seek to 
sidestep the Advisers Act by advising their funds only about real estate 
investments that are not “securities.”  As discussed in the introduction, this 
sidestepping would likely also allow the funds they advised to bypass the 
Investment Company Act and the Volcker Rule, since these types of funds 
wouldn’t likely be “investment companies” within the meaning of the 
Investment Company Act.  However, private equity real estate advisers 
may find it difficult to structure their operations so that they are not 
engaged in the business of advising about “securities,” since many types of 
real estate investments could potentially be “securities.”
138
  On the other 
hand, as noted in the introduction, most types of private equity real estate 
 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id.; see also College Resource Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 630, at *2-3 (Apr. 9, 1993) (echoing these factors).  
 137.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006).   
 138.  See infra notes 164–243 and accompanying text.  
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funds really do seek to invest in operating and developing real properties, 
and not on securities investments.  Below, this section explains how some 
of the most common real estate investments could potentially fall within 
the meaning of “securities” under the Advisers Act. 
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A. Investments in Traditional Real Estate Investments 
 
Real estate advisers will generally not be considered to advise persons 
or entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about 
investing in traditional real estate investments. 
An offer of real estate without any collateral arrangements with 
the seller or others does not involve the offer of a security. . . . 
Accordingly, interests in an apartment cooperative, even if in the 
form of stock, or in a residential condominium normally will not 
be securities.  As is usually the case, substance governs rather 
than form; that is, just as some things that look like real estate are 
securities, some things that look like securities are real estate.  
Similarly, the sale of commercial realty normally will not be 
viewed as a security if the purchaser directly retains control over 
the property and is not reliant on the efforts of others.
139
 
However, even with traditional real estate investments, there is always a 
risk that they can become securities. 
B. Investment in Stock 
 
If real estate advisers advise about investing in corporate stock, they 
would likely be advising about securities, since the definition of “security” 
under Section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act includes “stock.”
140
  In the 
event a real estate investment adviser invests in a corporation, the general 
rule, as established in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, is that 
“stock” is considered a “security” if it has the major characteristics of 
stock:  “dividends conditioned on an apportionment of profits, subjection to 
pledge, voting rights proportional to number of shares owned, and 
possibility of appreciation in value.”
141
  As Loss et al. note, 
The subsequent Supreme Court decision in Landreth Timber 
Company v. Lambreth[sic] added that, when stock possesses “all 
of the characteristics we identified in Forman as traditionally 
associated with common stock . . . , the plain meaning of the 
statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as 
 
 139.  2 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION § 3-A-
1(d)(iv), at 987-90 (4th ed. 2006) (internal footnotes and italics omitted). 
 140.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006). 
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‘securities’ subject to the coverage of the Acts.”
142
 
“The investment contract analysis of an instrument bearing the label stock 
is thus appropriate only when the ‘stock’ bears none or few of the 
characteristics usually associated with traditional stock.”
143
  When stock 
does not have these characteristics, the Supreme Court has employed the 
“investment contract” approach, which usually results in a finding that 
there is no security if the instrument involves no horizontal or vertical 
commonality.
144
 
C. Investments in Investment Contracts. 
Real estate interests have also been held to be “securities” under the 
investment contract theory if the conditions of an investment contract 
apply.
145
  In SEC v. W. J. Howey & Co., the Supreme Court held that the 
elements of an investment contract are: (1) an investment of money; (2) in 
a common enterprise; (3) when a person is led to expect profits; (4) solely 
from the efforts of others.
146
  In that quintessential investment contract case, 
the Supreme Court concluded that “an offering of units of a citrus grove 
development coupled with a contract for cultivating, marketing and 
remitting the net proceeds to the investor” was an “investment contract.”
147
  
Howey reveals how certain types of real estate investments could be 
deemed “securities.”  Professor Paredes notes that an investment of money 
within the meaning of Howey merely means that “‘the purchaser gave up 
some tangible and definable consideration in return for an interest that had 
substantially the characteristics of a security.’”
148
 
In order to determine for the purpose of the “investment contract” 
whether there is a “common enterprise,” “subsequent lower court[s] . . . 
have focused on whether a common enterprise involves horizontal 
commonality . . . or vertical commonality. . . .”
149
  “The Third, Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits . . . subscribe[] to the horizontal commonality 
 
142.    Id. at 1,015-16. 
 143.  Id. at 1,016.  
 144.  See generally SEC v. W. J. Howey & Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (noting 
that an “investment contract” is a “contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests 
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 145.  See, e.g., id. at 293 (holding that a share of ownership in a real estate development 
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 146.  Id. at 301. 
 147.  Id. at 293-94. 
 148.  LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(i)(1), at 928 (quoting Int’l Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979)). 
 149.  Id. § 3-A-1(d)(i)(2), at 930-31. 
2013] THE RISE OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 141 
 
 
approach.”
150
  Under this approach, courts will usually not conclude that 
there is an “investment contract” without pooling of investor funds.
151
  
Paredes takes the view that a strict horizontal commonality approach 
“would not reach instances in which investors . . . invest in individual 
property . . . along with a management, development, or marketing 
contract.”
152
  In addition, Paredes notes  that horizontal commonality may 
not reach a limited partnership with only a single investor, since there 
would be no pooling.
153
  Thus, it is possible that certain types of real estate 
investments could be structured to avoid this view of horizontal 
commonality. 
According to the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits, vertical commonality 
hinges on whether the “fortunes of all investors [are] dependent upon the 
promoter’s expertise.”
154
  Paredes notes that under this view of vertical 
commonality, “[u]nless two or more persons in some sense share in the 
profitability of an undertaking, it is difficult to argue that there is a common 
enterprise.”
155
  Thus, it is possible that certain types of real estate 
investments could be structured to avoid this view of vertical commonality. 
In the Ninth Circuit’s view, vertical commonality should be more 
restrictively defined as one in which the “‘fortunes of the investor are 
interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those 
seeking the investment or of third parties.’”
156
   Professor Paredes notes that 
the Ninth Circuit’s view “will embrace common enterprises both of a 
horizontal and of a vertical type whenever some form of profit sharing can 
be shown.”
157
  He continues: 
Thus, when two or more investors pool their resources, there 
would be a common enterprise even if the promoter did no more 
than receive a broker's commission.  Or when the income of one 
investor and one promoter was each dependent upon the profits 
of an undertaking, there would be a common enterprise. Under 
this approach, a conventional discretionary commodities account 
would not involve an investment contract if the broker only 
received commissions, but profit sharing by a broker in a 
discretionary account would create a security, as would profit 
sharing by a single promoter and a single investor in a 
 
 150.  Id. at 932. 
 151.  See id. (providing examples supporting this principle). 
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partnership, franchise arrangement, or pyramid scheme.
158
 
Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, it is more difficult to structure certain types 
of real estate investments to avoid the common enterprise requirement of 
Howey. 
In Forman,
159
 the Supreme Court analyzed whether there was a 
reasonable expectation of profits for “investment contract” purposes.
160
  
The Forman Court explained:  
[b]y profits, the Court has meant either capital appreciation 
resulting from the development of the initial investment, as in 
Joiner . . . or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of 
investors’ funds, as in Tcherepnin v. Knight . . . (dividends on the 
investment based on savings and loan association's profits).
161
 
Today, the requirement that profits come solely from the efforts of 
others should not be read literally with respect to the “investment contract” 
analysis.
162
  Instead, the prevailing view is that “the efforts made by those 
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential 
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”
163
 
The above discussion of investment contracts is only a preliminary 
and general analysis of the considerations involved in determining whether 
a particular investment is an investment contract.  Needless to say, any 
number of circumstances could cause real estate to be considered an 
investment contract, and therefore a security.  Below, this section discusses 
a few of the most common investment contracts issues that pertain to real 
estate interests. 
D. Investments in Wholly Owned Entities. 
Real estate advisers could advise about investing in a wholly owned 
entity either by holding real estate investments through wholly owned 
entities of funds, such as for tax-planning purposes, or alternatively, 
sometimes real estate advisers could purchase real estate investments on 
behalf of a fund by purchasing wholly owned entities that own real estate 
investments instead of purchasing the real estate investments themselves 
directly. 
 
 158.  Id. at 938-39. 
 159.  United Hous. Found, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837(1975). 
 160.  Id. at 852. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(i)(4), at 950. 
 163.  SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973); see also 
LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(i)(4), at 950, n. 172 (stating that this standard “has 
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If a real estate investment adviser invests in a wholly owned 
partnership or limited liability company, the wholly owned partnership or 
limited liability company would be analyzed under the “investment 
contract” framework.  Such interests would likely not be “securities” as 
there would be neither horizontal nor vertical commonality, since that form 
of investment would neither have a promoter nor pooling.
164
  Thus, real 
estate investment advisers could likely invest in a wholly owned 
partnership or limited liability company that owned real estate, without 
advising about “securities.” 
In the event a real estate investment adviser invests in a corporation, 
the general issues regarding “stock” discussed above would result.  Courts 
have generally not been forgiving with the entire sale of “stock” in a 
corporation in a sale of a business transaction.  In Landreth Timber, the 
Supreme Court rejected defendant’s contention that a sale of a business was 
not a “security,” even though a sale of a business was not a passive 
investment.
165
  Nonetheless, the Court in Landreth Timber did suggest that 
a “stock” sale of a business could not be a “security” if the “stock” didn’t 
possess the traditional characteristics of “stock.”  The Court noted that “the 
fact that instruments bear the label ‘stock’ is not of itself sufficient to 
invoke the coverage of the Acts.  Rather, we concluded that we must also 
determine whether those instruments possess ‘some of the significant 
characteristics typically associated with’ stock . . . .’”
166
 
Real estate advisers that find a need to invest in a wholly owned 
entity, if desiring to avoid “securities” issues, should invest in wholly 
owned non-corporate entities, such as limited liability companies or 
partnerships.  Obviously, limited partnerships would present “securities” 
problems, and there is no tactical reason to prefer a wholly owned limited 
partnership to a wholly owned limited liability company.  In the alternative, 
real estate investment advisers seeking to avoid “securities problems” that 
invest in wholly owned corporations could try to structure the stock so as to 
avoid bearing the major characteristics of “stock” under the Supreme 
Court’s analysis, thereby avoiding triggering “securities” issues.  There are 
not a lot of cases evaluating this second type of structuring effort, so no-
action relief may be desirable, given the readiness of the  Court to identify 
“stock” as a form of “securities.”  While investing in wholly owned limited 
liability companies or partnerships is preferable from a securities 
standpoint, investing in limited liability companies or partnerships may be 
disadvantageous from a tax standpoint, such as, without limitation, in a 
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situation where a real estate adviser desires to use a corporate blocker in 
one of its funds. 
Of course, if the wholly owned entity that would not otherwise be 
considered a “security” in turn invested in “securities,” then the real estate 
investment adviser would likely be considered an “investment adviser” by 
indirectly advising about securities, since Section 208(d) of the Advisers 
Act prohibits doing indirectly what cannot be done directly.
167
 Thus, there 
are limits to legitimate structuring attempts to avoid advising about 
“securities.” 
E. Investments in Limited Partnerships. 
Investments in limited partnership interests are generally considered to 
be investments in “securities.”
168
  Professor Loss notes that “if [the] owners 
participate actively in running the business,” then a limited partnership 
would not be a security.
169
  It is possible that real estate investment advisers 
who advise about investing in limited partnerships controlled by an 
investor would not be considered to be advising about securities.  Though 
not in the Advisers Act context, appellate precedent suggests that potential 
control is not sufficient to take a limited partnership outside of the 
securities laws; rather, the investor must have actual control.
170
 
Thus, if an investment adviser advises a fund to invest in a classic 
limited partnership, which in turn invests in real estate, the investment 
adviser will likely advise about “securities.”  Only rare limited partnership 
investments would not implicate “securities” issues. 
If investors actually actively participated in running or controlling a 
business structured as a limited partnership that was not a “security,” and 
that limited partnership invested in “securities,” then the real estate 
investment adviser would likely be considered an “investment adviser” by 
indirectly advising about securities because, as aforementioned, Section 
208(d) of the Advisers Act prohibits doing indirectly what cannot be done 
directly.
171
  Thus, again, we see that there are limits to legitimate 
structuring attempts to avoid advising about “securities.” 
 
 167.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 208(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(d) (2006). 
 168.  See LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(iii), at 969-82 (stating that limited 
partnerships have been treated as “securities” in both the public and private context). 
 169.  Id. at 983. 
 170.  See Rodeo v. Gillman, 787 F.2d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Potential managerial 
control (at least as conditioned here) – even if easily assumed – is not enough to take a 
limited partnership out of the reach of the securities laws.”). 
 171.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(d).  
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F. Investments in Other Partnerships and Joint Ventures. 
In United States v. Wetherald, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit noted: 
A general partnership or joint venture interest can be designated a 
security if the investor can establish, for example, that (1) an 
agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands 
of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes 
power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or 
venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business 
affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his 
partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is so 
dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability 
of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of 
the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or 
venture powers.
172
 
Otherwise, an investment in a partnership or a joint venture would likely 
not be considered a security.  In Wetherald, the court concluded that the 
partnerships amounted to securities.
173
  However, the facts forming the 
basis for this conclusion were egregious.  Among other factors, the 
investors had no knowledge or experience with respect to the business; the 
investors did not vote on major decisions; partnership committees were 
symbolic; investors’ time commitment was minimal; investors did not 
control disbursements; investors had no say in operations; and finally, 
investors had no ability to obtain company information.
174
 
In another recent case, Nunez v. Robin, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted: 
[There is a] strong presumption that a general partnership or joint 
venture interest is not a security.  A party seeking to prove the 
contrary must bear a heavy burden of proof. . . . Although general 
partners and joint venturers may not individually have decisive 
control over major decisions, they do have the sort of influence 
which generally provides them with access to important 
information and protection against a dependence on others.
175
 
The court further stated, “[T]he securities laws do not extend to every 
person who lacks the specialized knowledge of his partners . . . without a 
 
 172.  United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal 
citations omitted).   
 173.  Id. at 1327. 
 174.  Id. at 1326. 
 175.  Nunez v. Robin, 415 F. App’x 586, *589 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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showing that this lack of knowledge prevents him from meaningfully 
controlling his investment.”
176
  The court looked to a meaningful exercise 
of authority in this regard, such as signing checks or contracts on behalf of 
the partnership or joint venture, managing finances, active management of 
the investment, or having access to financial information in determining 
whether the partner had meaningful control over his investment.
177
  The 
court also considered whether any managerial decisions were made and 
whether the promoter was “uniquely capable,” as well as whether the 
investor was a mere passive investor.
178
 
Loss also notes that a general partnership may be considered a 
“security” when it operates de facto like a limited partnership, even if it is a 
de jure partnership.
179
 
On the whole, a general partnership is a superior vehicle to investment 
advisers from the point of view of avoiding “securities” issues when 
advising about investing in real estate.  However, as shown above, a 
partnership doesn’t always guarantee avoiding securities implications.  An 
additional problem with general partnerships is that they give rise to pass-
through taxation, and therefore cannot be used as corporate blockers. 
G. Investments in Notes 
To the extent that a real estate investment adviser is in the business of 
advising a person or entity about investing in notes, complex issues arise 
surrounding whether such notes are securities.  On the one hand, the 
definition of security in Section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act includes the 
term “note.”
180
  However, the Second Circuit has stated that “not all notes 
are securities.”
181
  Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court, in analyzing 
whether a note was a security, began with the “presumption that every note 
is a security.”
182
 
The Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young stated that this 
presumption could be rebutted if the note were not a true investment, and 
 
 176.  Id. at *590. 
 177.  See id. at *590-91 (describing plaintiff’s active participation in the joint venture as 
demonstrative of his meaningful involvement in the enterprise). 
 178.  See id. at *591 (considering several factors in determining  whether appellant’s 
ownership interest was an investment contract). 
 179.  See LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(iii), at 985 (“The pivotal criterion for 
distinguishing partnership or joint venture interests, as well as limited liability company 
membership interests, that are securities from those that are not usually will be the profits 
‘solely [or substantially] from the efforts of others’ element in the Howey test.”) (internal 
footnote omitted). 
 180.  Id. § 80b-2(a)(18). 
 181.  LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(b)(i), at 882. 
 182.  Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990) (internal footnote omitted). 
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discussed an attempt by the Second Circuit to divide investment notes from 
notes that are not securities.
183
  The following notes were not generally 
securities: 
“[T]he note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by 
a mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a 
small business or some of its assets, the note evidencing a 
‘character’ loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by 
an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply 
formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course 
of business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer of a 
broker, it is collateralized)”.
184
 
A later case added to this list “notes evidencing loans by commercial banks 
for current operations.”
185
 
While the Supreme Court in Reves acknowledged that the above types 
of notes were not securities, the Supreme Court thought more guidance was 
needed as to what other types of notes may not be securities.
186
  The 
Supreme Court stated: 
It is impossible to make any meaningful inquiry into whether an 
instrument bears a “resemblance” to one of the instruments 
identified by the Second Circuit without specifying what it is 
about those instruments that makes them non-“securities”.  
Moreover, as the Second Circuit itself has noted, its list is “not 
graven in stone,” and is therefore capable of expansion. Thus, 
some standards must be developed for determining when an item 
should be added to the list.
187
 
It also set forth what is known as the “family resemblance test”: 
First, we examine the transaction to assess the motivations that 
would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it.  If the 
seller’s purpose is to raise money for the general use of a 
business enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the 
buyer is interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to 
generate, the instrument is likely to be a “security.”  If the note is 
exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor asset or 
consumer good, to correct for the seller's cash-flow difficulties, 
 
 183.  See id. at 65-66 (noting that the “presumption [that every note is a security] cannot 
be irrebutable” and discussing the Second Circuit’s attempt to identify notes that do not fall 
into security category).  
 184.  Id. at 65 (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 
(2d Cir. 1976)). 
 185.  Id. (quoting Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 
1984)). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 65-66 (internal citations omitted). 
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or to advance some other commercial or consumer purpose, on 
the other hand, the note is less sensibly described as a “security.”  
Second, we examine the “plan of distribution” of the instrument 
to determine whether it is an instrument in which there is 
“common trading for speculation or investment.”  Third, we 
examine the reasonable expectations of the investing public:  The 
Court will consider instruments to be “securities” on the basis of 
such public expectations, even where an economic analysis of the 
circumstances of the particular transaction might suggest that the 
instruments are not “securities” as used in that transaction. 
Finally, we examine whether some factor such as the existence of 
another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the 
instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts 
unnecessary.
188
 
In summarizing its view, the Court concluded: 
A note is presumed to be a “security,” and that presumption may 
be rebutted only by a showing that the note bears a strong 
resemblance (in terms of the four factors we have identified) to 
one of the enumerated categories of instrument. If an instrument 
is not sufficiently similar to an item on the list, the decision 
whether another category should be added is to be made by 
examining the same factors.
189
 
In a prior no-action letter issued in the context of Section 202(a)(18) 
of the Advisers Act, the SEC staff implied that when a person in the 
business of giving advice about investments gives advice about a mortgage 
note (that is, a note evidencing debt on the acquisition of real estate), that 
mortgage note would “be a security pursuant to Section 202(a)(18) [of the 
Advisers Act].”
190
  Note that this no-action letter was issued prior to the 
Reves decision, but the decision in Reves may only apply in the context of 
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.
191
  Furthermore, the SEC’s position 
only takes place in the context of a no-action letter, and a court could 
potentially decide otherwise, based on Reves. 
However, a post-Reves federal district court case strongly suggests 
that a mortgage-backed note that “the lender or other commercial assignee 
transfers . . . to a retail broker/dealer, who then sells it to her customer,” 
would likely not be treated merely as a mortgage secured by a home, but 
 
 188.  Id. at 66–67 (internal citations omitted). 
 189.  Id. at 67. 
 190.  Ken Flood, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1976, at *3 (Mar. 2, 
1984). 
 191.  See Reves, 494 U.S. at 73 (“[W]e conclude that the demand notes at issue here fall 
under the ‘note’ category of instruments that are ‘securities’ under the 1933 and 1934 
Acts.”). 
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would be presumed to be a security unless shown not to be under the Reves 
family resemblance test.
192
  The court in that case concluded that the notes 
“b[ore] little resemblance to the mortgage-backed note given by a borrower 
to his lender in a typical home equity loan transaction,” and that therefore 
the mortgage-backed notes were securities.
193
 
In a more recent SEC administrative action, an issuer sold promissory 
notes “to individual investors to raise the funds necessary for the purchases 
of [mobile home] parks.”
194
  The SEC stated: 
[T]his four-factor analysis reveals that the [issued] notes do not 
sufficiently resemble a “note secured by a mortgage on a home” 
to be considered a non-security under that category. The Supreme 
Court contemplated only mortgage-backed notes issued in the 
context of a traditional face-to-face transaction between a 
borrower and commercial or consumer lender.”
195
 
Thus, it seems safe to conclude that a mortgage-backed note purchased as 
an investment will likely be a security. 
H. Investments in Loan Participations Interests. 
“The term ‘[loan] participation’ commonly refers to an undivided 
fractional interest and participation in a loan, along with the interest and 
fees paid.  This is in contrast to another popular structure where the loan is 
split into separate A and B loans, each with its separate promissory 
note.”
196
 
Real estate advisers will likely be considered to advise persons or 
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing 
in loan participation interests.  Real estate advisers could potentially 
purchase loan participation interests in mortgages and construction loans.  
In a no-action letter to Putnam Diversified Premium Income Trust, the SEC 
staff took the position that in the context of the Investment Company Act of 
1940, loan participations are “securities” because the term “security” under 
the Act “means ‘any note . . . evidence of indebtedness, transferable share, 
investment contract . . .  or any certificate of interest or participation in . . .  
any of the foregoing.’”
197
  The definition of “security” in the Advisers Act 
 
 192.  Mercer v. Jaffe, 736 F. Supp. 764, 769-770 (W.D. Mich. 1990). 
 193.  Id. at 770.  
 194.  In re. Alvin W. Gebhart, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 53,136, 2006 SEC LEXIS 
93 (Jan. 18, 2006). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Mark S. Fawer & Michael J. Waters, Purchasing Loan Participations: The Devil is 
in the Details, REAL EST. FIN. J., 38 (Winter 2009) . 
 197.  Putnam Diversified Premium Income Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 834, at *3, n. 1 (July 10, 1989) (alteration in original); Investment Company 
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reads in pari materia in these respects with the Investment Company 
Act,
198
 thus it would seem highly likely that the SEC staff would view loan 
participation interests as “securities” under the Advisers Act. 
The SEC staff in its no-action letter to Putnam Diversified went on to 
explain what it meant by loan participation.  In that letter, a fund would 
invest in: 
[P]articipating interests purchased from banks in a loan made by 
a syndicate of banks, represented by an agent bank that has 
negotiated and structured the loan, to corporate borrowers to 
finance internal growth, mergers, acquisitions, stock repurchases, 
leveraged buy-outs, and other corporate activities.  The loan 
participations may extend for the entire term of the loan or only 
for short “strips” that correspond to a quarterly or monthly 
floating rate interest period on the loan.  They may take the form 
of (1) a true assignment or novation that shifts to the assignee the 
direct debtor-creditor relationship with the corporate borrower, or 
(2) a participating interest that does not shift the debtor-creditor 
relationship to the assignee, who must rely on the original lender 
to collect sums due and otherwise to enforce its rights against the 
corporate borrower or the agent bank that administers the loan.
199
 
The SEC staff identified the Fund’s apparent rationale for why the 
loan participation interests were “securities.”  First, the SEC staff pointed 
to “the risk of insolvency of the corporate debtor or the issuing bank, or 
both, and the risk that the corporate debtor will prepay principal if interest 
rates fall.”
200
  Second, “[e]xcept for its investigation of the creditworthiness 
of the corporate borrower, the Fund will have no involvement in the 
commercial transactions underlying the original loans.”
201
  Third, “the Fund 
will purchase loan participations solely for investment purposes.”
202
  The 
gist of these points is that the loan participation interests were passive 
investments for the buyer. 
In another no-action letter, the SEC staff took the position that 
participation in a construction period mortgage loan, e.g. a loan secured by 
a short-term mortgage on an unfinished construction project, was a 
security, analogizing it to a note.
203
  In yet another no-action letter, the SEC 
 
Act of 1940 § 2(a)(36), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (2006). 
 198.  See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) 
(2006) (“security means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest . . .”). 
 199.  Putnam Diversified, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 834 at *1-2. 
 200.  Id. at *2. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  See Northwestern Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Found., SEC No-Action Letter, 
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staff took the position in the Investment Company Act context that 
participating interests in notes or bonds are securities when they are 
purchased on the secondary market and “secured by whole home 
mortgages and mortgages on apartment projects, shopping centers, office 
buildings, and other commercial enterprises.”
204
 
I. Investments in Mortgage Backed Securities. 
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are debt obligations that 
represent claims to the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, 
most commonly on residential property.  Mortgage loans are 
purchased from banks, mortgage companies, and other 
originators and then assembled into pools by a governmental, 
quasi-governmental, or private entity.  The entity then issues 
securities that represent claims on the principal and interest 
payments made by borrowers on the loans in the pool, a process 
known as securitization.
205
 
Mortgage-backed securities are interests in pools of mortgages, 
whereas a loan participation interest could be simply a passive investment 
in a single loan, potentially even an unsecured loan. 
Real estate advisers will likely be considered to advise persons or 
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing 
in mortgage-backed securities.  Although there is limited precedent to 
support this proposition in the context of the Advisers Act, these types of 
investments would usually be analyzed under the “investment contract” or 
“notes” framework.  In the event there is any doubt whether mortgage-
backed securities are “securities” under the Advisers Act, Section 
202(a)(18) of the same provides that the term “security” includes “any 
interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’ . . .”
206
 
 
1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1505, at *4 (May 21, 1984) (“The definition of the term 
‘security’ in section 2(a)(36) of the Investment Company Act includes any note or 
participation in any note.  A construction period mortgage loan, or any participation in such 
a loan, would, therefore, come within the definition of a security contained in section 
2(a)(36).”). 
 204.  ROBERT H. ROSENBLUM, INVESTMENT COMPANY DETERMINATION UNDER THE 1940 
ACT: EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS § 2.3.13, at 59 (2d ed. 2003) (citing Mortgage-Backed 
Income Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3551 (Aug. 30, 1979)).  
 205.  Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last modified July 23, 2010). 
 206.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006). 
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J. Investments in Real Estate Sale-Leaseback Transactions 
Real estate advisers will likely not be considered to advise persons or 
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing 
in real estate sale-leaseback transactions.  A real estate sale-leaseback 
transaction is a transaction where the seller sells a real estate asset to a 
buyer, and then the buyer leases it back to the seller long term.  In this way, 
the transaction functions as a loan, with payments taking the form of rent.  
Sale-leaseback transactions often give developers quick capital.  For 
example, a developer could “sell [his or her] model homes and lease them 
back from their buyers for anywhere from a few months to a few 
years.”]”
207
  The Sixth Circuit, applying the horizontal commonality 
approach, has concluded that sale and leaseback arrangements are not 
securities, even though the purchaser purchased in the apparent belief that 
the model homes would appreciate in value.
208
  However, the Sixth 
Circuit’s view does not rule out the possibility of concluding that a sale-
leaseback transaction is a “security” under the vertical commonality 
approach.  It should be noted that the SEC recently brought administrative 
proceedings finding that sale-leaseback transactions were “investment 
contracts” in certain cases, and thus “securities.”
209
 
K. Investments in Industrial Development Bonds. 
Industrial development bonds are 
[m]unicipal debt securities issued by a government agency on 
behalf of a private sector company and intended to build or 
acquire factories or other heavy equipment and tools. . . . 
Industrial Development Revenue Bonds are issued by a 
government to assist a private company that might otherwise be 
unable to obtain financing for its industrial venture or unwilling 
to undertake the project on its own.  The government’s goal in 
providing the debt securities is to improve the economic and 
employment conditions of its region.
210
 
 
 207.  Lew Sichelman, Sale-Leaseback, PRIVATECOMMUNITIES.COM (Oct. 15, 2010) 
http://www.privatecommunities.com/second-home-buying/sale-leaseback.htm. 
 208.  Hart v. Pulte Homes of Mich. Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1002 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 209.  See, e.g., In the Matter of Phil D. Kerley, Exchange Act Release No. 56033, 2007 
WL 1988419, at *1 (July 9, 2007) (finding that respondent “sold investment contract 
securities in the form of sale-leaseback transactions”); In the Matter of William P. Sauer, 
Exchange Act Release No. 55948, 2007 WL 1814113, at *1 (June 25, 2007) (finding that 
respondent “sold investment contract securities in the form of sale-leaseback transactions”). 
 210.  Industrial Development Revenue Bonds – IDRBs, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/idrb.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
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Real estate advisers will likely be considered to advise persons or entities 
about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing in 
industrial development bonds.  In an interpretive release, the SEC noted 
that industrial development bonds fall within specific categories of 
securities under the Advisers Act.
211
 
L. Investments in Time Share Condominiums and Analogous Real Estate 
Investments. 
A real estate adviser will likely be considered to advise persons or 
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing 
in time-share condominiums and analogous real estate investments.  Short 
of investments in fractional undivided interests in real estate, investments 
in condominiums can also present securities issues when they are “lived in 
during a limited part of the year but rented out during most of the year.”
212
  
Professor Paredes notes that the same “[types of securities issues apply] to 
offerings of all types of units in real estate developments which have 
characteristics similar to [condominiums that give rise to securities 
issues].”
213
 
Parades states: 
[T]he offering of condominium units in conjunction with any one 
of the following will cause the offering to be viewed as an 
offering of securities in the form of investment contracts: 
1. The condominiums, with any rental arrangement or other 
similar service, are offered and sold with emphasis on the 
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the 
managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or 
arranged for by the promoter, from rental of the units. 
2. The offering of participation in a rental pool arrangement; 
and 
3. The offering of a rental or similar arrangement whereby the 
purchaser must hold his unit available for rental for any part of 
the year, must use an exclusive rental agent or is otherwise 
materially restricted in his occupancy or rental of his unit. 
In all of the above situations, investor protection requires the 
application of the federal securities laws. 
If the condominiums are not offered and sold with emphasis on 
 
 211.  See Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Investment 
Advisors Act Release No. IA-1092, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2555 (Oct. 8, 1987) 
(clarifying that an investment advisor’s provision of “‘specific investment advice’ includes a 
recommendation, analysis or report about specific securities or specific categories of 
securities” such as industrial development bonds, among other instruments).  
 212.  LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(iv), at 992. 
 213.  Id. 
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the economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the 
managerial efforts of others, and assuming that no plan to avoid 
the registration requirements of the Securities Act is involved, an 
owner of a condominium unit may, after purchasing his unit, 
enter into a nonpooled rental arrangement with an agent not 
designated or required to be used as a condition to the purchase, 
whether or not such agent is affiliated with the offeror, without 
causing a sale of a security to be involved in the sale of the unit.  
Further a continuing affiliation between the developers or 
promoters of a project and the project by reason of maintenance 
arrangements does not make the unit a security. 
In situations where commercial facilities are a part of the 
common elements of a residential project, no registration would 
be required under the investment contract theory where (a) the 
income from such facilities is used only to offset common area 
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to 
the project as a whole and are [sic] not established as a primary 
income source for the individual owners of a condominium or 
cooperative unit.
214
 
M. Investments in Undeveloped Lots. 
A real estate adviser will usually not be considered to advise persons 
or entities about investing in “securities” if the advice is about investing in 
undeveloped lots, but lurking securities issues remain.  “[W]hile the sale of 
undeveloped lots normally would not involve a security, an investment 
contract may be found where the lots were sold for investment rather than 
residential use with emphasis on economic inducements in oral or written 
promotional materials.”
215
  In McCown v. Heidler, the 10
th
 Circuit noted 
that,  
land, as such, is not a security and that a land purchase contract, 
simply because the purchaser expects or hopes that the value of 
the land purchased will increase, does not fall automatically 
within the confines of the Securities Acts.  However, we do not 
agree that land or its purchase necessarily negates the application 
of the Securities Acts.
216
 
In McCown, the plaintiffs purchased vacant undeveloped lots.  The 
plaintiffs argued that “[t]he vacant lots were of little value unless, by the 
sole efforts of [developers], the development obligations of [the 
developers] were fulfilled.  Each of the purchasers of a . . . lot invested his 
 
 214.  Id. at 992-93. 
 215.  Id. at 995-96. 
 216.  McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 208 (10th Cir. 1975). 
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money in a common scheme which depended solely upon the efforts of [the 
developers].”
217
  The plaintiffs argued that “[t]he lots were purchased in 
expectation that fulfillment of the promise to improve them by [the 
developer] would result in a substantial increase in the value of the lots.”
218
  
The plaintiffs further argued that “[t]he lots were sold as, and purchased 
for, investment.”
219
  The plaintiffs presented evidence that the developers 
competed with Wall Street for investment money, held its real estate out to 
the public as an investment and referenced the enhancement of the value of 
the land through its managerial efforts.
220
  The court held that “there [was] 
a factual question as to whether the sale of [the] lots constitutes sales of 
securities.”
221
 
As a result, real estate investment advisers need to be careful when 
they advise about investing in undeveloped lots.  Real estate advisers 
should pay particular attention to whether they are relying upon the 
managerial efforts of others for enhancing the value of the undeveloped 
lots, and whether the lot is marketed to them as an investment. 
N. Investments in Fractional Undivided Interests in Oil, Gas or Other 
Mineral Rights. 
In order to understand what fractional interests in oil and gas are, one 
needs to understand how the typical oil and gas project is structured.  
Typically, speculators will acquire leases on, 
[O]il and gas rights on as many of the individual tracts as they 
can.  The tracts have typically been ‘granted, demised, leased and 
let’ to the lessee ‘for the sole and only purpose of mining and 
operating oil and gas and laying pipelines’ during a stated term of 
years.  In these instances, the lessor has typically received, in 
addition to an immediate cash bonus in some cases, a promise on 
the part of the lessee to pay a stated rental per acre for every year 
in which a well is not drilled, and a further promise of a stated 
percentage, usually 1/8, of the oil and gas actually produced and 
sold or its value at the prevailing market price.
222
 
This 1/8 interest held by the landlord is called the landowner’s royalty 
interest, “and it has commonly found its way into the securities markets in 
lots of fractional undivided portions after having been transferred to banks 
 
 217.  Id. at 209. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. at 209-10. 
 221.  Id. at 211. 
 222.  LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(c), at 903-04. 
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as collateral for loans or having been sold to an oil royalty dealer.”
223
  The 
7/8 interest held by the lessee is called the working interest.  The lessee 
[M]ay sell fractional undivided shares of the lease to raise 
working capital, or it may give a part interest in the lease to a 
drilling contractor, who in turn may sell all or part of his share to 
finance the drilling.  As in the case of the landowners’ royalty 
interests, which are fractions of the customary 1/8 portion, these 
working interests, which are fractions of the 7/8 portion, may 
normally have given rights of participation either in the oil or gas 
or in the proceeds from its sale.
224
 
A real estate adviser will likely be considered to advise persons or 
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing 
in fractional undivided interests in oil, gas or other mineral rights.  
Investments in fractional undivided interests in oil, gas or other mineral 
rights are expressly included as “securities” by Section 202(a)(18) of the 
Advisers Act.
225
Prof. Paredes notes that the Federal Trade Commission 
posited that, 
The word ‘rights’ is broad enough to make the definition 
applicable to interests which are regarded as giving 
ownership of the oil or gas in place as well as to interests 
which merely afford the owner the right to produce oil or 
gas.  However, there is no fractional undivided interest if 
the whole landowner’s royalty interest is transferred, even 
though under the terms of the lease the holder may be 
entitled to only 1/8 or some other portion of the 
production.
226
 
O. Leases 
A real estate adviser could under certain circumstances be considered 
to advise persons or entities about investing in “securities” if they advise 
them about investing in fractional undivided interests in leases.  Professor 
Paredes notes that, “[a] lease arrangement normally will not involve a 
security.   However, as illustrated by [SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.], 
the combination of a lease and other economic inducement whose value is 
 
 223.  Id. at 904. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006). 
 226.  LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(c), at 905 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
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substantially dependent on the efforts of a promoter or other parties can 
create an investment contract.”
227
  In Joiner,
228
 
[A]n oil prospector named Joiner organized a one man 
corporation that acquired by assignment oil and gas leaseholds in 
a 3000 acre tract in Texas.  The tract was given the name Joiner 
Paramount Development.  In order to finance the drilling of a 
well, Joiner offered to sell to the public in widely scattered areas 
throughout the country instruments purporting to be assignments 
of leaseholds in specific portions of the tract . . . [T]he purchasers 
generally had no choice as to the location of the land covered by 
their leases.  They were invited to purchase leases on 
undescribed, unlocated acreage that was selected in each case by 
the promoters.  It was represented in the selling literature that a 
test well was being drilled, and the literature was clearly aimed at 
creating the impression that investors would earn a profit through 
the efforts of Joiner in bringing in oil, although nothing specific 
was said about what arrangements would be made if the well 
should prove successful.
229
 
In Joiner, the defendants first tried to argue that the assignments of 
leaseholds in specific portions of the tract were not “securities” because 
they were not typical forms of securities.  The Supreme Court rejected this 
argument and suggested that such assignments of leaseholds were 
“investment contracts.”
230
  Next, the defendants attempted to argue that 
such assignments of leaseholds were not “securities” because they were not 
fractionalized interests in oil and gas, since parcels subdivided the 
leaseholds.  The Court again rejected this argument and suggested that such 
assignments of leaseholds were “investment contracts.”
231
  Third, the 
defendants attempted to argue that such assignments of leaseholders were 
not “securities” because the leases and assignments under state law 
conveyed interests in real estate.  The Court responded as follows: 
In applying acts of this general purpose, the courts have not been 
guided by the nature of the assets back of a particular document 
or offering.  The test rather is what character the instrument is 
given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of 
distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the 
prospect.  In the enforcement of an act such as this it is not 
inappropriate that promoters’ offerings be judged as being what 
 
 227.  Id. § 3-A-1(d)(iv), at 995. 
 228.  SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). 
 229.  LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(c), at 913. 
 230.  C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. at 350-51. 
 231.  Id. at 352. 
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they were represented to be.
232
 
This latter point made by the Supreme Court suggests that any type of 
fractional interests in real estate leases could give rise to “securities” 
concerns under certain circumstances, not just fractional interests in oil and 
gas leases. 
P.   Investments in REITs 
Over the last two or three decades, REITs emerged as an important 
type of real estate investment.  “The term REIT refers to a ‘real estate 
investment trust’ as set forth in subchapter M of chapter 1 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986.”
233
  REITs can include different forms of entities.  
“The net effect [of REIT rules] is that an entity formed as a trust, 
partnership, limited liability company or corporation can be a REIT.”
234
  
REITs are essentially companies that are required to have most of their 
income and assets tied to real estate, and which are then permitted to 
achieve special federal income tax consequences. 
A real estate adviser would likely be considered to advise persons or 
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing 
in REITs.  From a securities standpoint, investments in most REITs would 
give rise to “securities” issues as the investments would be considered 
“stock” or “investment contracts.”  For wholly owned REITs, the concerns 
expressed regarding wholly owned entities in general would apply. 
Q. Investments in TICs 
Today, tenancies in common (“TICs”) are a popular medium of real 
estate investment.  The Securities Division of the State of Washington 
notes that “a tenancy in common is a form of property ownership in which 
multiple persons each own an undivided fractional interest in the entire 
property.”
235
  Typically, the investors in a TIC don’t retain managerial 
control. 
[A]n investment contract is involved in the public offering of 
fractional undivided interests in a building — whether an office 
 
 232.  Id. at 352-53. 
 233.  Frequently Asked Questions About Real Estate Investment Trusts, MORRISON & 
FOERSTER LLP 1, http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/FAQ_REIT.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2013). 
 234.  Id. at 3. 
 235.  Alert: Tenancy-in-Common Interests as “Securities”, STATE OF WASH., DEP’T OF 
FIN. INSTS., SEC. DIV., (Sept. 8, 2005), http://dfi.wa.gov/sd/pdf/tenancy_in_common.pdf 
[hereinafter Tenancy-in-Common Interests as “Securities”]. 
2013] THE RISE OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 159 
 
 
building or an apartment building in which equity ownership is 
not synonymous with occupancy — under some sort of 
arrangement by which the promoter or a nominee assumes the 
responsibility of physical management of the property and 
distribution of the profits to the co-owners.
236
 
A real estate adviser would likely be considered to advise persons or 
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing 
in tenancy in common investments (TICs).  The Securities Division of the 
State of Washington has concluded that “[t]enancies in common may 
constitute ‘securities’ under the ‘investment contract’ test.”
237
 
At a 2007 Tenants in Common membership symposium, David Lynn, 
the chief counsel in the SEC Division of Corporate Finance “stated that 
SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corporation, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005), which 
dealt with viatical contracts, reflected the SEC’s opinion that significant 
pre-purchase managerial activities undertaken to insure the success of the 
investment in themselves may well make the TIC interests securities.”
238
   
“Of course, it would be extremely difficult for a sponsor to offer TIC 
interests without taking pre-purchase activities to aid the success of the 
investment.”
239
  However, the Supreme Court has not definitively resolved 
the issue yet. 
One point to note is that recently, a federal district court considered 
whether TICs were “securities” in San Francisco Residence Club.  The 
court applied the “investment contract” framework, and concluded that 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should be denied, since plaintiffs 
did not present “undisputed facts to establish that . . . the TIC interests were 
securities . . . .”
240
  That case hinged on the factual issue of how much 
managerial control was retained by plaintiffs. 
This case therefore suggests that a real estate fund potentially could 
invest in TICs without definite securities problems if the fund retained 
adequate managerial control.  Another possibility employed by sponsors of 
TICs to avoid securities issues is to hire independent management for the 
TIC.  However, given the uncertainties in this area, seeking no-action relief 
under such circumstances would be advisable. 
 
 236.  LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(iv), at 991. 
 237.  Tenancy-in-Common Interests as “Securities”, supra note 235.  
 238.  Tenants-in-Common Arrangements and the Securities Law, METHVEN & ASSOCS., 
http://www.methvenlaw.com/Practice-Areas/Real-Estate/Tenants-In-Common-
Arrangements-and-Securities-Laws.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  San Francisco Residence Club, Inc. v. Amado, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55134, at 
*15 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2010). 
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R. Investments in Real Estate Derivatives 
“A derivative is a contract between two or more parties whose value is 
based on an agreed-upon underlying financial asset, index or security. 
Common underlying instruments include: bonds, commodities, currencies, 
interest rates, market indexes and stocks.”
241
 
A real estate adviser could potentially be considered to advise persons 
or entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about 
investing in real estate derivatives.  Section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act 
states that the term “security” includes 
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security 
(including a certificate of deposit) or any group or index of 
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value 
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege  entered 
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency 
. . . .
242
 
The Advisers Act suggests that a real estate derivative based on real 
estate that is not a security may not be a “security.”  However, given that, 
as shown above, many real estate investments are “securities,” it is very 
probable in many cases that a real estate derivate would be based on a 
“security.”  Also, real estate advisers may want to invest in foreign 
currency derivatives for hedging purposes, which could put it within the 
realm of the Advisers Act. 
S. Investment in Real Estate Funds 
There are many different types of real estate funds, such as public 
mutual funds or private equity real estate funds.A real estate adviser would 
likely be considered to advise persons or entities about investing in 
“securities” if they advise them about investing in real estate funds.  Real 
estate funds invariably fall within the “investment contract” analysis under 
the Advisers Act. 
T. Investment in the Fund Itself 
A real estate fund investment adviser could be considered an 
“investment adviser” if he recommends investment in a fund that he 
sponsors, potentially even if the fund solely invests in non-securities real 
 
 241.  Jean Folger, Frequently Asked Questions: What is a derivative?, INVESTOPEDIA 
(July 11, 2012), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/12/derivative.asp. 
 242.  Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006). 
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estate.
243
  In this case, a real estate adviser can potentially mitigate the risk 
by limiting his advice about securities to one-off advice to invest in his 
fund, and explicitly stating to investors both orally and in writing that the 
real estate investment adviser is neither holding itself out, nor representing 
that he is an investment adviser.
244
  To be even safer, the real estate 
investment adviser should not provide recommendations to invest in the 
fund, and could explicitly state that he is not able to do so. 
U. Conclusion 
This discussion was not intended to be exhaustive of every potential 
scenario that could lead to a real estate investment adviser being considered 
an “investment adviser.”  The takeaway lesson from this analysis is that if a 
private equity real estate investment adviser belongs to one of the fortunate 
categories of real estate advisers that don’t advise about “securities,” then 
such private equity real estate adviser will shed the title of an “investment 
adviser” within the meaning of the Advisers Act and will thus not be 
subject to the burdensome registration and compliance regime of the 
Advisers Act.  Such advisers would likely also not be subject to the 
Investment Company Act and the Volcker Rule. 
However, the above analysis shows that any time a private equity real 
estate adviser advises about real estate investments that fall within 
“securities,” the adviser becomes subject to the Advisers Act.  The analysis 
above shows that a wide range of real estate investments can potentially be 
“securities,” including both entities and non-entity investments in real 
estate.  Private equity real estate advisers will also need to consider that 
under Section 208(d) of the Advisers Act, if they restructure their 
operations from direct investments to indirect investments in securities, not 
only will they fail to reach the goal of shearing off their titles of “advisers” 
but their actions would be deemed illegal circumventions under the 
Advisers Act.
245
  For example, if any subsidiary entities were to own 
“securities,” the investment adviser could not avoid the Advisers Act by 
owning “securities” through those entities, even if those entities are not 
“securities.”  However, Section 208(d) should generally not prohibit 
legitimate structuring attempts, which generally means structuring the real 
estate adviser’s fund’s investments so that they are not directly or indirectly 
 
 243.  See LEMKE & LINS, supra note 131, § 1:7 (“[A]dvice about interests in entities that 
own or hold non-securities . . . would generally be considered giving advice about 
securities . . .”). 
 244.  See id. § 1:5 (noting that the SEC staff looks at whether the person holds him or 
herself “out to the public as an investment adviser.”). 
 245.  See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(a)(d) (prohibiting indirect actions that would be unlawful, 
under the statute, if done directly). 
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“securities,” without creating affiliates to invest in “securities” to evade the 
Advisers Act. 
Unsurprisingly, sidestepping the Advisers Act is easier said than done.  
Oftentimes, private equity real estate investment advisers cannot walk this 
road, even if their goal is really just to invest in operating and developing 
real properties, and not in securities.  Private equity real estate investment 
advisers should recognize that there might be considerable drawbacks to 
structuring their investment advice to sidestep the Advisers Act.  First, 
structuring to avoid the Advisers Act will severely limit what types of real 
estate investments a private equity real estate adviser can advise on.  
Private equity real estate investment advisers will need to consider whether 
being subject to registration and regulation under the Advisers Act (and 
potentially state law) is worth the burden of not being able to advise about 
“securities.”  Second, determining whether a real estate investment is a 
“security” may involve a lot of time, energy, and expense.  Third, 
determining whether a real estate investment is a “security” may involve 
compliance uncertainty.  Private equity real estate investment advisers 
should understand that if they decide to structure their operations so that 
they are not “investment advisers” on the basis that they do not generally 
advise about “securities,” that there could be considerable uncertainty 
regarding what would be considered advising about “securities.”  Private 
equity real estate investment advisers wanting to sidestep the Advisers Act 
in this way should consult their counsel. 
Note, private equity real estate fund investment advisers who need to 
advise about “securities” in a limited capacity can reduce, but perhaps not 
eliminate, the risk that they would be considered “investment advisers” by 
limiting any advice about “securities” to one-off advice and explicitly 
stating to investors both orally and in writing that the real estate investment 
adviser is neither holding himself out nor representing himself as an 
investment adviser. 
 III.  THE ABILITY OF A PRIVATE EQUITY REAL ESTATE ADVISER TO 
SIDESTEP THE PORTIONS OF THE DODD-FRANK THAT SUBJECT 
PRIVATE FUNDS INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO ADDITIONAL 
REGULATIONS 
If it is impractical for private equity real estate funds to avoid 
investing in securities and be exempt from the Advisers Act, is it possible 
for the advisers to reduce the burdens imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act in 
any other respects?  The answer is that the Dodd-Frank Act burdens, in 
particular, investment advisers to “private funds.”  “Private funds,” a term 
added to the Advisers Act by Dodd-Frank, includes an investment fund that 
would be an investment company as defined in Section 3 of the Investment 
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Company Act
246
 but for the exemptions in Sections 3(c)(1)
247
 or 3(c)(7)
248
 
thereof.  Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) were the 
most frequently relied upon exemptions by private equity funds. 
In the next portion of this article, we will consider new paths for 
private equity real estate investment advisers to sidestep the parts of the 
Dodd-Frank Act that burden investment advisers to “private funds,” most 
significantly Volcker Rule and Form PF. 
This article predicts that private equity real estate investment advisers 
may likely want to restructure their funds’ exemptions to take advantage of 
non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act exemptions, different from 
those that are typically relied upon.  If the private equity real estate 
investment adviser advises Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 
3(c)(9) exempt funds under the Investment Company Act, the adviser 
won’t be considered advising “private funds” and thus should have the 
ability to avoid the Dodd-Frank Act provisions that target “private funds” 
advisers.  It should be noted that private equity real estate investment 
advisers, in particular, will have the option of considering the Sections 
3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) exemptions. 
Before diving into the benefits of advising Section 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 
3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) exempt funds under the Dodd-Frank 
Act, it is worth noting that there are also potential benefits intrinsic to the 
Investment Company Act itself.  Section 3(c)(1) exempt funds have the 
advantage that the suitability requirements of Section 3(c)(1) are not as 
heightened as for Section 3(c)(7) exempt funds.  Section 3(c)(7) exempt 
funds require “qualified purchasers,” a type of super accredited wealthy 
investor.  Section 3(c)(1) exempt funds, however, have the drawback that 
the fund can be, “[B]eneficially owned by not more than one hundred 
persons.”
249
 
 
 246.  The definition of an “investment company” is beyond the scope of this article, but 
subject to certain exceptions, generally includes, without limitation, most types of 
companies that (i) invest more than 40% of their total assets (excluding government 
securities and cash) in securities on an unconsolidated basis, or (ii) hold themselves out as 
primarily engaged in the business of investing in securities.  Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A),(C). 
 247.  Per Section 3(c)(1), the definition of “investment company” does not include 
“[a]ny issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially 
owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not 
presently propose to make a public offering of its securities.”  Investment Company Act of 
1940 § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006). 
 248.  Per Section 3(c)(7), the definition of “investment company” does not include 
“[a]ny issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at 
the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is not making 
and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of such securities.”  Id. § 80a-
3(c)(7)(A). 
 249.  Id. § 80a-3(c)(1). 
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Since the Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 
3(c)(9) exemptions are neither limited to funds with not more than one 
hundred persons, nor funds with qualified purchasers, the Sections 3(a)(1), 
3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) exemptions offer some 
attractive features under the Investment Company Act.  However, the 
Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) 
exemptions have often been overlooked by practitioners due to their super-
complex securities structuring problems that they pose, which potentially 
means (A) more compliance time, energy and expense, and (B) more 
compliance uncertainty.  Nonetheless, it may now be the time for private 
equity real estate investment advisers to give them a harder look. 
For private equity real estate investment advisers seeking to rely upon 
the new “private funds” exemption created by Dodd-Frank,
250
 the 
investment adviser may need to act as an investment adviser solely to 
“private funds,” in which case the investment adviser may desire not to 
advise Section 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) 
exempt investment companies, which are not “private funds.”  Pursuant to 
Rule 203m-1, an investment adviser seeking nonetheless to utilize the 
Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) 
exemptions and the “private funds” exemption could still do so if “the 
investment adviser treats the issuer as a private fund under the [Advisers] 
Act (15 U.S.C. 80b) and the rules thereunder for all purposes.”
251
 
Below, this article considers how a private equity real estate 
investment adviser could minimize the new burdens that the Dodd-Frank 
imposes on advisers to “private funds,” by considering the specific benefits 
of advising non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds.  Private equity advisers seeking 
to restructure their funds in this way may wish to seek SEC staff no-action 
relief to confirm the legal bases for these possibilities. 
A. Benefit 1 – Form PF 
Beyond subjecting many investment advisers to the existing record 
keeping and reporting requirements framework under the Advisers Act, the 
Dodd-Frank Act imposes additional record keeping and reporting 
requirements with respect to “private funds.”  Under Section 404 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC may require any registered investment adviser to 
 
 250.  See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(m)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(m)(1) 
(Supp. 2012) (“The Commission shall provide an exemption from the registration 
requirements under [the Advisers Act] to any investment adviser of private funds, if each of 
such investment adviser acts solely as an adviser to private funds and has assets under 
management in the United States of less than $150,000,000.”). 
 251.  17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)-1(d)(5) (2013). 
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be subject to certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements with respect 
to “private funds.”
252
 
Registered investment advisers who manage one or more “private 
funds” are now required to file Form PF if the adviser or its related persons, 
collectively, have “at least $150 million in private fund assets under 
management as of the last of [the adviser’s] most recently completed fiscal 
year.”
253
  Advisers must report on Form PF certain information regarding 
the “private funds” they manage, and this information is intended to 
complement information the SEC collects on Form ADV. . . .
254
  “Rule 
204(b)-1 will require SEC-registered investment advisers who manage 
private funds to report risk exposure statistics on a consistent basis . . . on 
Form PF.”
255
 
As the definition of “private funds” under Section 402 of the Dodd-
Frank Act does not include funds exempt under Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 
3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9), registered private equity real estate 
investment that advise non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) funds should not be subject to 
Form PF.
256
 
Not subjecting private equity real estate to Form PF was likely 
intended by the regulators, since private equity real estate doesn’t pose 
systemic risks.  This is confirmed by the fact that the regulators have 
already finalized Form PF, and there is no indication that it applies to 
private equity real estate utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions. 
B. Benefit 2 – Future Regulation on the Horizon 
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the comptroller general of the United 
States to conduct “a study of the feasibility of forming a self-regulatory 
organization (“SRO”) to oversee private funds . . . .”
257
  In addition, the 
Dodd-Frank Act requires the comptroller general to conduct “a study on the 
appropriate criteria for determining the financial thresholds or other criteria 
needed to qualify for accredited investor status and eligibility to invest in 
private funds . . . .”
258
 
 
 252.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010). 
 253.  SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF 1, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Risky Reporting: Form PF in a Nutshell, ERNST & YOUNG 1 (Jan. 2012),  
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Risky_reporting_Form_PF_in_a_nutshell/$FI
LE/Risky%20reporting_Form%20PF%20in%20a%20nutshell.pdf.  
 256.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 404 (explaining that private funds must disclose certain 
required information). 
 257.  Id. § 416. 
 258.  Id. § 415. 
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On July 11, 2011, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
released a study regarding the feasibility of forming an SRO to oversee 
investment advisers to “private funds.”
259
  The study indicated that such an 
SRO could be done, but concluded that it would require legislation and 
would not be without challenges.
260
  Thus, it does not appear likely that 
such an SRO is on the horizon. 
However, if there ever were further regulation of “private funds,” 
private equity real estate investment advisers that advise exempt funds 
other than “private funds,” such as Section 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 
3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9) exempt funds, would likely not be subject to 
such SRO oversight or increased suitability thresholds. 
Not subjecting private equity real estate to a future SRO was likely 
intended by the regulators, since private equity real estate doesn’t pose 
systemic risks. 
C. Benefit 3 – Foreign Private Advisers 
Foreign private equity real estate investment advisers may seek to rely 
upon the revised Section 203(b)(3) exemption from registration under the 
Advisers Act for “foreign private advisers,” as defined in Section 
202(a)(30) thereof.
261
  The Dodd-Frank Act defines the term “foreign 
private adviser” to mean any investment adviser who, among other things, 
“has, in total, fewer than 15 clients and investors in the United States in 
private funds advised by the investment adviser.”
262
 
Thus, if a foreign private equity real estate investment adviser advises 
Investment Company Act exempt funds other than “private funds,” a 
foreign private equity real estate investment adviser would likely be able to 
advise fewer than fifteen funds in the United States, and the number of 
investors in the United States in those would not be restricted, since the 
statute only restricts the number of investors in “private funds.”  Thus, if a 
foreign private equity real estate investment were to structure its funds as 
Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9) exempt 
funds, that would make it easier for them to fit within the foreign private 
adviser exemption under the Advisers Act. 
It should be noted that an additional advantage of this type of 
structuring is that foreign private advisers would additionally not be subject 
to either the old or the new Advisers Act record keeping and reporting 
 
 259.  Private Fund Advisers: Although a Self-Regulator Organization Could Supplement 
SEC Oversight, It Would Present Challenges and Trade Offs, U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE (July 2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320886.pdf.  
 260.  Id. at 11. 
261.   Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(30), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30) (2006). 
 262.  Dodd-Frank Act § 402(a). 
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provisions, including Form PF, since they wouldn’t be registered 
investment advisers. 
The ability of private equity real estate to more easily satisfy the 
“foreign private advisers” exemption was likely intended by the regulators, 
since private equity real estate doesn’t give rise to systemic risk concerns. 
D. Benefit 4 – Intrastate Advisers 
The Dodd-Frank Act added that the intrastate adviser exemption in 
Section 203(b)(1) of the Advisers Act cannot be utilized by investment 
advisers that advise “private funds.”
263
  Following the Dodd-Frank Act, 
Section 203(b)(1) provides an exemption from registration under the 
Advisers Act to “any investment adviser, other than an investment adviser 
who acts as an investment adviser to any private fund, all of whose clients 
are residents of the State within which such investment adviser maintains 
his or its principal office and place of business. . . .”
264
  As a result, an 
intrastate investment adviser seeking to avoid registration under the 
Advisers Act could potentially advise funds exempt under Sections 3(a)(1), 
3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9) of the Investment Company 
Act. 
The ability of private equity real estate to more easily satisfy the 
“intrastate advisers” exemption was also likely intended by the regulators, 
since, as discussed above, private equity real estate doesn’t give rise to 
systemic risk concerns. 
E. Benefit 5 – Volcker Rule 
Regardless of whether an investment adviser is an “investment 
adviser” within the meaning of the Advisers Act, the new Volcker Rule 
provides, subject to certain limited exceptions, that “a banking entity shall 
not – (A) engage in proprietary trading; or (B) acquire or retain any equity, 
partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a 
private equity fund.”
265
  In addition, subject to certain carve-outs, the 
Volcker Rule provides that, 
Any nonbank financial company supervised by the Board that 
engages in proprietary trading or takes or retains any equity, 
partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsors a hedge 
fund or a private equity fund shall be subject, by rule . . . to 
additional capital requirements for and additional quantitative 
 
 263.  Id. § 403. 
 264.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(1) (2006). 
 265.  12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
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limits with regards to such proprietary trading and taking or 
retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or 
sponsorship of a hedge fund or a private equity fund . . . .
266
 
The Volcker Rule generally defines both “hedge funds” and “private equity 
funds” to include any issuers that rely on the exclusion from the definition 
of investment company under Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment 
Company Act or “such similar funds” as determined by the SEC, 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or appropriate federal 
banking agencies.
267
 
Currently, these agencies are considering promulgating rules that 
would broadly define “such similar funds” in such a way as to subject 
Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exempt funds, as well as other types of exempt 
funds and entities, to the above provisions of the Volcker Rule.  If the joint 
agencies limit their discretion and promulgate rules that exclude from the 
scope of the Volcker Rule most exempt funds, other than Sections 3(c)(1) 
and 3(c)(7) exempt funds, then private equity real estate investment 
advisers would find it particularly advantageous to advise Sections 3(a)(1), 
3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9) exempt funds. 
In 2011, the joint agencies promulgated a joint release that set forth a 
proposed rule, but these agencies have yet to issue a final rule.  In the joint 
release, these agencies stated as follows:  “The proposed rule follows the 
scope of the statutory definition by covering an issuer only if it would be an 
investment company, as defined in the Investment Company Act, but for 
section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act.”
268
  In footnote 222 of the joint 
release, the agencies noted: 
Under the proposed rule, if an issuer (including an issuer of asset-
backed securities) may rely on another exclusion or exemption 
from the definition of “investment company” under the 
Investment Company Act other than the exclusions contained in 
section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, it would not be considered a 
covered fund, as long as it can satisfy all of the conditions of an 
alternative exclusion or exemption for which it is eligible.
269
 
Thus, there is reason to be optimistic that the agencies will choose to limit 
their discretion and not apply the Volcker Rule against private equity real 
estate advisers utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions when they eventually 
promulgate a final rule.  For the reasons discussed in the policy analysis 
 
 266.  Id. § 1851(a)(2). 
 267.  Id. § 1851(h)(2). 
 268.  Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,897 
(Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Volcker Rules Release]. 
 269.  Id. at n.222. 
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section, this paper strongly urges the regulators not to apply the Volcker 
Rule against private equity real estate advisers utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) 
exemptions. 
 IV.  A COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE EQUITY REAL 
ESTATE ADVISERS SEEKING TO UTILIZE NON-(C)(1)/(C)(7) 
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT EXEMPTIONS 
Following the Dodd-Frank Act, given the potential benefits of 
advising non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds discussed in Part II, private equity 
real estate investment advisers clearly will want to consider structuring 
their private equity real estate funds so that they are exempt under Sections 
3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or Section 3(c)(9) of the 
Investment Company Act.  This will allow a private equity real estate 
investment adviser to take the position that it does not advise “private 
funds.”  However, utilizing the Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 
3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or Section 3(c)(9) Investment Company Act exemptions 
involves complex securities considerations, so private equity real estate 
investment advisers will need to weigh the costs and benefits of this type of 
structuring. 
Below, this part briefly summarizes these considerations. These 
summaries are meant only to be an introduction to the structuring 
considerations.  The requirements of these exemptions are complex and 
legal counsel should be sought.  For more information on Investment 
Company Act exemptions structuring considerations, consult Robert H. 
Rosenblum’s seminal treatise, Investment Company Determination under 
the 1940 Act:  Exemptions and Exceptions.
270
The reader should note in the 
discussion below that when the term “issuer” or “company” is used, it 
refers to the potential funds that a private equity real estate adviser would 
advise. 
A. Section 3(a)(1) 
The term “investment company” means, under Section 3(a)(1), 
[A]ny issuer which — (1) is or holds itself out as being engaged 
primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of 
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; (2) is engaged or 
proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount 
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such 
business and has any such certificate outstanding; or (3) is 
 
 270.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204. 
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engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or 
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value 
exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets 
(exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an 
unconsolidated basis.
271 
 
“Investment securities,” as used in Section 3, “includes all securities 
except (A) Government securities, (B) securities issued by employees' 
securities companies, and (C) securities issued by majority-owned 
subsidiaries of the owner which (i) are not investment companies, and (ii) 
are not relying on the exception from the definition of investment company 
in paragraph (1) or (7) of subsection (c).”
272
 
“Securities” under the Investment Company Act are described by the 
Investment Company Act in exactly the same way as under the Advisers 
Act.  “Security” is defined under the Investment Company Act to mean 
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, 
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest 
in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, 
or privilege on any security (including a certificate of deposit) or 
on any group or index of securities (including any interest therein 
or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, 
or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange 
relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of 
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, 
receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing.
273
 
Even though the definition of “securities” is nearly the same as under 
the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), an instrument may be a security for 
Investment Company Act purposes even if it is not for purposes of the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.  For example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that bank certificates of deposit are not necessarily securities 
 
 271.  Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 3(a)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(a)(1)(A)-(C) 
(2006).  While this article provides a brief introduction to Section 3(a)(1) issues, the reader 
should consult the Rosenblum treatise, supra note 204, §§ 3-5, for a more general discussion 
of Section 3(a)(1) issues. 
 272.  15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(a)(2). 
 273.  Id. § 80a-2(a)(36). 
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for purposes of the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.
274
  Nonetheless, the 
SEC has said that bank certificates of deposit may be securities for 
purposes of the Investment Company Act: 
While the language in the Investment Company Act’s definition 
of the term “security” is identical to that in the Securities Act, the 
regulatory context under the Investment Company Act differs 
fundamentally from that under the Securities Act and the 
Securities Exchange Act. . . . Since the bank regulatory statutes 
generally do not apply to the operation of [money market] funds, 
and since the exclusion of certificates of deposit from the 
definition of security in the Investment Company Act would 
seriously undermine the protections contemplated by Congress, 
the SEC believes that the relevant context requires that the term 
“security” take on a “different coloration” under the Investment 
Company Act.
275
 
In the context of real estate, the SEC staff has sometimes taken the 
position that an interest in real estate is not a “security” under the 
Investment Company Act.  According to the SEC staff in Pruco, investing 
in “traditional non-securities real estate investments” did not require 
registration under the Investment Company Act, since these investments 
were not considered securities.
276
  However, other types of real estate 
interests could potentially be “securities,” which would likely entail a 
similar analysis as set forth in Part I of this article. 
In the Investment Company Act context, the SEC staff has indicated 
that when a real estate fund invests in a company that invests in real estate, 
that investment may be a security as well.
277
  The Two-Tier Real Estate 
Companies release (discussed below) sets forth no-action criteria for 
relying upon Section 3(a)(1) when a parent partnership is a two-tier real 
estate company by virtue of its investments in other limited partnerships.
278
 
Certain real estate funds may thus fall outside the definition of 
“investment company” under Section 3(a)(1), while others potentially 
could fall within that definition, depending on the type of real estate 
investments that they make, and on whether those real estate investments 
 
 274.  See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982) (“We therefore hold that the 
certificate of deposit . . . . is not a security.”). 
 275.  Joel H. Goldberg, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2460, at *1-2 
(May 6, 1982) (internal citations omitted). 
 276.  Pruco Life Real Property Account, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 2730, at *6 (Sept. 18, 1986).  See also ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 2.3.13, at 59 
(explaining that the SEC Staff does not hold an interest in real estate as a security). 
 277.  See ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 2.3.13, at 59 (explaining the SEC staff’s 
position that interests in a company that invests in real estate are securities).  
 278.  Two-Tier Real Estate Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-8456, 
39 Fed. Reg. 32,129 (Sept. 5, 1974). 
172 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
 
are securities investments.  To the extent a real estate fund falls outside of 
the definition of “investment company” in Section 3(a)(1), the SEC staff 
has suggested that regular monitoring is required to ensure that the issuer 
continues to fall outside of that definition.
279
  To the extent a real estate 
fund falls within the definition of “investment company” under Section 
3(a)(1), investment advisers seeking not to advise “private funds” as a 
result of the Dodd-Frank Act will need to consider using Sections 3(b)(1), 
3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9) for an exemption from the Investment 
Company Act. 
The drawback for real estate investment advisers of trying to fall 
outside the definition of “investment company” in Section 3(a)(1) is that a 
Section 3(a)(1) exemption would likely place severe limitations on the 
types of investments that a real estate fund could invest in, not to mention 
the ongoing monitoring requirements. 
B. Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) 
Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) of the Investment Company Act exempt 
issuers from the basic definition of an “investment company” contained in 
Section 3(a)(1)(C) (discussed above).
280
 
Nonetheless, the Commission has taken the position that a 
determination under Section 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2) that an issuer is 
primarily engaged in a non-investment company business also 
necessarily is a determination that the issuer is engaged in a 
noninvestment company business for purposes of Section 
3(a)(1)(C) and that the issuer therefore is not an investment 
company under Section 3(a)(1)(A).
281
 
The Rosenblum treatise adds that the Staff would not allow a 
company to rely upon the Sections 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2) exemptions in the 
event an issuer “holds itself out as an investment company.”
282  
Companies 
that are not exempt under either Section 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2) always have the 
option of seeking Section 6(c) exemptive relief as a fall-back option.
283
 
 
 279.  See Pruco Life Real Property Account, supra note 276, at *1 (discouraging 
enforcement action provided that the fund regularly monitor its accounts). 
 280.  Section 3(b)(2) is a related exception to section 3(a)(1)(C), but it is not discussed, 
since Section 3(b)(2) is not self-operating. 
 281.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 6.2, at 157. 
 282.  Id. While this article provides a brief introduction to Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) 
issues, the reader should consult Rosenblum, supra note 204, §§ 6-7, for a more general 
discussion. 
 283.  See id. § 6.4, at 181 (explaining that the Commission may grant exemptive relief 
under Section 6(c) if the exemption is in the public interest and consistent with the 
protection of investors and purpose of the Investment Company Act). 
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Section 3(b)(1) exempts from the definition of investment company in 
Section 3(a)(1)(C) “any issuer primarily engaged, directly or through a 
wholly-owned subsidiary or subsidiaries,
284
 in a business or businesses 
other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in 
securities.”
285
  That is, issuers that conduct an operating business through 
wholly-owned subsidiaries are exempted from the definition of an 
investment company, even though over 40 percent of their total assets 
technically consist of securities.  The SEC takes the view that the Section 
3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) exceptions are “not available to an issuer that holds 
itself out as an investment company.”
286
 
Section 3(b)(2) of the [Investment Company] Act is closely 
related to Section 3(b)(1) and . . . .  authorizes the Commission to 
declare by order that an issuer is not an investment company as 
defined in Section 3(a)(1)(C) if the issuer is primarily engaged in 
a business or businesses other than that of investing, reinvesting, 
owning, holding, or trading in securities either directly, through 
majority-owned subsidiaries, or through controlled companies 
conducting similar types of businesses. . . .
287
 
The Commission has stated:  
[C]ertain operational differences exist between section 3(b)(1) 
and section 3(b)(2).  Section 3(b)(1) is self-operating, while 
section 3(b)(2) requires a Commission order.  Additionally, 
section 3(b)(1) applies only to companies operating either 
directly or through wholly owned subsidiaries, while section 
3(b)(2) applies additionally to companies operating through 
majority-owned subsidiaries and certain controlled companies. . . 
 
 284.  Section 2(a)(43) of the Investment Company Act defines a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of a person as “a company 95 per centum or more of the outstanding voting 
securities of which are owned by such person, or by a company which, within the meaning 
of this paragraph, is a wholly owned subsidiary of such person.”  Investment Company Act 
of 1940 § 2(a)(43), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(43) (2006).   
Section 2(a)(42) defines a “voting security” as “any security presently entitling the 
owner or holder thereof to vote for the election of directors of a company.”  Id. § 80a-
2(a)(42). 
[T]he Staff has suggested that a limited partnership (the ‘subsidiary’) may be 
deemed to be a wholly owned subsidiary of a parent partnership, even if the 
limited partnership interests are not voting securities, when the parent 
partnership owns at least 95 percent of the limited partnership interests of the 
subsidiary and the general partner of the parent partnership also will serve as the 
general partner of the subsidiary.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 6.5, at 185. 
 285.  Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(1) (2006). 
 286.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 6.2, at 157. 
 287.  Id. § 6.1, at 155. 
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.
288
 
In order to rely upon either Section 3(b)(1) or Section 3(b)(2), 
an issuer initially must establish that it is engaged in some 
noninvestment business. If an identifiable noninvestment 
business exists, the inquiry shifts to whether that business is 
primary.  An issuer that is primarily engaged in one or more non-
investment company businesses may be eligible to rely upon 
Section 3(b)(1) or Section 3(b)(2).  By contrast, an issuer that is 
engaged, but not primarily engaged, in a noninvestment company 
business may not rely upon Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2). . . .
289
 
The determination of whether an issuer is primarily engaged in a 
non-investment company business for purposes of Section 
3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) generally is based upon the five-factor test 
established in the Commission’s 1947 decision in Tonopah 
Mining Co. . . .  The five factors examined under the Tonopah 
test are (1) the issuer’s historical development, (2) its public 
representations of policy, (3) the activities of its officers and 
directors, (4) the nature of its present assets, and (5) the sources 
of its present income.
290
 
Occasionally, the SEC uses a different test than the Tonopah test.  As 
related to real estate, “in certain exemptive applications involving oil, gas, 
and other mining companies, the Commission has from time to time looked 
at financial tests other than simply the percentage of assets invested in and 
income derived from investment securities.”
291
 
As far as non-investment company businesses are concerned, the SEC 
has permitted certain real estate activities to count as non-investment 
company businesses when the company was primarily engaged in certain 
real estate activities. The SEC has, at least under certain facts, permitted 
engaging in real estate secured lending,
292
 owning an office building,
293
 
owning single family homes,
294
 engaging in the business of servicing loans 
 
 288.  Id. at 156 (internal quotation omitted).  
 289.  Id. § 6.3, at 158 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). 
 290.  Id. at 158-59 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 291.  Id. § 6.3, at 173. 
 292.  See, e.g., In re Baldwin Sec. Corp., Investment Company Act Release No. IC-
15747, 1987 SEC LEXIS 4662, at *1 (May 20, 1987) (ordering that applicant who engaged 
in primary real estate secured lending is not considered an investment company). 
 293.  See, e.g., In re Fed. Power & Light Co., Investment Company Act Release No. 298, 
1942 SEC LEXIS 718, at *10 (Jan. 19, 1942) (ordering that applicants who owned stock in 
a realty company that engaged solely in the operation of a office building to be 
noninvestment companies). 
 294.  See, e.g., Hereth, Orr and Jones, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 2951, at *14 (Sept. 2, 1983) (concluding that a company that provided a pool of 
investment funds to be used to purchase single family homes is not an investment 
company). 
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secured by mortgages,
295
 and investing in mortgages or being primarily 
engaged in the business of servicing loans secured by such mortgages.
296
 In 
a no-action letter, the SEC staff gave broad relief for a variety of real estate 
activities where the company’s business primarily consisted of: 
(1) originating real estate mortgage loans for sale to permanent 
lenders pursuant to commitments from permanent lenders to 
purchase such loans, (2) servicing loans for permanent lenders, 
(3) real estate brokerage, (4) sales of various forms of insurance, 
primarily to borrowers, (5) residential and commercial property 
management, and (6) real estate investment and development, 
primarily as a general partner in various limited partnerships 
formed for the purpose of owning multi-family and commercial 
real estate.
297
 
In addition, certain kinds of oil, gas, and mining businesses are also 
considered non-investment company businesses.
298
  However, when a real 
estate fund invests in real estate activities that are “securities,” then it is 
unlikely that the real estate fund would be considered a non-investment 
company business. 
There are some barriers to relying upon Sections 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2).  
At times, “[t]he Commission and the Staff . . .  have taken the position that 
companies other than industrial companies and industrial holding 
companies are not eligible to rely upon Sections 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2).”
299
  In 
addition, “the Commission and the Staff have taken the position that 
Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) are not available to the types of issuers that are 
included among the various exemptions in Section 3(c) of the [Investment 
Company] Act.”
300
  However, “[i]n a number of instances . . . the 
Commission and the Staff have implicitly have taken the opposite position” 
and “the Staff has permitted issuers to rely upon Section 3(b)(1) when they 
have engaged . . . in certain real estate activities, even though Section 
 
 295.  See e.g., First Deed Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2565, 
at *24 (Mar. 29, 1979) (concluding that a company primarily engaged in the business of 
investing in mortgages need not register under the Investment Company Act of 1940). 
 296.  See, e.g., Financial Mortgage & Realty Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC 
No-Act. LEXIS 1921, at *15-16 (July 18, 1977) (concluding that a company primarily 
engaged in the business of servicing loans secured by mortgages need not register under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940). 
 297.  H. & Val J. Rothschild, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
1928, at *4 (Sept. 5, 1976). 
 298.  See ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 6.4, at 176-77 (noting noninvestment 
businesses can include exploration, development, and distribution of oil, gas, and precious 
metals). 
 299.  Id. at 179. 
 300.  Id. 
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3(c)(5)(C) of the [Investment Company] Act applies to similar 
companies.”
301
 
The SEC staff has also allowed a company to fall under the Section 
3(b)(1) exemption when that company owned shares of a mineral 
subsidiary whose business consisted “of owning or holding oil, gas, and 
other mineral royalties or leases or fractional interests in oil, gas, or other 
mineral royalties or leases within the meaning of Section 3(c)(9)” of the 
Investment Company Act.
302
 
Issuers that operate non-investment real estate companies indirectly 
through wholly owned subsidiaries may rely upon Section 3(b)(1). 
Section 3(b)(1) excepts an issuer from the definition of 
investment company if the issuer is primarily engaged, either 
directly or through a wholly owned subsidiary or subsidiaries, in 
a noninvestment company business.  Section 3(b)(1) does not 
apply to issuers engaged in noninvestment company businesses 
through majority-owned or controlled subsidiaries, although such 
issuers may apply to the Commission for an exemptive order in 
Section 3(b)(2).
303
 
Section 2(a)(43) of the [Investment Company] Act defines a 
wholly owned subsidiary of a person as: a company 95 per 
centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of which are 
owned by such person, or by a company which, within the 
meaning of this paragraph, is a wholly owned subsidiary of such 
person.
304
 
“Thus, under Section 2(a)(43), a wholly owned subsidiary may be 
owned either directly by the parent company or indirectly through one or 
more wholly owned subsidiaries of the parent company.”
305
  It should be 
noted, relevant to the real estate fund context, that: 
[T]he Staff has suggested that a limited partnership . . . may be 
deemed to be a wholly owned subsidiary of a parent partnership, 
even if the limited partnership interests are not voting securities, 
when the parent partnership owns at least 95 percent of the 
limited partnership interests of the subsidiary and the general 
partner of the parent partnership also will serve as the general 
partner of the subsidiary.
306
 
 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  The Energy Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 4427, 
at *1 (Dec. 13, 1972). 
 303.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 6.5, at 184 (internal footnote omitted). 
 304.  Id. 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  Id. at 185. 
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To the extent that the wholly owned subsidiaries themselves engage in non-
operating businesses, the exception provided by Section 3(b)(1) would 
likely not be available, since Section 48(a) of the Investment Company Act 
prohibits doing indirectly what cannot be done directly.
307
 
The drawback for real estate investment advisers of utilizing the 
exemptions in Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2)  is that, like utilizing the Section 
3(a)(1) exemption, the Section 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) exemptions also would 
likely place severe limitations on the types of investments that a real estate 
fund could invest in. 
C. Section 3(c)(5)(C) 
1. Generally 
Section 3(c)(5)(C) generally excludes from the definition of 
investment company, “[a]ny person who is not engaged in the business of 
issuing redeemable securities, face-amount certificates of the installment 
type or periodic payment plan certificates, and who is primarily engaged in 
. . . purchasing or otherwise acquiring mortgages and other liens on and 
interests in real estate.”
308
  Below, this section discusses Section 3(c)(5)(C) 
in more detail. 
2.   Mortgage-Related Pools Concept Release 
Section 3(c)(5)(C) 
[W]as enacted in 1940 to exclude from regulation under the 
Investment Company Act companies that were engaged in the 
mortgage banking business and that did not resemble, or were not 
considered to be, issuers that were in the investment company 
business.  Since that time, as the mortgage markets have evolved 
 
 307.  See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 48(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47(a) (2006) (“It 
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to cause to be done any act or thing 
through or by means of any other person which it would be unlawful for such person to do 
under the provisions of this subchapter or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder.”). 
 308.  Id. § 80a-3(c)(5)(c). Section 3(c)(5) of the Investment Company Act also excludes 
from the definition of investment company, “Any person who is not engaged in the business 
of issuing redeemable securities, face-amount certificates of the installment type or periodic 
payment plan certificates, and who is primarily engaged in one or more of the following 
businesses: (A) Purchasing or otherwise acquiring notes, drafts, acceptances, open accounts 
receivable, and other obligations representing part or all of the sales price of merchandise, 
insurance, and services; (B) making loans to manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of, 
and to prospective purchasers of, specified merchandise, insurance, and services . . . .”  Id. § 
80a-3(c)(5). 
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and expanded, a wide variety of companies, many of them 
unforeseen in 1940, have relied upon Section 3(c)(5)(C).  The 
statutory exclusion from the definition of investment company 
provided by Section 3(c)(5)(C) does not have an extensive 
legislative history and has not been comprehensively addressed 
by the Commission.  Section 3(c)(5)(C) has been addressed in 
staff no-action letters on a case-by-case basis. . . .
309
 
Many different types of companies that engage in a variety of 
businesses rely on this exclusion.  Such companies include: 
Those that originate and hold mortgages and participations of 
mortgages that they originated; companies engaged in the 
business of acquiring from affiliates or third parties mortgages 
and mortgage-related instruments (such as mortgage 
participations, mezzanine loans and mortgage-backed securities); 
companies that invest in real estate, mortgages and mortgage-
related instruments; and companies whose primary business is to 
invest in so-called agency securities and other mortgage-backed 
securities.
310
 
The Commission refers to these types of companies as mortgage-related 
pools, many of which are REITs.
311
 
In September 2011, the SEC published a concept release and request 
for public comment focusing on, among other things, whether mortgage-
related pools should be able to rely upon the Section 3(c)(5)(C) 
exemption.
312
  The Concept Release asks for views about how this 
exclusion should apply to mortgage-related pools, whom the Commission 
suggested were making judgments about their status under the Investment 
Company Act without sufficient Commission guidance.
313
  The 
Commission was concerned that “some types of mortgage-related pools 
might interpret the statutory exclusion provided by Section 3(c)(5)(C) in a 
broad manner, while others might interpret the exclusion too narrowly, 
suggesting that there may be confusion among some mortgage-related 
pools about when the exclusion applies.”
314
  The Commission was also 
“concerned that the staff no-action letters that have addressed the statutory 
exclusion in Section 3(c)(5)(C) may have contained, or led to, 
 
 309.  Companies Engaged in the Business of Acquiring Mortgages and Mortgage-
Related Instruments, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-29778, 76 Fed. Reg. 55,300, 
55,301 (Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Mortgages Concept Release]. 
 310.  Id. (internal footnotes omitted).  
 311.  See id. at 55,302 (“Many, if not most, mortgage-related pools are corporations or 
business trusts that have elected to be treated as REITs for purposes of their tax status under 
the Internal Revenue Code.”).  
 312.  Id. at 55,300. 
 313.  Id. at 55,301. 
 314.  Id. 
2013] THE RISE OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 179 
 
 
interpretations that are beyond the scope of the exclusion and inconsistent 
with investor protection.”
315
  Furthermore, the Commission was “concerned 
that certain types of mortgage-related pools today appear to resemble in 
many respects investment companies such as closed-end funds and may not 
be the kinds of companies that were intended to be excluded from 
regulation under the Act by Section 3(c)(5)(C).”
316
 
Thus, any Section 3(c)(5)(C) discussion in this article that relates to 
mortgage-related pools could be subject to change in the near future. 
3.   Asset-Backed Issuers Concept Release 
Asset-backed issuers usually hold a pool of financial assets, which 
subjects them to the “investment company” definition in Section 3(a)(1). 
[C]ertain asset-backed issuers rely on the exclusion from the 
definition of investment company in Section 3(c)(5) of the 
Investment Company Act rather than on Rule 3a-7.  Section 
3(c)(5) was intended to exclude from the definition of investment 
company certain factoring, discounting and mortgage companies, 
and did not specifically contemplate asset-backed issuers, which 
generally did not exist at the time Congress adopted the 
Investment Company Act in 1940.
317
 
Nevertheless, 
[M]any issuers of mortgage-backed securities have sought to rely 
on Section 3(c)(5).  These asset-backed issuers include issuers of 
securities backed by whole residential mortgage loans and home 
equity loans (two of the most commonly securitized assets), 
whole commercial mortgages, participated mortgage interests, 
and “whole pool certificates” issued or guaranteed by Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae.
318
 
In August 2011, the SEC published a concept release and request for 
public comment “revisiting the ability of asset-backed issuers to rely on the 
exclusion provided by Section 3(c)(5) . . . in the aftermath of the recent 
financial crisis . . . .”
319
  Accordingly, the Commission sought comment on 
“whether Section 3(c)(5) should be amended to limit the ability of asset-
 
 315.  Id. 
 316.  Id. 
 317.  Treatment of Asset-Backed Issuers under the Investment Company Act, Investment 
Company Act Release, No. IC-29779, 76 Fed. Reg. 55,308, 55,320 (Sept. 7, 2011)(internal 
footnote omitted) [hereinafter Asset-Backed Issuers Concept Release]. 
 318.  Id. at 55,320-21 (internal footnotes omitted).  
 319.  Id. at 55,321. 
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backed issuers to rely on Section 3(c)(5).”
320
Thus, any Section 3(c)(5)(C) 
discussion in this article that relates to asset-backed issuers could be subject 
to change in the near future. 
4.   Securities That May Not Be Issued under Section 3(c)(5)(C) 
The Section 3(c)(5)(C) exclusion does not apply to issuers that are 
“engaged in the business of issuing redeemable securities, face-amount 
certificates of the installment type or periodic payment plan 
certificates.”
321
Concerns about issuing face-amount certificates of the 
installment or periodic payment plan certificates are generally not 
applicable to most modern real estate funds.  Nonetheless, in one no-action 
letter, “[A] company’s proposed method of distributing . . . which 
contemplated annual payments for ten years and a guarantee of a maturity 
value at the end of the tenth year, involved the issuance of a periodic plan 
certificate for purposes of Section 3(c)(5).”
322
 
Under Section 2(a)(32), “redeemable security” means, 
[A]ny security, other than short-term paper, under the terms of 
which the holder, upon its presentation to the issuer or to a person 
designated by the issuer, is entitled (whether absolutely or only 
out of surplus) to receive approximately his proportionate share 
of the issuer's current net assets, or the cash equivalent thereof.
323
 
The purpose of this statutory restriction was to regulate companies that 
invested in certain kinds of “notes, commercial paper, and mortgages and 
other liens on real estate [that] ‘attempted to capitalize on the popularity of 
open end [investment] companies by issuing redeemable securities.’”
324
  
What is a redeemable security under Section 2(a)(32) can entail a highly 
 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5) (2006).  
Under the Investment Company Act Section, “periodic payment plan certificate” means (A) 
any certificate, investment contract, or other security providing for a series of periodic 
payments by the holder, and representing an undivided interest in certain specified securities 
or in a unit or fund of securities purchased wholly or partly with the proceeds of such 
payments, and (B) any security the issuer of which is also issuing securities of the character 
described in clause (A) of this paragraph and the holder of which has substantially the same 
rights and privileges as those which holders of securities of the character described in clause 
(A) have upon completing the periodic payments for which such securities provide.”  Id. § 
80a-2(a)(27). 
 322.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.2, at 404, n. 8 (discussing Georgia Int’l. Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1938 (May 10, 1972)). 
 323.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32). 
 324.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.2, at 404-05 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 37 
(1969)). 
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complex and fact specific analysis.
325
  Below, some of the key issues for 
real estate funds are traced out, but such summary is not necessarily 
exhaustive of every potential Section 2(a)(32) claim that can arise for real 
estate funds aspiring to rely upon Section 3(c)(5)(C). 
[N]otwithstanding the requirement in Section 2(a)(32) that a 
redeemable security must entitle the holder to approximately his 
or her proportionate share of the issuer’s current net assets, or the 
cash equivalent thereof, the Staff has taken the position that a 
security may be a redeemable security even if a portion of the 
issuer’s income is excluded from the redemption rights.
326
 
In one early no-action letter, the SEC took the position that securities 
were redeemable securities where the fund would “offer to purchase, 
during a 30 day period following mailing of the year-end valuation of the 
limited partnership interests, any limited partnership interests tendered to it 
at a price equal to 90% of the their value . . . .” 
327
  Clearly, a redemption 
option for 90% of the value of the interests is very nearly for the 
proportionate share of the issuer’s current net assets, or cash equivalent 
thereof.  It is difficult to predict how the SEC staff would view, for 
example, a redemption option 50% of the value of the interests. 
The Rosenblum treatise notes: 
The Staff also takes the position that a fixed-income security 
entitles its holders to receive approximately their proportionate 
share of the issuer’s current net assets, within the meaning of 
Section 2(a)(32), if the holders are entitled to receive the stated 
dollar amount of the fixed-income security plus the accrued 
return on that security.
328
 
The reason for this view is that in the Citicorp no-action letter, the SEC 
staff stated that “[i]t is the staff’s position that the net asset value (or its 
equivalent) of fixed-income securities can be calculated by reference to 
their stated dollar amount plus accrued return.”
329
  On the other hand, the 
SEC staff previously indicated that “bonds were not redeemable securities 
when, among other things, their redemption price was based on the 
principal amount of the Bonds and not on the Bond holders’ proportionate 
shares of the issuer’s current net assets.”
330
  Under the statutory restriction, 
 
 325.  See id. at 405-06 (providing details on what is a redeemable security within the 
meaning of Section 2(a)(32)).  
 326.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 327.  Georgia Int’l Corp., 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS at *11. 
 328.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.2, at 406. 
 329.  Citicorp Sec., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 683, at *10, 
n. 12 (Aug. 4, 1995). 
 330.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.2, at 407, n.19 (discussing DSM Co., SEC No-
182 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
 
“a security is redeemable only if it is redeemable at the option of the 
holder.  A security is not a redeemable security within the meaning of 
Section 2(a)(32) if it is redeemable only at the option of the issuer.”
331
 
As a general rule of thumb, this requirement is much more 
problematic for open-end companies than for private equity real estate 
funds.  Most private equity real estate funds are closed-end funds, which, 
by definition, means that their redemption is subject to a lock-up period 
during which investors are not permitted to redeem.  The Rosenblum 
treatise notes that “the Staff has taken the position that a security that may 
be presented to the issuer by the holder is not a redeemable security if. . . 
substantial restrictions are placed upon the right of redemption. . . .”
332
  For 
real estate funds, this would clearly be the most important Section 2(a)(32) 
issue. 
In one relatively recent no-action letter, Nebraska Higher Education 
Loan Program, a loan program issued three series of variable rate demand 
bonds to finance the purchase of student loans from originating lenders.
333
  
The SEC staff took the position that the bonds subject to a three-year 
holding period (essentially the same thing as a lock-up) were not 
redeemable securities for purposes of Section 2(a)(32), but the SEC staff 
declined to conclude that the bonds subject to a two-week or thirty-day 
holding period were not redeemable securities.
334
  In between thirty-days 
and three years there is a considerable gray area.  However, one would 
hope that, at a minimum, two-year lock-up periods, which tend to be at the 
lower end of private equity fund lock-up periods, would still not be 
redeemable securities for purposes of Section 2(a)(32). 
Other no-action letters are promising for private equity real estate 
funds with various types of lock-up periods on the redeemable securities 
issue.  In Citicorp Securities, the SEC staff wrote: 
You believe that the Trust will not be issuing redeemable 
securities within the meaning of Section 2(a)(32) because of the 
limitations placed on an investor’s ability to withdraw all or a 
portion of its investment from the Trust prior to the targeted 
maturity date.  Withdrawals will not be permitted during the first 
six months following an investment in the Trust, and thereafter, a 
notice period of 180 days will be required.  In addition, no 
withdrawal will be honored if, prior to the date of honor, the 
Trust had received notice requiring it to honor a commitment to 
 
Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2880, at *11 (Nov. 5, 1986)). 
 331.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.2, at 405. 
 332.  Id. at 406. 
 333.  Neb. Higher Educ. Loan Program, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 464, at *2 (Apr. 3, 1998). 
334.   Id. 
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purchase Long-term Assets.  We agree that, in these 
circumstances, the Trust will not be issuing redeemable 
securities.
335
 
It should be noted that in that letter, in the alternative, “[i]nvestors will be 
permitted to sell their beneficial interests at any time to qualified third-
party purchasers that are not affiliated with the Trust or its administrator, 
but only if other investors representing at least 51% of the remaining 
beneficial interests consent in writing to the sale.”
336
 
In Redwood Mortgage Investors VII, the SEC staff gave no-action 
relief on the redeemable securities issue when a limited partnership formed 
as a mortgage lender gave the following withdrawal rights.
337
  First, limited 
partners could withdraw their capital after one year from the date of 
purchase, subject to a 10% early withdrawal penalty.  The balance would 
be distributed in four quarterly installments.  Second, limited partners could 
withdraw their capital commencing five years after their purchase of 
interests in the partnership.  The capital could be withdrawn in twenty 
quarterly installments or longer beginning the last day of the quarter 
following the quarter in which the investor gives notice of the intent to 
withdraw.  Third, after five years, limited partners could withdraw their 
capital from the partnership in four equal quarterly installments subject to a 
10% early withdrawal penalty.  The 10% penalty would be applicable to 
any such withdrawal prior to the time when such sums could have been 
withdrawn pursuant to the five-year (or longer) withdrawal period.  
Payments under the four payment plan also would begin on the last day of 
the quarter following the quarter in which the investor gave notice of his 
intent to withdraw from the partnership and liquidate his capital account.
338
 
The partnership’s obligation to pay withdrawing investors would be 
satisfied solely from the available cash flow of the partnership.  The cash 
flow would be available for payment to withdrawing investors after all 
current expenses of the partnership have been paid and adequate provisions 
have been made for the payment of monthly, quarterly or annual cash 
distributions to those investors who elect such distributions upon 
subscription for units.  Any cash flow remaining after satisfying the above 
obligations would be available to pay the withdrawing investors. If the 
partnership’s cash flow were not sufficient to liquidate capital accounts in 
the above time period, the partnership would pay whatever cash flow is 
available to liquidate the capital accounts but would not liquidate any 
existing mortgage loans to pay early withdrawing investors.  The 
 
 335.  Citicorp Sec., Inc., 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS at *10. 
336.   Id. at n.11. 
 337.  Redwood Mortg. Investors VII, a Cal. LTD P’Ship, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 33, at *1 (Jan. 5, 1990). 
338.   Id. at *6-*7. 
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partnership would not, in any twelve month period, liquidate more than 
20% of the total capital accounts outstanding at the beginning of such 
twelve month period.  It should be noted that in granting no-action relief, 
the SEC staff particularly pointed to the fact that there was a one-year 
holding period.
339
 
In California Dentists’ Guild Real Estate Mortgage Fund II, the SEC 
staff gave no-action relief on the redeemable securities issue when a real 
estate mortgage fund made the following key representations: 
(1) the Fund will invest substantially all of its assets in mortgage 
loans secured by mortgages or deeds of trust on real property; (2) 
no investor may withdraw funds during the first 12 months 
following his initial investment in the Fund; (3) thereafter, an 
investor may withdraw funds only at the end of each calendar 
quarter, and only after prior notice of at least 90 days; (4) any 
such withdrawal by an investor will be limited to the lessor of $ 
100,000 or 25% of the investor’s account per calendar quarter; 
(5) during any calendar year, the Fund will not use more than 
20% of the value of its outstanding units at the beginning of such 
calendar year to fund withdrawals; (6) withdrawal payments will 
be made only to the extent that the Fund has cash available which 
is not invested in mortgage loans; (7) the Fund will not establish 
a reserve fund and in no event will any mortgage loans be sold or 
otherwise disposed of, or will any proceeds from the sale of new 
units be used, to provide cash for making withdrawal payments to 
investors; and (8) if the total amount of withdrawals requested 
exceeds available cash, individual withdrawal requests will be 
satisfied in proportion to the total amount of withdrawals 
requested.
340
 
As an alternative to permitting withdrawal only to the extent that a fund 
had cash available that was not invested in real estate and mortgage loans, 
the SEC staff granted no-action relief where “funds were available from 
principal payments or prepayments on mortgage loans, or from the 
liquidation of mortgage loans for reasons other than the need to meet 
investor redemption requests.”
341
 
 
339.   Id. 
 340.  Cal. Dentists’ Guild Real Estate Mortg. Fund II, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC 
No-Act. LEXIS 39, at *1-2 (Jan. 4, 1990). 
 341.  Neb. Higher Educ. Loan Program, Inc., 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS at *10, n. 11 
(citing U.S. Prop. Invs., N.V., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 641 (May 
1, 1989)). 
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5.   The “Primarily Engaged” Requirement / Types of Assets (the 
55/25 Test) 
As discussed above, “Paragraph (C) of Section 3(c)(5) requires an 
issuer to be primarily engaged in purchasing or otherwise acquiring 
mortgages and other liens on and interests in real estate."
342
The SEC staff 
has taken the position that in order to satisfy the “primarily engaged” 
requirement of Section 3(c)(5)(C), an issuer “must invest at least fifty-five 
percent of its assets in mortgages and other liens on and interests in real 
estate (‘qualifying interests’).”
343
  The staff has interpreted the primarily 
engaged requirement also to require that “[a]n additional twenty-five 
percent of the issuer’s assets must be in real estate related assets [(“Real 
Estate Related Assets”)], although this percentage may be reduced to the 
extent that more than fifty-five percent of the issuer’s assets are invested in 
qualifying interests.”
344
  The remaining 20% of the issuer’s assets may be in 
unrestricted miscellaneous assets.
345
 
6.   Temporarily Satisfying the 55/25 Test 
The SEC staff has not objected if an issuer continues, 
[T]o rely upon Section 3(c)(5)(C) if it temporarily does not 
satisfy the 55/25 percent test discussed above if (1) its failure to 
satisfy the test results from receiving additional cash, such as 
from an offering of its securities or as a result of the sale of an 
underlying asset and (2) the issuer intends to liquidate or to use 
the cash to purchase additional qualifying interests as soon as 
possible but generally within one year.
346
 
In one no-action letter, the SEC staff stated that, 
Whether a longer period also would be deemed temporary would 
depend on such factors as (1) whether the failure of the company 
to become primarily engaged in a non-investment business or 
excepted business or liquidate within one year was due to factors 
beyond its control; (2) whether the company’s officers and 
employees during that period tried, in good faith, to effect the 
company’s investment of its assets in a non-investment business 
 
 342.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4, at 413. 
 343.  Id. at 414 (quoting DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING 
INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 68 (1992) [hereinafter 
PROTECTING INVESTORS REPORT]). 
 344.  Id. 
 345.  Id. 
 346.  Id. at 415.  “[T]he Staff has stated that under certain circumstances a period longer 
than a year may be permissible.”  Id.   
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or excepted business or to cause the liquidation of the company; 
and (3) whether the company invested in securities solely to 
preserve the value of its assets.
347
 
7.   Effect of Qualifying Interests and Real Estate Related Assets 
Held through Corporate Subsidiaries on the 55/25 Test 
The staff has addressed situations where companies holding 
Qualifying Interests and Real Estate Related Assets are held through 
subsidiaries of an issuer.  If the issuer is a two-tier partnership, then the 
more specific no-action guidance on two-tier partnerships discussed in the 
next section applies.  If the issuer is a corporation holding a subsidiary 
corporation or partnership, or the issuer is a partnership holding a 
subsidiary corporation, then presumably the more generalized guidance 
outside of the two-tier partnerships no-action letters applies.  This more 
generalized guidance is discussed in this section. 
Generally, an issuer’s interest, for purposes of determining the 55/25 
test, 
[I]n any real estate that is owned by a wholly owned or majority 
owned subsidiary of [an issuer] or by a general partnership in 
which the [issuer] or a wholly owned subsidiary owns an interest 
will be determined by the percentage ownership interest of the 
[issuer] in the subsidiary or the general partnership.
348
 
However, if, 
Real estate [is] owned by a minority owned subsidiary or by a 
general partnership in which [the issuer] or a wholly owned 
subsidiary is not actively involved in the management and 
operation of the general partnership or in which the agreement of 
the [issuer] or a wholly owned subsidiary for all major decisions 
affecting the general partnership,
349
 
then the real estate investment “will be considered . . . a miscellaneous 
investment.”
350
 
Under Section 2(a)(24) of the Investment Company Act, a 
“‘[m]ajority-owned subsidiary’ of a person means a company 50 per 
centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of which are owned by 
 
 347.  Medidentic Mortg. Investors, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
1506, at *3-4 (May 23, 1984). 
 348.  NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 820, at *34-
35 (June 20, 1991). 
349.   Id. 
 350.  Id. at *35. 
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such person, or by a company which, within the meaning of this paragraph, 
is a majority-owned subsidiary of such person.”
351
 
8. Two-Tier Real Estate Companies 
Two-tier real estate partnerships are partnerships, rather than 
corporations, that invest in partnerships that engage in real estate activities.  
“In recent years, the question of the applicability of the [Investment 
Company] Act to two-tier real estate companies has arisen most often in 
connection with limited partnerships which invest, as limited partners, in 
limited partnerships engaged in the real estate business.” 
352
 
“In a 1974 Release . . . the Staff . . . stated that under certain 
conditions it would not recommend enforcement against companies that 
invested in partnership interests and that did not register under the 
[Investment Company] Act.”
353
  The SEC staff analogized two-tier 
partnerships to “securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries, which 
are not investment securities for purposes of Section 3(a)(1)(C).”
354
  “The 
Two-Tier Real Estate Companies release primarily dealt with two-tier real 
estate companies — that is, limited partnerships and other companies that 
invest in interests of other limited partnerships engaged in the real estate 
business.”
355
  “[H]owever, . . . ‘the interpretive positions expressed in [the] 
release would apply to other types of business ventures such as cattle 
breeding and raising and agricultural activities.’”
356
 
The staff’s guidance said that two-tier partnerships, “will not be 
deemed to be an investment company under either Section 3(a)(1)(A) or 
Section 3(a)(1)(C) . . . when the parent partnership is a two-tier real estate 
company by virtue of its investments in other limited partnerships (the 
‘subsidiary partnerships’) that invest in real estate” when certain conditions 
are met.
357
  In the Two-Tier Real Estate Companies release, the SEC staff 
provided the following conditions: 
(1) such company owns more than 50 percent of the limited 
partnership interests in all the limited partnerships in which it 
invests and has the right to dismiss and replace the general 
partners of such underlying companies and the limited partners of 
 
 351.  Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(24), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(24) (2006). 
 352.  Two-Tier Real Estate Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-8456, 
39 Fed. Reg. 32,129, 32,130 (Sept. 5, 1974). 
 353.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 36.1, at 783 (citing Two-Tier Real Estate Cos., 39 
Fed. Reg. at 32,129). 
 354.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 36.1, at 783. 
 355.  Id. 
 356.  Id. (quoting Two-Tier Real Estate Companies, 39 Fed. Reg. at 32,130). 
 357.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 36.2, at 784. 
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such company have the right to dismiss and replace their general 
partner or partners; (2) such company is not an investment 
company within the meaning of Section 3(a)(1) of the 
[Investment Company] Act; and (3) such company does not 
register under the [Investment Company] Act in reliance upon an 
opinion of counsel that it is not an investment company within 
the meaning of Section 3(a)(3) of the [Investment Company] 
Act.
358
 
Rosenblum notes that “a parent partnership could be an investment 
company under Section 3(a)(1)(A) if, for example, it held the interests in 
the subsidiary partnerships as passive investments, as opposed to being 
actively engaged in the activities of the subsidiary partnerships . . . .”
359
 
In the Two-Tier Real Estate Companies release, the Staff also 
stated that a two-tier limited partnership that does not own 
majority interests in each of its underlying partnerships might 
nonetheless be eligible for an exemptive order pursuant to 
Section 3(b)(2) of the [Investment Company] Act if the two-tier 
partnership actually is engaged in the real estate business through 
its control of the underlying partnerships.
360
 
In order to qualify for the Section 3(b)(2) exemption, 
[T]he business activities of the two-tier partnership would have to 
be carried out for the partnership by its general partner and, . . . 
an issuer would have to demonstrate that in carrying on such 
activities its general partner would be acting on behalf of the 
partnership and not on its own behalf.
361
 
The history of the two-tier partnership and its general partner, 
the type of compensation of the general partner, the control by 
the limited partners of the two-tier partnership over its general 
partner and over the general partners of the underlying 
partnerships, may be relevant, together with other factors, to the 
determination of whether the general partner of a two-tier 
company, in engaging in activities related to the business of the 
underlying limited partnerships, is doing so on behalf of the two-
tier partnership or on its own account.
362
 
Finally, the staff has stated that a two-tier partnership that invests “in 
limited partnerships engaged in the development and building of housing 
for low and moderate income persons may qualify” for an order under 
 
 358.  Two-Tier Real Estate Cos., 39 Fed. Reg. at 32,130 (internal footnote omitted). 
 359.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 36.2, at 784. 
 360.  Id. § 36.3, at 785. 
 361.  Two-Tier Real Estate Cos., 39 Fed. Reg. at 32,130-31. 
 362.  Id. at 32,130, n.5. 
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Section 6(c) exempting it from all the provisions of the Investment 
Company Act.
363
  However, this type of exemption requires that interests in 
the parent partnership are “sold only to persons for whom investment in 
limited profit, essentially tax-sheltered investments would not be unsuitable 
. . . .”
364
  In addition, “requirements for fair dealing by the general partner 
of the issuer with the limited partners of the issuer should be included in 
the basic organizational documents of the company.”
365
 
9. Joint Ventures 
The SEC staff has concluded that certain joint venture investments of 
an issuer that invests in fee interests in real estate and mortgage loans 
secured exclusively by real estate, or some combination of the foregoing, 
would count toward the issuer’s Qualifying Assets.
366
  In United States 
Property Investments, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a company that would own interests in joint 
ventures that were formed to acquire fee interests in real estate and to make 
mortgage loans secured exclusively by real estate, or some combination of 
the foregoing.
367
 The company’s interests in joint ventures would consist 
exclusively of general partnership interests in joint ventures with up to 
three partners and in which the company’s proportionate interest would 
depend on its capital contribution to the joint venture.  The company would 
have a right of first refusal to acquire the interests of the other partners.  
The company would be active in the management and operation of each 
joint venture formed to acquire interests in real estate and the agreement of 
the company would be required for all major decisions affecting each such 
joint venture.  In joint ventures formed to make mortgage loans, each 
partner would contribute funds to be loaned and each loan would be 
secured exclusively by a mortgage on real estate.  Although the company 
would acquire as little as 10% interest in the mortgage loan joint ventures, 
the company would have the right, by itself, to foreclose the mortgage 
securing the loan in the event of default. 
 
 363.  Id. at 32,131. 
 364.  Id. 
 365.  Id. 
 366.  U.S. Prop. Invs., N.V., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 641, at 
*19 (May 1, 1989). 
 367.  Id. at *25. 
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10.   Satisfying the 55% Qualifying Interests Test 
a. Qualifying Interests in General 
As discussed above, Qualifying Interests generally include “mortgages 
and other liens on and interests in real estate.”
368
  There are several 
common types of Qualifying Interests.  This article summarizes some of 
the major types of real estate interests that the SEC staff has suggested 
would constitute Qualifying Interests.  Since these SEC staff positions are 
based on relatively old no-action letters, the views of the SEC staff may no 
longer be the same.  Furthermore, not every single letter has been 
exhaustively summarized, but rather the focus has been on summarizing the 
most important letters.  One final thing to note is that the SEC staff has 
generally permitted entities seeking relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) to 
invest in multiple types of Qualifying Interests at the same time.
369
 
b. Fee Interests 
It appears clear that, unquestionably, all forms of traditional fee 
interests in real estate are Qualifying Interests.  In United States Property 
Investments, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) 
on the Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a corporation that invested 
in fee interests in real estate.
370
  In one letter, it was clear that ownership 
interests in shopping centers were Qualifying Interests, but that point 
follows from the fact that fee interests in real estate are generally 
Qualifying Interests.
371
 
c. Leases 
Investing in properties that are leased from a lessor, as well as leasing 
out properties owned or leased by the entity seeking to avoid the 
Investment Company Act, appears to receive no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue.  In Burger King Investors 
Master, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the 
Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a partnership that would acquire 
 
 368.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4, at 413. 
 369.  See id., § 15.4, at 417 (citing NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC 
No-Act. LEXIS 820 (June 20, 1991)(issuer invested in real estate, whole pool mortgage-
backed securities and certain real estate loans)). 
 370.  U.S. Prop. Invs., N.V., 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS, at *25. 
 371.  MSA Realty Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1913, at *5-
*8 (Mar. 19, 1984). 
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leases.
372
  In that letter, the partnership would both lease properties from 
Burger King Corporation and, in turn, lease the properties to Burger King 
franchisees.
373
  In City National Bank, the SEC staff gave no-action relief 
under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with respect to an issuer holding individual 
municipal real estate leases.
374
  In Gustavus Adolphus, the SEC staff gave 
no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a fund as lessor 
that would lease its fractional interests in land and buildings to a lessee, 
thereby generating income for the fund.
375
  In that letter, the lessee’s 
obligations to make rental payments were secured by real estate, but that 
representation does not appear to be necessary for no-action relief, based 
on an analysis of other SEC no-action letters where a company invested in 
real estate leases. 
d. Mortgage Loans and Deeds of Trust Secured by Real Estate 
In United States Property Investments, the SEC staff gave no-action 
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue with 
respect to a corporation that invested in mortgage loans secured by real 
estate.
376
  The types of letters that have received no-action relief contain a 
variety of factual representations, but this article attempts to explicate the 
key issues from these letters in terms of what types of mortgage loans 
secured by real estate would receive no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue. 
In terms of permitted types of loans, the SEC staff has given no-action 
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with respect to either bonds or notes secured 
by mortgage collateral.
377
  In one no-action letter, as a condition to no-
action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue, the 
SEC staff required that bonds “be secured by a lien on real estate giving the 
holder the right to foreclose in the event of default.”
378
  From the 
perspective of obtaining no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the 
Qualifying Interests issue, it would be advisable for all mortgage collateral 
 
 372.  Burger King Investors Master L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 1883, at *1 (Mar. 5, 1986). 
373.   Id. 
 374.  City Nat’l Bank, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1831, at *1 
(March 9, 1984). 
 375.  Gustavus Adolphus Coll. Pooled Income Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC 
No-Act. LEXIS 2578, at *1-2 (Oct. 19, 1987). 
 376.  U.S. Prop. Invs., N.V., 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS at *25. 
 377.  See Am. Dev. Fin. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2275, at 
*1 (July 23, 1987) (providing no-action relief to issuer that invested at least 55% of its 
assets in notes and bonds secured by mortgages on real estate). 
 378.  M.L. Stern & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2309, at *2 
(May 21, 1984). 
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to give the bond holder or note holder rights to foreclose in the event of 
default. 
In terms of subordination, in American Housing Trust I, the SEC staff 
gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests 
issue with respect to a trust that held loans secured by first lien mortgages 
and deeds of trust on real estate.
379
  In California Dentists’ Guild, the SEC 
staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying 
Interests issue when a fund invested in mortgages on real estate, even 
though the fund sometimes invested in second or third mortgages or deeds 
of trust on real estate.
380
 
In terms of collateral, in Breen Mortgage Fund, the SEC staff granted 
no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue 
when the loan collateral included single-family residences, commercial 
property and unimproved land, but presumably all fee interest real 
collateral could result in no-action relief.
381
  In Embarcadero Mortgage 
Fund, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the 
Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a limited partnership that 
originated mortgage loans, which were secured by deeds of trust on real 
property.
382
  Thus, it appears that real estate mortgages could be either 
originated or purchased, and still receive no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C).
383
  It also appears that deeds of trust on fee interests will suffice 
as mortgage collateral and still receive no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C). 
In most no-action letters where no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C) is granted on the Qualifying Interests issue, the loans have been 
fully collateralized, but in one no-action letter in the non-profit economic 
development context, each loan would generally be collateralized on at 
least a 75% loan-to-value ratio.
384
  In a recent no-action letter, Capital 
Trust, the SEC staff noted that “[it] generally take[s] the position that an 
 
 379.  Am. Hous. Trust I, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 751, at *1-3 
(May 21, 1988). 
 380.  Cal. Dentists’ Guild Real Estate Mortg. Fund II, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC 
No-Act. LEXIS 39, at *1-2 (Jan. 4, 1990). 
 381.  Breen Mortg. Fund I, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 85, at *1-2 
(Jan. 20, 1988). 
 382.  Embarcadero Mortg. Fund I, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
2879, at *1 (Nov. 5, 1986). 
 383.  Other SEC no-action letters accord with this view.  See, e.g., Redwood Mortg. 
Investors, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2721, at *6 (Aug. 25, 1986) 
(company would “make loans secured by deeds of trust on real property . . . .”). 
 384.  Am. Dev. Fin. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2275, at *1, 
*12 (July 23, 1987). 
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asset is not a [Qualifying Interest] if it is not fully secured by [real] 
estate.”
385
 
e. Loan Participations 
In Dayton Area Building, the SEC staff gave no-action relief when a 
trust invested in participation interests in construction period mortgage 
loans where each loan was fully secured by real property.
386
 The 
participation interests held by the trust were sufficient to give its trustee the 
right to foreclose the mortgage securing the loan in the event of default. 
In a later no-action letter, Capital Trust, the SEC clarified that, 
[A]n [asset] issuer that is engaged primarily in purchasing or 
otherwise acquiring participations or fractionalized interests in 
individual or pooled mortgages or deeds of trust is not entitled to 
rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C).  We have, however, taken the position 
that an issuer that holds mortgage participation interests may 
nevertheless rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C) if the mortgage 
participation interests have attributes that would classify them as 
being interests in real estate rather than as being interests in the 
nature of a security in another person engaged in the real estate 
business.
387
 
Discussing construction period mortgage loans, the SEC stated that, 
[E]ach mortgage participation interest held by the trust was an 
interest in real estate because the participation interest was in a 
mortgage loan that was fully secured by real property and the 
trustee had the right by itself to foreclose on the mortgage 
securing the loan in the event of default.
388
 
In MGIC Mortgage Corporation, the SEC staff granted no-action 
relief when the entity seeking relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the 
 
 385.  Capital Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 491, at *10, 
n.12 (May 24, 2007) [hereinafter Capital Trust 2007] 
 386.  Dayton Area Bldg. and Constr. Indus. Found., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC 
No-Act. LEXIS 2034, at *1, *27 (May 7, 1987);  see also Northwestern Ohio Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Found., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1505, at *4-5 
(May 21, 1984)  (“Because it is represented that each loan would be fully secured by real 
property and that the participation interests held by a trust would give the foundation, as 
trustee for the trust, the right by itself to foreclose the mortgage securing the loan in the 
event of default, it appears that a trust would be primarily engaged in purchasing or 
otherwise acquiring mortgages and other liens on and interests in real estate.”). 
 387.  Capital Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 281057, at *5 (Feb. 3, 2009) 
[hereinafter Capital Trust 2009]. 
 388.  Id. 
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Qualifying Interests issue invested in participations or fractional interests in 
individual or pooled mortgages or deeds of trust, provided that: 
(1) such interests are created by the fractionalization of whole 
mortgage loans or pools of whole mortgage loans which have 
been purchased by [the entity]; (2) [the entity] retains a 
continuing percentage ownership interest of at least 10% in each 
whole mortgage loan or pool thereof which it has fractionalized; 
(3) [the entity] alone is the formal, record owner of the 
mortgages; and (4) [the entity] throughout the life of the 
participation has complete supervisory responsibility with respect 
to the servicing of mortgage loans included in a participation and 
has sole discretion as to enforcement of collections and the 
institution and prosecution of foreclosure or similar legal 
proceedings as set forth in paragraph 7 of the Participation 
Agreement.
389
 
The SEC staff stated that, 
These conditions are intended to insure that if [the entity] 
engages primarily in acquiring undivided interests in whole 
mortgages or pools thereof . . . [the entity] will have a substantial 
continuing ownership interest in such mortgages and pools and 
unrestricted control over the enforcement of the lien and other 
matters with respect to such mortgage loans so that the interest 
retained by [the entity] would be an interest in real estate within 
the meaning of Section 3(c)(5)(C) of the Act rather than an 
interest in the nature of a security in another person engaged in 
the real estate business.
390
 
f. B-Notes 
In Capital Trust 2009, the SEC staff granted no-action relief under 
Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue when a REIT proposed 
to invest in B-Notes.
391
  B-Notes are a type of note that is used in A/B 
financings, which the SEC staff described as follows: 
[I]n an A/B financing, the principal balance of a single 
commercial mortgage loan is divided between two or more 
mortgage lenders as a means of spreading the credit risk 
associated with the mortgage loan between the lenders. . . . 
[U]nlike a mortgage loan participation where each loan 
participant has a pari passu interest in the mortgage loan, an A/B 
 
 389.  MGIC Mortg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 98, at *1-2 
(Aug. 1, 1974). 
 390.  Id. at *2. 
 391.  Capital Trust 2009, 2009 WL 281057, at *7-8. 
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financing is a senior/subordinated structure.  The senior 
participation, called the “A-Note,” has priority over the junior 
participation, called the “B-Note,” with respect to the allocation 
of payments made on the mortgage loan. . . . [A]ll periodic 
payments made by the borrower on the underlying mortgage loan 
are allocated first to the A-Note holder, as senior lender, in 
accordance with the terms of the A/B financing and then to the 
B-Note holder, as junior lender. . . . [I]n the event of a default on 
the mortgage loan, all collections or recoveries on the loan are 
allocated first to the A-Note holder until the A-Note holder has 
been fully paid before any payments are made to the B-Note 
holder. . . . [A]ny losses incurred with respect to the loan are 
allocated first to the B-Note holder and then to the A-Note 
holder. . . . [T]he loan is fully secured by a mortgage on the 
underlying commercial property and the value of the underlying 
commercial property at the time of the A/B financing always 
exceeds the combined principal balance of the B-Note and the A-
Note.
392
 
[I]n the typical A/B financing in which the [REIT] invests, a 
lender enters into a mortgage arrangement with a borrower and 
then participates [in] the mortgage loan to form an A/B financing 
structure.  The lender, who holds legal title to the mortgage loan 
and is listed as the lender of record, retains the A-Note but sells 
the B-Note to the [REIT]. . . . [T]he [REIT] as B-Note holder 
obtains the right to receive from the A-Note holder the [REIT’s] 
proportionate share of the interest and the principal payments 
made on the mortgage loan by the borrower at the time such 
payments are made, and the [REIT’s] returns on its B-Note 
investment are based on the principal and interest payments made 
by the borrower.
393
 
[I]n some A/B financings, the B-Note holder’s participation 
interest is evidenced by a separate note issued by the borrower to 
the B-Note holder and which is directly secured by the mortgage. 
. . .
394
  [I]n these types of A/B financings, the [REIT] as B-Note 
holder is in contractual privity with the borrower with respect to 
the underlying mortgage loan and thus payment on the B-Note 
should not be affected in the event of the bankruptcy of the A-
Note holder. . . . [I]n other A/B financings in which the [REIT] 
 
 392.  Id. at *1. 
 393.  Id. at *2. 
 394.  “[T]he B-Note is different from a second mortgage loan because the B-Note 
represents a participation interest in a single mortgage loan, whereas a second mortgage loan 
represents the issuance and administration of a separate loan. . . . [T]he separate note issued 
by the borrower evidences a participation in a mortgage loan and not an interest in a whole, 
unparticipated mortgage loan held by a single mortgagee.”  Id. at *2, n.2. 
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invests, the B-Note holder holds a participating beneficial 
ownership interest in the mortgage loan and mortgage loan 
proceeds.  The participation interest, however, is not evidenced 
by a separate note from the borrower and thus the [REIT] as B-
Note holder is not in contractual privity with the borrower. . . . 
[T]he [REIT] arguably could have difficulty obtaining payment 
in the event that the A-Note holder files for bankruptcy. . . . 
[W]ith the exception of the bankruptcy issue, the two types of 
A/B financings are similar in all other material respects.
395
 
[T]he [REIT] as B-Note holder enters into an agreement with 
the A-Note holder that sets forth the rights and obligations of the 
parties (“Agreement”). . . . [U]nder the Agreement, the A-Note 
holder is afforded the sole and exclusive authority to administer 
and service the mortgage loan so long as the mortgage loan is a 
performing loan.  The Agreement, however, provides the [REIT] 
as B-Note holder with approval rights with respect to any 
decisions relating to material modifications to the loan 
agreements, or in connection with any material decisions 
pertaining to the administration and servicing of the mortgage 
loan.
396
 
[T]he Agreement also grants the [REIT] as B-Note holder the 
right to control the administration and servicing of the loan in the 
event that the loan becomes a non-performing loan (“control 
rights”). . . .
397
 [T]hese control rights include the right to appoint 
a special servicer to manage the resolution of the non-performing 
loan, including any proposed foreclosure or workout of the loan. . 
. . [T]he [REIT] generally will have the right to advise, direct, or 
approve certain actions to be taken by the special servicer, 
including those with respect to any modification or forgiveness of 
principal or interest in connection with the defaulted loan, any 
proposed foreclosure of the mortgage loan or acquisition of the 
underlying property by deed-in-lieu of foreclosure or any 
 
 395.  Id. at *2. 
 396.  Id. at *3. 
 397.  “[T]he B-Note holder may exercise its control rights under the terms of the 
Agreement either directly or indirectly by appointing a third party (called an operating 
advisor) to administer its rights. . . . [G]enerally the B-Note holder retains these control 
rights only so long as its position in the mortgage loan is deemed to have ‘value,’ based 
upon an appraisal. . . . [T]he B-Note has ‘value,’ for this purpose, if the initial principal 
amount of the B-Note (adjusted for prepayments, debt write-downs and appraisal reduction 
amounts applied to the B-Note) exceeds 25% of the initial principal amount of the B-Note 
(adjusted for prepayments). . . . [A]n ‘appraisal reduction amount,’ for this purpose, 
generally is the amount by which the full outstanding mortgage indebtedness exceeds 90% 
of the appraised value of the underlying real property.  If the appraisal indicates that the B-
Note does not have ‘value,’ the B-Note holder’s control rights are forfeited to the A-Note 
holder.”  Id. at *3, n.6. 
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proposed sale of a defaulted mortgage loan. . . . [T]he special 
servicer is generally obligated to follow the [REIT’s] decisions 
unless the special servicer believes that doing so would violate 
any applicable law or provisions of any agreement applicable to 
the financing arrangement.  In addition, . . . the special servicer is 
subject to the limitations prescribed by a “servicing standard,” 
which requires the special servicer to act in the best interests of 
both the A-Note holder and the [REIT] as B-Note holder and in a 
commercially reasonable manner.  The [REIT], however, for any 
reason has the right to terminate and replace the special 
servicer.
398
 
[T]he [REIT] as B-Note holder has the right to receive written 
notice with respect to the performance of the mortgage loan and 
all reasonably requested information in connection with the 
exercise of the B-Note holder’s rights. . . . [T]he [REIT] also has 
the right to cure any monetary and non-monetary defaults on the 
mortgage loan. . . . [T]he [REIT] may purchase the A-Note at a 
price of par plus interest in the event that the loan becomes non-
performing.
399
 
Before proceeding to evaluate whether it would grant no-action relief 
with respect to the B-Note assets, the SEC reiterated its position that, 
[A]n issuer that is engaged primarily in purchasing or otherwise 
acquiring participations or fractionalized interests in individual or 
pooled mortgages or deeds of trust is not entitled to rely on 
Section 3(c)(5)(C).  [The SEC staff] has, however, taken the 
position that an issuer that holds mortgage participation interests 
may nevertheless rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C) if the mortgage 
participation interests have attributes that would classify them as 
being interests in real estate rather than as being interests in the 
nature of a security in another person engaged in the real estate 
business.
400
 
Thus, the goal of the REIT’s arguments made to the SEC staff was to 
convince the SEC that the B-notes were true interests in real estate rather 
than interests in the nature of a security in another person engaged in the 
real estate business. 
The REIT argued, 
[T]hat a B-Note is a participation interest in a mortgage loan that 
is fully secured by real property, and is not a loan extended to the 
A-Note holder. . . . [T]he B-Note  is not an interest in the A-Note 
holder with payment depending on the profits generated by the 
 
 398.  Id. at *3 (internal footnote omitted). 
 399.  Id. at *4. 
 400.  Id. at *5. 
198 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
 
A-Note holder’s operations.  Rather, . . . the B-Note is based on 
the interest and principal payments made by the borrower on the 
underlying mortgage loan. . . .
401
 [T]he [REIT] invests in a B-
Note only after performing the same type of due diligence and 
credit underwriting procedures that it would perform if it were 
underwriting the entire mortgage loan. . . .
402
 [T]he A-Note holder 
does not guarantee payment of the B-Note holder’s share of 
interest and principal payments received from the borrower on 
the underlying mortgage loan.
403
  Accordingly, . . . the B-Note 
holder looks to the borrower for payment on its B-Note and not 
to the A-Note holder.
404
 
The REIT also argued that, 
[T]he [REIT] as B-Note holder has rights with respect to the 
administration and servicing of the mortgage loan that further 
suggest that the B-Note is an interest in real estate.  Although the 
A-Note holder has the exclusive authority to administer and 
service the mortgage loan as long as the loan is a performing 
loan, . . . the [REIT] as B-Note holder has approval rights in 
connection with any material decisions pertaining to the 
administration and servicing of the loan, including decisions 
relating to leasing and budget requests from the borrower. . . . 
 
 401.  “[I]n the event that the A-Note holder becomes bankrupt and the B-Note holder is 
treated as an unsecured creditor of the A-Note holder, the B-Note holder may not receive its 
full payment on the B-Note notwithstanding the fact that the borrower has been making full 
and timely payments on the underlying mortgage loan. . . . [I]n the event that this will occur, 
the B-Note will no longer be considered [Qualifying Interests]. . . .”  Id. at *6, n. 22. 
 402.  “[L]ike the procedures for investing in whole mortgages, the procedures that the 
[REIT] performs prior to investing in B-Notes include hands-on analysis of the underlying 
collateral for the loan, market analysis, tenant analysis, financial analysis, visits to the 
property, borrower background checks, and lease and contract review. . . . [T]he [REIT] 
performs its own independent analysis and does not rely on the A-Note holder’s analysis or 
conclusion on the creditworthiness of the mortgage loan borrower.”  Id. at n. 23. 
 403.  “[T]he following additional factors indicate that the B-Note is a mortgage loan 
participation interest and not a loan extended to the A-Note holder: (1) there is no difference 
in term to maturity contained in the B-Note and the underlying mortgage loan; (2) the total 
payments made by the borrower on the underlying mortgage loan do not exceed the 
aggregate payments made on the A-Note and the B-Note; and (3) there is no difference in 
scheduled payment terms between the borrower and the A-Note holder, and between the A-
Note holder and the [REIT], except for the priority in the allocation of interest and principal 
payments granted to the A-Note holder by virtue of its position as senior participant.  
Furthermore, . . . although there is a difference in the interest rate due on the underlying 
mortgage loan and the B-Note, the difference is due to the legitimate risk premium that the 
B-Note holder receives on assuming first loss. . . . [The writer’s] view that the B-Notes 
described in [the no-action] letter are true participations and not loans extended to the A-
Note holder is based on an evaluation of the factors that the courts have considered in 
similar cases.”  Id. at n. 24. 
 404.  Id. at *6. 
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[T]he B-Note holder has approval rights with respect to any 
material modification to the loan agreements.
405
 
Finally, the REIT argued, 
[A]s B-Note holder[, it] has effective control over the remedies 
relating to the enforcement of the mortgage loan, including 
ultimate control of the foreclosure process, in the event that the 
loan becomes non-performing. . . . [T]he [REIT] has such rights 
notwithstanding the fact that the [REIT] does not have the 
unilateral right to foreclose on the mortgage loan, or that the 
special servicer is required to act in the best interests of both the 
A-Note holder and the B-Note holder under the special servicing 
standard.  In particular, . . . the [REIT] as B-Note holder has the 
right to select the special servicer, and often appoints its wholly 
owned subsidiary to act in that role. . . . [I]n the event that the 
mortgage loan becomes non-performing, the [REIT] is able to 
pursue the remedies it desires by advising, directing or approving 
the actions of the special servicer.  If the [REIT] is dissatisfied 
with the remedy selected by the special servicer, . . . the [REIT] 
may:  (1) terminate and replace the special servicer at any time 
with or without cause; (2) cure the default so that the mortgage 
loan is no longer non-performing; or (3) purchase the A-Note at 
par plus accrued interest, thereby acquiring the entire mortgage 
loan.
406
 
When the SEC staff granted no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) 
on the Qualifying Interests issue when a REIT proposed to invest in B-
Notes, it noted that its position was based, in particular, on the following 
representations: 
(1) a B-Note is a participation interest in a mortgage loan that is 
fully secured by real property; (2) the [REIT] as B-Note holder 
has the right to receive its proportionate share of the interest and 
the principal payments made on the mortgage loan by the 
borrower, and . . . the [REIT’s] returns on the B-Note are based 
on such payments; (3) the [REIT] invests in B-Notes only after 
performing the same type of due diligence and credit 
underwriting procedures that it would perform if it were 
underwriting the underlying mortgage loan; (4) the [REIT] as B-
Note holder has approval rights in connection with any material 
decisions pertaining to the administration and servicing of the 
loan and with respect to any material modification to the loan 
agreements; and (5) in the event that the loan becomes non-
performing, the [REIT] as B-Note holder has effective control 
 
405.   Id. at *7. 
406.   Id. 
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over the remedies relating to the enforcement of the mortgage 
loan, including ultimate control of the foreclosure process, by 
having the right to:  (a) appoint the special servicer to manage the 
resolution of the loan; (b) advise, direct or approve the actions of 
the special servicer; (c) terminate the special servicer at any time 
with or without cause; (d) cure the default so that the mortgage 
loan is no longer non-performing; and (e) purchase the A-Note at 
par plus accrued interest, thereby acquiring the entire mortgage 
loan.
407
 
One final thing to note about Capital Trust 2009 is that the SEC staff 
declined to express a view on whether an A-Note, as described in the no-
action letter, is a Qualifying Interest.  The SEC implied, on the A-Note 
issue, that it was concerned about the fact that “the B-Note holder has 
effective control over the remedies relating to the enforcement of the 
mortgage loan, including ultimate control of the foreclosure process, in the 
event that the loan becomes non-performing.”
408
 
g. Tier 1 Mezzanine Loans 
In Capital Trust, Inc., the SEC staff granted no-action relief under 
Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue when a REIT proposed 
to invest in Tier 1 mezzanine loans made specifically and exclusively for 
the financing of real estate.
409
  The SEC staff described the Tier 1 
mezzanine loans as follows: 
[I]n a Tier 1 mezzanine loan arrangement, the [REIT] lends 
money as mezzanine lender to a special purpose bankruptcy 
remote entity (“mezzanine borrower”) whose sole purpose is to 
hold all of the ownership interests of another special purpose 
entity that owns the commercial real estate being financed and 
that is subject to a mortgage loan secured by the property 
(“property-owning entity”). . . .
410
 [U]nder the terms of their 
respective organizational documents and loan documents, the 
property-owning entity may not engage in any business other 
than owning and holding the underlying property and the 
mezzanine borrower may not engage in any business other than 
owning and holding the ownership interests in the property-
owning entity. . . . [T]he ownership interests held by the 
 
 407.  Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 408.  Id. at n.25. 
 409.  Capital Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 491, at *12-
13 (May 24, 2007).  
 410.  “[M]ezzanine loans are junior to the senior position of the mortgage holder but 
senior to the equity position of the owner of the underlying real property.”  Id. at *2, n.2. 
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mezzanine borrower has no value apart from the underlying real 
property that is held by the property-owning entity other than 
incidental assets related to ownership of the property.
411
 
The request for relief noted that there “may be multiple tiers of 
mezzanine loans made in connection with the financing of a property,” but 
the request for relief was “limited to mezzanine loans that are granted to a 
mezzanine borrower that directly owns interests in the entity that owns the 
property being financed,” hence the idea of “Tier 1” mezzanine loans, as 
opposed just to mezzanine loans.
412
 
[T]he mezzanine borrower enters into an agreement with the 
[REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine lender pursuant to which it pledges 
its entire ownership interests in the property-owning entity to the 
[REIT] as collateral for the mezzanine loan.
413
  The [REIT] 
obtains a first priority perfected security interest in the ownership 
interests in the property–owning entity
414
 . . . . [I]f the mezzanine 
borrower were to default on the mezzanine loan, the [REIT] has 
the right to foreclose on the collateral and, through its 100% 
ownership of the property-owning entity, become the owner of 
the underlying real estate. . . .
415
 
[T]he [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine lender also enters into an 
intercreditor agreement with the mortgage lender in connection 
with the issuance of the Tier 1 mezzanine loan that sets forth the 
relative priority of rights between the two parties with respect to 
claims on the underlying property being financed.  Among other 
things, . . . . the [REIT] obtains rights under the intercreditor 
agreement that allow it to readily cure defaults or purchase the 
mortgage loan in the event of a default on the mortgage loan . . . . 
[T]he agreement also gives the [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine 
lender various control rights over the management of the 
 
 411.  Id. at *1-2.  Incidental assets included “cash generated from rental payments and 
held for short periods of time pending distribution or disbursement to meet operating 
expenses.”  Id. at *2, n.2. 
 412.  Id. at n.1 
 413.  “[T]he aggregate principal balance of a [mortgage] loan and mezzanine loan at 
origination would be less than the value of the underlying property so that the mezzanine 
loan would be fully secured by the underlying [real] property.”  Id. at *3, n. 3.  
 414.  “[T]ypically both the mezzanine borrower and the mezzanine lender are limited 
liability companies. . . . [I]n very rare cases the property-owning entity may be organized as 
a limited partnership.  In such cases, the mezzanine borrower would own all of the limited 
partnership interests in the property-owning entity as well as all of the ownership interests in 
the general partner of the property-owning entity.  The mezzanine borrower would pledge 
the ownership interests in both the property-owning entity and the general partnership as 
collateral for the mezzanine loan.”  Id. at n.4 
 415.  Id. at *3. 
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underlying property.
416
 
[I]n the commercial real estate financing industry second 
mortgages have effectively been replaced in part by Tier 1 
mezzanine loans . . . . [S]econd mortgages are rarely offered as a 
result of the increased practice of securitizing senior commercial 
mortgages . . . . [T]he nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations (“NRSROs”) have expressed an unwillingness to 
assign the highest ratings to securities issued by a trust holding a 
pool of senior commercial mortgages when the underlying 
properties associated with these mortgages are encumbered by 
second mortgages. . . . [T]he NRSROs are concerned that the 
presence of a second mortgage may negatively impact the trust’s 
remedies in the event that the senior mortgage should default, 
which in turn could impede payments made to the trust’s 
securities holders. . . . [S]uch concerns are not found in the Tier 1 
mezzanine loan arrangement because . . . . the absence of a 
second lien on the underlying property minimizes the likelihood 
that payments made to the trust’s securities holders might be 
affected in the event of a default of a senior mortgage in the 
pool.
417
 
Before proceeding to evaluate whether it would grant no-action relief 
to the Tier 1 mezzanine loan assets, it noted that the REIT had argued “that, 
except for the lack of a mortgage loan against the property, such a 
mezzanine loan is the functional equivalent of, and provides its holder with 
the same economic experience as, a second mortgage.”
418
  More 
specifically, the REIT argued as follows: 
Tier 1 mezzanine loans that the [REIT] holds are the functional 
equivalent of second mortgages because, except for the lack of a 
mortgage lien on the property, all of the principal terms and 
features of a second mortgage loan are present. . . . [B]oth are 
loans, made specifically and exclusively for the financing of real 
estate, that are junior to the first mortgage loan but senior to the 
equity position of the owner of the property. . . . [S]econd 
mortgages and Tier 1 mezzanine loans are underwritten based on 
the same considerations and after the lender performs a hands-on 
analysis of the underlying commercial property, including, 
among other things, inspection of the property, review of revenue 
leases and property agreements, analyses of local commercial 
real estate market conditions, and review of the financial 
performance of the property. . . . [A]s is typically the case with a 
second mortgage lender, the [REIT] exercises ongoing control 
 
 416.  Id. at *4-5. 
 417.  Id. at *5-6. 
 418.  Id. at *7. 
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rights over the management of the underlying property, such as 
rights relating to the approval of major leases, budget 
improvements, capital expenditures and the application of 
insurance proceeds or condemnation awards, as well as the right 
to replace the property manager in case of default on the loan.  
Finally, . . . . the [REIT] has rights under the intercreditor 
agreement to readily cure defaults or purchase the mortgage loan 
in the event of a default on the mortgage loan.
419
 
[T]he economic experience of the [REIT] as a Tier 1 mezzanine 
lender is no different from the economic experience of a second 
mortgage lender.  Although the [REIT] holds as collateral the 
ownership interests of the property-owning entity rather than the 
property itself, . . . . the value of the collateral is economically the 
same under both loan forms.  In essence, . . . . the ownership 
interests in the property-owning entity have no economic value 
apart from the underlying real property (other than incidental 
assets related to the ownership of the property) because the 
property-owning entity in a Tier 1 mezzanine loan arrangement is 
not permitted to engage in any business except the ownership of 
the real property.  Consequently, the [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine 
lender, like the second mortgage lender, looks to the underlying 
real property as the true measure of the value of its collateral. . . . 
[D]espite the absence of a mortgage lien, the [REIT] has the right 
to foreclose on the collateral and, through its ownership of the 
property-owning entity, become the owner of the underlying real 
estate.
420
 
When the SEC staff granted no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) 
on the Qualifying Interests issue when a REIT proposed to invest in Tier 1 
mezzanine loans, it noted that its position was based, in particular, on the 
following representations: 
(1) a Tier 1 mezzanine loan is a subordinated loan made 
specifically and exclusively for the financing of real estate; (2) 
both second mortgages and Tier 1 mezzanine loans are 
underwritten based on the same considerations and after the 
lender performs a hands-on analysis of the property being 
financed; (3) the [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine lender exercises 
ongoing control rights over the management of the underlying 
property; (4) the [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine lender has the right 
to readily cure defaults or purchase the mortgage loan in the 
event of a default on the mortgage loan; (5) the true measure of 
the collateral securing the Tier 1 mezzanine loan is the property 
being financed and any incidental assets related to the ownership 
 
 419.  Id. at *7-8. 
 420.  Id. at *8-9. 
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of the property; and (6) the [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine lender 
has the right to foreclose on the collateral and through its 
ownership of the property-owning entity become the owner of the 
underlying property . . . .
421
 
h. Real Estate Mortgage-Backed Securities 
According to the Rosenblum treatise, 
[T]he Staff has taken the position that securities representing an 
interest in a pool of mortgages (that is, mortgage-backed 
securities) may be qualifying interests if the holder of those 
securities will have the same economic experience as a person 
holding the underlying mortgages (including the receipt of 
principal and interest payments and the risk of prepayment on the 
underlying mortgages).
422
 
In particular, the SEC staff has granted no-action relief in the case of 
certain industrial development bonds, whole pool mortgage-backed 
securities and agency whole pool certificates,
423
 which are each discussed 
below. 
i. Real Estate Mortgage-Backed Securities:  Industrial 
Development Bonds 
The SEC staff has granted no-action letters when the entity seeking 
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue invested in 
industrial development bonds, which is not surprising since industrial 
development bonds are simply a form of bonds or notes secured by 
collateral.  In Merrill Lynch, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under 
Section 3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a pool created by Merrill Lynch that 
would invest in industrial development obligations in the form of notes or 
bonds (“Loans”).
424
  The pool would own one or more irrevocable standby 
letters of credit, which Merrill Lynch arranged for banks to issue and which 
would guarantee the payment of the full principal and interest payments of 
all the loans held by the pool.  The loans of the pool that were treated as 
Qualifying Interests (calculated on the basis of principal amount) would be 
secured exclusively by first mortgages or deeds of trust on real property.
425
  
The loans in the pool would in all instances consist of the entire issue of 
 
 421.  Id. at *12-13. 
 422.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4, at 417. 
 423.  Id. (citing PROTECTING INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 331). 
 424.  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 4235, *1-3 (Nov. 4, 1981). 
425.   Id. 
2013] THE RISE OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 205 
 
 
such loans and not portions thereof.
426
  The loans would not be of the type 
of security for which secondary markets exist.
427
  Once the pool was 
formed, it would be fixed and loans could not be added, withdrawn or 
substituted.
428
  Each loan would be a purchase money mortgage with the 
proceeds thereof being used to develop the properties that would serve as 
the security for such loan.
429
  There would be at least a 100% loan to value 
ratio (minus transactional expenses) with respect to the mortgaged property 
for each loan.  Each loan would be assigned in its entirety to the trustee for 
the pool.
430
  The trustee of the pool would have the right to foreclose 
against the mortgage property securing the loans.
431
  Since Merrill Lynch 
involved mortgage pass-through certificates being sold to the investors in 
the pool, additional representations to obtain no-action relief were made, 
which are likely not necessarily relevant to real estate funds. 
The SEC staff has also granted no-action letters when the entity 
seeking relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue 
invested in loan participation interests in industrial development bonds.  In 
Salomon Brothers, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a trust that would hold fractional undivided 
interests in real mortgages the interest on which is exempt from Federal 
income tax.
432
  The real estate interests would exist in the form of industrial 
development bonds or other obligations (“Mortgage Bonds”) secured at the 
time of their issuance by purchase money mortgages or deeds of trust on 
real estate.
433
  Each of the Mortgage Bonds would be primarily secured by 
purchase money mortgages or deeds of trust on real property acquired or 
developed with the proceeds of the Mortgage Bonds, and had a loan to 
value ratio at the time the Mortgage Bonds were issued of not more than 
100 percent.
434
  Mortgage Bonds treated as Qualifying Interests would be 
secured, at the date of their issuance and at the date of issuance of the 
Certificates, exclusively by interests in real estate.
435
  Such Mortgage 
Bonds would represent the entire outstanding issue of one or more issues of 
Mortgage Bonds.
436
  In those cases where the mortgages or deeds of trust 
securing the Mortgage Bonds run to an indenture trustee for the benefit of 
 
426.   Id. 
427 .  Id. 
428.   Id. 
429.   Id. 
430.   Id. 
431.   Id. 
 432.  Salomon Brothers, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2283, at *1-2 
(June 17, 1985). 
433 .   Id. 
434.   Id. 
435.   Id. 
436.   Id. 
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the holders from time to time of the Mortgage Bonds, the Trust will have 
the right, as the holder of the entire issue of such bonds, to direct the 
indenture trustee to foreclose on the real property covered by such 
mortgages or deeds of trust.
437
  In all other cases, the mortgages or deeds of 
trust securing the Mortgage Bonds would be assigned, and title to such 
mortgages transferred to the trustee, who would have the right to foreclose 
on the real property subject to such mortgages or deeds of trust.
438
  The 
Mortgage Bonds would not be readily tradable in any currently-existing 
secondary market.  Since Salomon Brothers involved mortgage pass-
through certificates being sold to investors in the trust, additional 
representations to obtain no-action relief were made, which are likely not 
necessarily relevant to real estate funds. 
In American Development Finance Inc., the SEC staff gave no-action 
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with lighter representations with respect to a 
non-profit organization that would invest in local industrial development 
bonds.
439
  The non-profit was organized for the purpose of advancing the 
functions of economic development, job creation and community 
revitalization.
440
  A series of industrial development bonds for the borrower 
and the related economic development project would be purchased from a 
state or local economic development agency having the power to issue 
industrial development bonds.
441
  The local industrial development bonds 
would constitute a special, limited obligation of the local issuer payable by 
the local issuer solely from the revenues derived from the project.
442
  The 
revenues for payment of each bond would be derived typically from a 
lease, installment sale agreement or loan agreement between the local 
issuer and the borrower providing for an unconditional obligation on the 
part of the borrower to make payments at least sufficient to pay the 
principal of and interest on the industrial development bond as the same 
respectively became due.
443
  The lease, installment agreement or loan 
agreement would be assigned by the local issuer to the non-profit as holder 
of the industrial development bond (or to a trustee for the benefit of the 
non-profit), and debt service payments by the borrower would be made 
directly to or for the account of the non-profit (or such trustee).  As security 
for the payment of the industrial development bond, a mortgage would be 
given on the project being financed.
444
  Each loan would be secured by a 
 
437.   Id. 
438.   Id. 
 439.  Am. Dev. Fin. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2275, at *1-
2 (July 23, 1987). 
440.   Id. 
441.   Id. 
442.   Id. 
443.   Id. 
444.   Id. 
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mortgage or deed of trust on the property which is being or to be acquired, 
constructed, renovated or otherwise developed through the proceeds of the 
loan, i.e, “purchase money mortgages”. Each loan would generally be 
collateralized on at least a 75% loan-to-value ratio.  In many instances, the 
loans would be overcollateralized, but none of the loans would be 
materially undercollateralized. 
In Citytrust, the SEC staff granted no-action relief when the entity 
seeking relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue 
invested in both mortgage loans in the form of industrial development 
bonds (“Mortgage IDBs”) and equipment loans in the form of industrial 
development bonds (“Equipment IDBs”).
445
 
The Equipment IDBs represent loans made to fund the purchase 
price of equipment and costs specifically related to equipment 
acquisition such as installation expenses.  The Mortgage IDBs 
represent loans made to finance the acquisition or improvement 
of real estate; they are secured by real estate and generally had an 
original loan-to-value ratio of not more than 80%.  In some cases, 
the Mortgage IDBs are also secured by other collateral (generally 
equipment located on the real estate premises where the subject 
of the mortgage financing and, in some instances, by other assets 
such as a certificate of deposit and a security interest in 
receivables) or a guarantee (issued by the parent, another related 
corporation, the principals, or the individual owner/operators of 
the borrowing corporation).
446
 
The SEC staff appeared to suggest that both the Mortgage IDBs and 
Equipment IDBs were Qualifying Interests, but subject to the following 
criteria: 
(1) the original principal amount of the loan did not exceed 100% 
of the value of its real estate collateral when the loan was made; 
(2) the value of the real estate collateral was confirmed by an 
appraisal prepared in connection with the original loan by a 
qualified independent third-party appraiser retained to appraise 
the particular properties; (3) [the lender] applied the same 
underwriting criteria whether the loan was secured exclusively or 
additionally by other collateral or a guarantee, and (4) a 
Mortgage IDB benefitting from non-real estate collateral will be 
disqualified as [Qualifying Interests] if, in connection with a 
default, the amount recovered from non-real estate collateral 
(including guarantees) exceeds 40% of the original principal 
amount of the loan (the “40% test”).  [The entity’s governing 
 
 445.  Citytrust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1389, at *1-2 (Dec. 
19, 1990).  
446.   Id. at 2. 
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documents] will require that recovery may not be made against 
non-real estate collateral on a Mortgage IDB otherwise 
qualifying as [Qualifying Interests] if after giving effect to such 
recovery (i) the 40% test will be violated with respect to such 
Mortgage IDB and (ii) the consequence of such violation and 
related disqualification would be to cause the [entity], based upon 
the Mortgage IDBs that continue to qualify as [Qualifying 
Interests] and the Equipment Loan IDBs, to fail the requirement 
that at least 55% of the value of the [entity’s] assets at the time of 
the issuance of the [interests in the entity] consisted of 
[Qualifying Interests] . . . .
447
 
“Further, to qualify as [Qualifying Interests] includable in the 55%, 
the related IDB must represent the entire issuance of IDBs [i.e., a “whole” 
interest].”
448
  “The [entity’s] assets will be fixed at the time [the bank] 
conveys them to the [entity], and no substitution of [entity] assets will be 
permitted.”
449
  The entity “will have the right unilaterally to direct the IDB 
trustee to foreclose the mortgage securing the IDB in the event of 
default.”
450
 
  
 
447.   Id. at *3-4. 
448.   Id. at *4. 
449.   Id. at *4-5. 
450.   Id. at *6. 
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j. Real Estate Mortgage-Backed Securities:  Whole-Pool 
Mortgage-Backed Securities 
The SEC staff has granted no-action letters when the entity seeking 
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue invested in 
whole-pool mortgage-backed securities notes.  In Premier Mortgage Corp., 
Premier Mortgage proposed “to offer to the public non-redeemable series 
of bonds and, with the proceeds of the offering, acquire non-recourse notes 
of savings and loan associations (‘S & Ls’) having a total face amount 
equal to the total face amount of the bonds.”
451
  In reaching its position, the 
SEC staff noted the following critical representations: 
Each note would be secured by a pool of whole mortgage loans, 
which are first liens on real property, owned or originated by a 
S&L, which would execute and deliver to [issuer] a master 
assignment of the mortgage loans in recordable form and a UCC-
1 Financing Statement evidencing the debt created by the note.  
In turn, Premier would assign the notes, the payments to be made 
under each note, and the mortgage loans to a trustee under an 
indenture for the benefit of the bondholders (“the trustee”).  The 
mortgage loans in a pool accepted by Premier as collateral would 
be fixed after a cut-off date (which is the day immediately 
preceding the effective date of the registration statement for the 
bonds) and no mortgage loans could be added to, withdrawn 
from, or substituted in the pool.  On the S & L’s default, the 
maturity of its note would be accelerated and the trustee could 
sell the mortgage loans or retain them.  If the trustee retains a 
mortgage loan, it could foreclose it upon the mortgagor’s default.  
Prepayments on, and adjusted proceeds of foreclosures of, 
mortgage loans would flow through to the trustee to be applied to 
the mandatory redemption of the bonds.  Except to the extent that 
the mortgage loans are prepaid, the notes could not be prepaid 
without Premier’s written consent.  The monthly debt service on 
the notes would equal the adjusted scheduled monthly payments 
of principal and interest on the mortgage loans.  Similarly, the 
principal and interest rate on the notes would be the same as the 
principal and weighted average interest rate of the mortgage 
loans. 
Moreover, we understand that Premier will not proceed with its 
proposed offering unless, among other things, the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation determines that, if and when a S & L is placed in 
 
 451.  Premier Mortg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2145, at 
*1 (Mar. 14, 1983). 
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receivership, (1) Premier, as a secured creditor, would be entitled 
to the full principal amount of the notes outstanding based either 
on the notes’ face amount or their initial offering price plus that 
portion of the initial issue discount amortized or (2) the receiver 
would arrange for the continued servicing of the mortgage loans 
and the continued payments on the notes.
452
 
k. Real Estate Mortgage-Backed Securities: Agency Whole Pool 
Certificates 
The SEC staff has granted no-action letters when the entity seeking 
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue invested in 
agency backed whole pool certificates.  In Security Mortgage Acceptance 
Corp., the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with 
respect to a company that issued bonds backed by guaranteed mortgage 
pass-through certificates issued by Federal National Mortgage Association 
(“Fannie Mae”) and/or Mortgage Participation Certificates issued by 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) in addition to 
mortgage pass-through certificates fully guaranteed as to principal and 
interest by Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”).
453
  
The pass-through certificates treated as Qualifying Interests would consist 
of certificates representing all of the certificates backed by an underlying 
mortgage pool (“Whole Pool Certificates”).  The letter suggested that 
certificates representing less than all certificates backed by an underlying 
mortgage pool (“Non-Whole Pool Certificates”) would not be Qualifying 
Interests. 
In NAB Asset Corp., the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a corporation that invested in whole pool 
mortgage-backed securities, noting that the SEC staff had previously 
granted no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with respect to 
investments in Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and/or Federal 
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) certificates comprising an 
undivided interest in the entire pool of mortgages backing the certificates, 
which the SEC staff defined as whole pool mortgage-backed securities.
454
  
Each real estate loan that was included within Qualifying Interests would 
meet the following criteria: 
(1) the loan [would] be secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on 
 
452.   Id. at *1-3. 
 453.  Sec. Mortg. Acceptance Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
1936, at *1-2 (Mar. 24, 1986). 
 454.  NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 820, at *4 n.7 
(June 20, 1991). 
2013] THE RISE OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 211 
 
 
one or more tracts or parcels of real estate; (2) 100% of the 
principal amount of the loan as indicated in the credit files of the 
originating bank was secured by real estate at the time of 
origination, and (3) 100% of the fair market value of the loan 
[would] be secured by real estate at the time the Company 
receives the loan. . . . 
The value of the real estate securing the loans to be acquired by 
the Company [would] be determined by recent independent third 
party appraisals.  The fair market value of the real estate loans to 
be initially acquired by the Company [would] be determined at 
the book value thereof on the books of the Bank.  The fair market 
value of the real estate loans to be acquired by the company in 
the future [would] be based on the acquisition prices of such 
loans.
455
 
In the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC stated that, 
The [SEC] staff has expressed the view that “whole pool 
certificates” that are issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac or Ginnie Mae (“agency whole pool certificates”) provide 
the holder with the same economic experience as an investor who 
purchases the underlying mortgages directly, [including the 
receipt of both principal and interest payments and the risk of 
prepayment on the underlying mortgage loans, notwithstanding 
the guarantees provided by the agencies,] and therefore would be 
[Q]ualifying [I]nterests. . . .
456
 
In the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC requested comment on 
how it should treat agency whole pool certificates under Section 3(c)(5)(C), 
including whether it should “revisit the staff’s view that agency whole pool 
certificates may be treated as [Qualifying Interests].”
457
 
l. Loans Secured by Oil and Gas Interests 
The SEC staff has extended its treatment of real estate loans to loans 
secured by oil and gas interests with regard to whether it will grant no-
action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue.  In 
Apache Petroleum Co., SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a company that 
invested in loans secured by oil and gas interests, such as working interests 
and overriding royalties.
458
  The SEC further based its no-action relief on 
 
455.   Id. at *4, 6 (internal footnote omitted). 
 456.  Mortgages Concept Release, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-29778, 76 
Fed. Reg. 55,300, 55,305 (Sept. 7, 2011). 
 457.  Id. at 55,307. 
 458.  Apache Petroleum Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2462, at 
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the fact that the combined loan interest would be comparable to market 
rates at the time the loan was made, and that the repayment of the principal 
as well as the fixed, additional, or contingent interest on the notes would be 
100% secured solely by mortgages that will be exclusively on real estate, as 
defined under state law.
459
  In Apache Petroleum Co., the oil and gas 
interests were treated as real estate under state law.  However, it is possible 
that the SEC could reach a different conclusion if oil and gas interests were 
not treated as real estate interests under applicable state law.
460
 
m. Installment Land Sales Contracts 
An installment land contract is merely an alternative method to 
finance the purchase of real estate on a secured basis.  In the case of an 
installment land contract, however, the seller would retain outright legal 
title to the property to be acquired, subject to its obligation to convey legal 
title to the buyer upon the full payment of the purchase price over the term 
of the contract. 
Investing in installment land contracts appears to receive no-action 
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue, since 
installment land contracts are analogous to secured real estate loans.  In 
American Housing Trust I, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under 
Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a trust 
that invested in installment landed contracts on real estate.
461
 
n. Condominium Units and Cooperative Residential Apartments 
Investing in condominiums and occupied cooperative residential 
apartments each appears to receive no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue.  In D.B.G. Property Investors, 
Inc., the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the 
Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a partnership that invested in 
condominium units and occupied cooperative residential apartments and 
suggested that these investments were Qualifying Interests.
462
 
o. Condominium and Cooperative Housing Loans and Notes 
Secured by Ownership Interests in Cooperative Housing or 
 
*1-2 (Apr. 30, 1982). 
459.   Id. 
460.   Id. 
 461.  American Housing Trust I, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 751, 
at *1, *27 (May 21, 1988). 
 462.  D.B.G. Prop. Investors, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
3087, at *1 (Dec. 29, 1986). 
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in Shares of Cooperative Housing 
In Greenwich Capital Acceptance, Inc., the SEC staff gave no-action 
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on a Qualifying Interests issue with respect 
to a trust whose assets consisted “primarily of loans secured by ownership 
interests in cooperative housing. . . .”
463
  In that letter, “[e]ach Coop Loan 
[was] a purchase money loan secured fully and exclusively by the 
borrower’s interest in a cooperative apartment (‘Coop Apartment’) . . . .”
464
  
The SEC staff gave no-action relief even though “the security interest held 
by a lender in a Coop Loan [was] not technically a mortgage . . . .”
465
  In 
another no-action letter, the SEC also gave no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a corporation who planned “to engage in the 
business of purchasing notes (or similar obligations, i.e. bonds) . . . . 
secured by security interests in the shares of residential cooperative 
apartments . . . .”
466
 
p. Assets that are the Functional Equivalent of, and that 
Provide their Holder with the Same Economic Experience as, 
a Direct Investment in Real Estate or in a Loan or Lien Fully 
Secured by Real Estate. 
The SEC staff has on more than one occasion noted that it has 
“provided no-action relief where an asset can be viewed as being the 
functional equivalent of, and the asset provides its holder with the same 
economic experience as, a direct investment in real estate or in a loan or 
lien fully secured by real estate . . . .”
467
  Recall that the SEC staff in 
Capital Trust agreed with the REIT’s argument that “except for the lack of 
a mortgage loan against the property, such a [Tier 1] mezzanine loan is the 
functional equivalent of, and provides its holder with the same economic 
experience as, a second mortgage.”
468
 
The SEC staff in Capital Trust discussed numerous no-action letters 
where the SEC staff effectively concluded that an asset could “be viewed 
as being the functional equivalent of, and the asset provides its holder with 
 
 463.  Greenwich Capital Acceptance, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 1003, at *1 (Aug. 8, 1991). 
 464.  Id. at *5. 
 465.  Id. at *5-6. 
 466.  P&B Realty Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2825, 
at *1, *3 (Dec. 4, 1985). 
 467.  Capital Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 491, at *10 
(May 24, 2007) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 468.  Id. at *7. 
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the same economic experience as, a direct investment in real estate or in a 
loan or lien fully secured by real estate. . . .”
469
 
11. Mortgages Concept Release 
The SEC and staff are reviewing interpretive issues relating to the 
status of mortgage-related pools under the Investment Company Act, and 
may be in the process of changing such interpretive issues.  “Mortgage-
related pools” are “companies that are engaged in the business of acquiring 
mortgages and mortgage-related instruments and that rely on the exclusion 
from the definition of investment company in Section 3(c)(5)(C) of the 
[Investment Company] Act.”
470
  In the Mortgages Concept Release, the 
SEC noted that: 
Some mortgage-related pools have determined that certain other 
assets constitute qualifying assets for purposes of that exclusion.  
For example, we understand that mortgage-related pools 
generally treat bridge loans, certain construction and 
rehabilitation loans, wrap-around mortgage loans and 
investments in distressed debt as qualifying interests, provided 
that the loans are fully secured by real estate.  We also 
understand that some mortgage-related pools have determined to 
treat a convertible mortgage (which is a mortgage plus an option 
to purchase the underlying real estate) as two assets—a mortgage 
 
 469.  See id. at *10 (discussing (1) Investors GNMA Trust, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action 
Letter, 1983 WL 28500 (July 22, 1983), “where counsel opined that the issuer’s ownership 
of GNMA Mortgage Pass-Through Securities representing 100% beneficial interests in 
mortgage pools constitutes an investment in mortgages within the meaning of Section 
3(c)(5)(C) because ownership of these securities ‘is the functional equivalent of ownership 
of the underlying mortgage loans,’” (2) GEM Savings Association, SEC Staff No-Action 
Letter, 1983 WL 28748 (Sept. 28, 1983), where “counsel argued that issuer’s ownership of 
GNMA certificates is the ‘functional equivalent of ownership in an interest in real estate,’ 
thereby permitting the issuer to rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C), because the certificates represent 
100% beneficial interests in each underlying mortgage pool, the payment of principal and 
interest on the underlying mortgages is passed through to holders of GNMA certificates and 
the certificates are secured by the real estate associated with the underlying mortgages,” (3) 
NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 820 (June 20, 1991), 
where “counsel stated that an issuer that has general partnership interests in partnerships that 
hold real estate and loans backed by real estate should be ‘functional equivalents of direct 
ownership in the real estate and loans held by the partnerships and not be ‘securities’ for 
securities law purposes,’” (4) U.S. Prop. Invs., N.V., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 641 (May 1, 1989), where “counsel argued that issuer’s joint venture 
investments in real estate and mortgages are the ‘functional equivalents of direct ownership 
by the . . . . [issuer], and would not constitute ‘securities’ under the ‘investment contract 
test’ used for securities law purposes.’”). 
 470.  Mortgages Concept Release, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-29778, 76 
Fed. Reg. 55,300, 55,300 (Sept. 7, 2011). 
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loan (treated as a qualifying interest provided that it is fully 
secured by real estate) and an option to purchase real estate 
(which is assigned an independent value and treated as a real 
estate-type interest). 
With respect to certain other mortgage-related instruments, there 
appears to be a degree of uncertainty or differing views among 
mortgage-related pools as to the availability of the Section 
3(c)(5)(C) exclusion.  For example, it appears that some 
mortgage-related pools that invest in certificates issued by pools 
that hold whole loans and participation interests in loans that are 
secured by commercial real estate (“CMBS") limit the amount of 
CMBS that they hold, treating such assets as real estate-type 
interests under Section 3(c)(5)(C), whereas others treat certain 
CMBS as qualifying interests.
471
 
In the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC noted that, 
The evolution of mortgage-related pools and the development of 
new and complex mortgage-related instruments, the Commission 
is reviewing interpretive issues relating to the status of mortgage-
related pools under the Investment Company Act and whether 
mortgage-related pools potentially are making judgments about 
their status under the [Investment Company] Act without 
sufficient Commission guidance.  It appears that some types of 
mortgage-related pools might interpret the statutory exclusion 
provided by Section 3(c)(5)(C) in a broad manner, while others 
might interpret the exclusion too narrowly. . . . The Commission 
also is concerned that staff no-action letters that have addressed 
the statutory exclusion in Section 3(c)(5)(C) may have contained, 
or led to, interpretations that are beyond the intended scope of the 
exclusion and inconsistent with investor protection.
472
 
In particular, in the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC sought 
comment on the following issues: 
 Whether “Section 3(c)(5)(C) is generally being used consistent 
with the purposes and policies underlying that provision and 
investor protection?”
473
 
 Whether “certain mortgage-related pools may be giving too broad 
an interpretation to [Section 3(c)(5)(C)]?  If so, does such broad 
interpretation result in companies that resemble traditional 
investment companies avoiding regulation under the Act, and, if 
 
 471.  Id. at 55,306. 
 472.  Id. at 55,301. 
473.   Id. at 55,306. 
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so, is it inconsistent with the purposes and policies underlying that 
provision and investor protection?”
474
 
 Whether “certain companies may be giving to narrow an 
interpretation to [Section 3(c)(5)(C)?”
475
 
 Whether the 55%/45% is “an appropriate approach to determining 
an issuer’s primary engagement for purposes of Section 
3(c)(5)(C)?”
476
 
 “[W]hether any of the staff’s analysis relating to the determination 
of whether an asset is a ‘lien on or interest in real estate’ for 
purposes of Section 3(c)(5)(C) would be relevant in formulating 
Commission guidance for today’s mortgage-related pools.”
477
 
 “[S]hould certain mortgage participations be treated as interests in 
real estate and, if so, what types of participations and why?”
478
 
 “Is a company whose primary business activity consists of holding 
mortgage participations, the type of entity that should be excluded 
from the definition of investment company?   Why or why not, and 
does it matter what type(s) of participations the company holds?”
479
 
 “If participations are to be treated as interests in real estate, what 
features should be considered in making a determination about 
such assets?”
480
 
 “Should the Commission revisit the staff’s view that agency whole 
pool certificates may be treated as interests in real estate?”
481
 
 “[W]hether guidance is needed with respect to other mortgage-
related instruments.  If so, which instruments and what should that 
guidance provide?  We note in particular the differing approaches 
taken by certain mortgage-related pools as to the appropriate 
 
474.   Id. 
475.   Id. 
476.   Id. 
477.   Id. at 55,307 
478.   Id. 
479.   Id. 
480.  Id. 
481.   Id. 
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treatment of certain types of CMBS
482
 for purposes of determining 
a company’s ability to rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C).”
483
 
 “[W]hether a company whose primary business consists of 
investing in CMBS, or any other type of mortgage-backed security, 
is the type of entity that Congress intended to be encompassed by 
the exclusion provided by Section 3(c)(5)(C).”
484
 
12. Interests that are Not Qualifying Interests 
“The Staff has taken the position that assets that do not represent 
interests in or loans backed by real estate are not [Q]ualifying 
[I]nterests.”
485
 
a. Mortgage Placement Fees 
 
A mortgage placement fee is generally a fee charged by a mortgage 
broker for negotiating a loan between the lender and the borrower.In 
G.A.B.E., the SEC staff declined to give no-action relief under Section 
3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue to a company that was in the 
business of acquiring mortgages on real estate because too much of the 
company’s gross revenues may have been attributable to mortgage 
placement fees rather than interest income from mortgages and other liens 
acquired with funds from investors.
486
  Moreover, the holders of some of 
the company’s securities had interests that lied exclusively in mortgage 
placement fees. 
Presumably, the SEC staff’s view is that the interest from a mortgage 
is part of the investment in the mortgage, but the revenues earned from 
placement fees are not Qualifying Interests.  Similarly, the SEC staff’s 
decision suggests that a company in “the business of making mortgage 
placements” does not fall within Qualifying Interests. 
b. Notes Not Secured Exclusively by a Mortgage or Deed of 
 
 482.  In the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC noted how “some mortgage-related 
pools that invest in certificates issued by pools that hold whole-loans and participation 
interests in loans that are secured by commercial real estate . . . .”  Id. at 55,306.  Such 
certificates are what the SEC meant by CMBS.  
483.   Id. 
484.   Id. 
 485.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4.2(ii), at 419. 
 486.  G.A.B.E., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1784, at *1, *4 
(Mar. 15, 1974). 
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Trust on Real Property 
In Newman and Associates, the SEC declined to give no-action relief 
under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue to a trust that 
invested in notes of the owner of a real estate project “where none of the 
[notes] is secured exclusively by a mortgage or deed of trust on real 
property.”
487
  The owner of the real estate project was the Borrower under 
the notes.  In that no-action letter, “[t]he Borrower [would] purchase a 
surety bond, which [would] insure the availability to the [trust] of sufficient 
moneys to pay the principal of and interest on the [bonds sold to trust 
investors] when due in the event the Borrower defaults on the [notes].”
488
  
“The Borrower’s obligations to indemnify and hold the surety harmless 
from all loss, cost, liability, or expense in connection with the [project] and 
its financing [would] be secured by a first mortgage lien on the [project] 
and certain other rights and properties which [would] be mortgaged, 
assigned, or pledged to the surety (collectively, ‘Collateral Security’).”
489
  
“The Trustee [would] be subrogated to the rights of the surety with respect 
to the Collateral Security if (a) the surety is placed in receivership or (b) the 
Borrower and the surety both default in making payments sufficient to pay 
the principal of and interest on the Bonds.”
490
  None of these attempts, 
however, remedied the fact that the notes did not fall within Qualifying 
Interests since they were not secured exclusively by a mortgage or deed of 
trust on real property. 
c. Notes Not Fully Secured by Real Estate 
In Prescott, Ball & Turben, the SEC staff declined to give no-action 
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue to a 
company that would invest in notes that were not “fully secured solely by 
real estate,” even though the notes were “primarily secured by real 
estate.”
491
  Under certain limited circumstances, however, the SEC staff 
appears to have granted no-action relief when notes were not fully secured 
by real estate. 
 
 487.  Newman & Assocs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2527, 
at *1 (July 18, 1986). 
 488.  Id. 
 489.  Id. 
 490.  Id.  
 491.  Prescott, Ball & Turben, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1965, 
at *1 (Feb. 19, 1982). 
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d. Participations or Fractionalized Interests in Individual or 
Pooled Mortgages or Deeds of Trust 
As discussed above, in Capital Trust 2009, the SEC staff clarified 
that, 
[A]n issuer that is engaged primarily in purchasing or 
otherwise acquiring participations or fractionalized 
interests in individual or pooled mortgages or deeds of 
trust is not entitled to rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C).  We have, 
however, taken the position that an issuer that holds 
mortgage participation interests may nevertheless rely on 
Section 3(c)(5)(C) if the mortgage participation interests 
have attributes that would classify them as being interests 
in real estate rather than as being interests in the nature of a 
security in another person engaged in the real estate 
business.
492
 
In one no-action letter, the SEC staff denied no-action relief on the 
Section 3(c)(5)(C) issue because the pool consisted of fractionalized 
interests in notes representing less than all of the outstanding notes of that 
issue and the pool would not be in a position to foreclose the mortgages 
securing the notes.
493
  Instances in which participations or fractionalized 
interests in individual or pooled mortgages or deeds of trust fall within 
Qualifying Interests are discussed above.   
e. Entities that Invest in Real Estate and Related Assets or that 
are Engaged in the Real Estate Business 
Investments in entities that invest in real estate and related assets or 
that are engaged in the real estate business themselves do not count as 
Qualifying Interests for the funds investing in those entities, even if the 
entities in which the fund invests qualify under Section 3(c)(5)(C).  In 
M.D.C. Holdings, the SEC staff declined to give no-action relief under 
Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue to a REIT that invested 
“in various partnerships and trusts (‘Entities’) which invest in real estate-
related assets . . . .”
494
  In The Realex Capital Corp., the SEC staff declined 
to give no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests 
 
 492.  Capital Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 281057, at *5 (Feb. 3, 2009). 
 493.  Marion Bass Sec., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2473, at 
*1 (July 9, 1984). 
 494.  M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2091, at 
*1 (May 5, 1987). 
220 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
 
issue to an issuer that “would be formed to invest in limited partnership 
interests in an underlying limited partnership that would own and operate a 
building.”
495
  Despite these concerns, however, the SEC staff has 
occasionally, as discussed above, granted no-action relief on the Section 
3(c)(5)(C) issue with respect to corporate subsidiaries, two-tier investment 
companies, and joint ventures. 
f. Certain Whole or Partial Pool Certificates 
In the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC wrote that agency partial 
pool certificates that represent “less than the entire ownership interest in a 
mortgage pool” have not been considered Qualifying Interests because they 
are “more akin to being an investment in the securities of an issuer holding 
mortgages rather than an investment directly in the underlying mortgages . . 
. .”
496
  “The rationale is that an investor in partial pool certificates obtains 
greater diversification and is subject to a different prepayment risk than an 
investor who purchases the underlying mortgages directly.”
497
  However, 
entities may treat these types of assets as Real Estate Related Assets for 
purposes of determining whether an issuer may rely on Section 
3(c)(5)(C).
498
  Nonetheless, the SEC staff has concluded that whole or 
partial pool certificates issued by private issuers are generally not 
Qualifying Interests.
499
  It is unclear whether this SEC statement overrules 
the Premier Mortgage no-action letter.
500
 
 
 495.  The Realex Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1935, 
at *1 (Mar. 19, 1984). 
 496.  Mortgages Concept Release, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-29778, 76 
Fed. Reg. 55,300, 55, 306 n. 55 (Sept. 7, 2011).  
 497.  PROTECTING INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 343, at 73. 
 498.  See id. (reporting that the fundamental protections of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 should remain intact with only minor adjustments for recent changes in financial 
markets). 
 499.  Id. 
 500.  See Premier Mortg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2145, 
at *1-3 (Mar. 14, 1983) (recommending the SEC take no action against mortgage 
corporation attempting to buy fully secured loan notes with proceeds from public bond 
offering since corporation’s investment in the notes would result in a substantially similar 
investment experience as a direct investment in the underlying mortgages themselves).  
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g. Private Residential Mortgage Loans Held by the Issuer under 
Funding Agreements 
“[T]he Staff has stated that private residential mortgage loans (as 
opposed to loans issued by financial institutions) held by the issuer under 
funding agreements are not qualifying interests.”
501
 
h. Rights to Receive the Cash Flows On, and Beneficial 
Interests In, Certain Mortgages When Another Legal Entity 
Retained Legal Title to the Mortgages 
The Rosenblum treatise notes that the SEC staff “appears to take the 
position to rely upon Section 3(c)(5)(C), an issuer must have full ownership 
of the [Q]ualifying [I]nterests.”
502
 
In HUD Multifamily, the SEC staff declined to give no-action relief 
under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue to a trust whose 
assets would “consist of the cash flows on, and beneficial interests in, 
certain multifamily project mortgage loans.”
503
  In that letter, “(1) HUD 
[would retain] ‘bare legal title’ to the mortgages . . . ; (2) HUD [would 
control] the right to foreclose on the mortgages . . . ; and (3) HUD’s 
obligations . . . may result in action or inaction that may not be consistent 
with the economic interests of the [investors] . . . .”
504
  The SEC staff thus 
concluded that an issuer must hold legal title, control the right to foreclose, 
and be able to act in a manner that is consistent with the goals of interest 
holders in the issuer in order to establish a Qualifying Interest.
505
 
In another release, the SEC noted the following: 
Defendants argued that they satisfied [Section 3(c)(5)(C)] by 
acquiring, for a nominal sum, a residual interest in two trusts that 
had issued mortgaged backed bonds to the public.  By structuring 
the transactions in a particular way, defendants were able to put 
on their own books all of the mortgages in the trusts . . . even 
though defendants did not own the mortgages.  The Court 
rejected this argument, held that defendants were unregistered 
investment companies and appointed a trustee to take over the 
management of the defendants’ business.
506
 
 
 501.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4.2(ii), at 421. 
 502.  Id.   
 503.  HUD Multifamily Project Mortg. Loans Asset Sale, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1401, at *1 (Sept. 29, 1988). 
504.   Id. at 1-2. 
 505.  Id. at *1-2. 
 506.  SEC  v. IBF Collateralized Finance Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 17870, 79 
SEC Docket 118, 119 (Dec. 2, 2002). 
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13. Section 6(c) Exemptive Orders 
Congress has encouraged the proliferation of mortgage-backed 
securities: 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Secondary Mortgage Market 
Enhancement Act of 1984 (SMMEA), in order to broaden “the 
market for mortgage-backed securities by encouraging more 
extensive involvement of the private sector in the formation of 
conduits for the flow of mortgage capital from investors to 
lenders and homebuyers.”  In enacting SMMEA, Congress 
recognized that the vast majority of the mortgage-backed 
securities were (and are) issued or guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, 
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac and sought to reduce regulatory 
barriers preventing private companies from also issuing 
mortgage-backed securities.
507
 
In addition, Congress expected the SEC to facilitate mortgage-backed 
securities: 
In enacting SMMEA . . . Congress also stated that it expected the 
Commission to “monitor the private secondary mortgage market 
and provide appropriate administrative relief from the provisions 
of the [1940] Act if compliance with the Act unnecessarily 
[hinders] development of the market.”  In particular, Congress 
noted the Commission authority under Section 6(c) of the 1940 
Act to grant exemption from any provisions of that Act and stated 
that it expected “the Commission will exercise this authority with 
a view to encouraging a vigorous private secondary mortgage 
market.”
508
 
Following the enactment of SMMEA, the SEC has exempted many 
mortgage-backed securities under Section 6(c), with a view to encouraging 
private secondary mortgage market transactions.
509
  “Most of the exemptive 
orders concern CMOs
510
 and REMICs
511
 whose assets consist primarily of 
 
 507.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.7, at 426 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 508.  Id. at 427 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 509.  Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 98-293 9 (1984)). 
 510.  “A CMO is a debt obligation whose structure allows the cash flows on the 
underlying mortgage pools to be carved up into separate classes of securities, called 
‘tranches,’ each with a specified coupon and stated maturity.  Scheduled payments and 
prepayments from the mortgage pool are allocated to retire the classes in the order of stated 
maturities.”  PROTECTING INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 343, at 8–9. 
 511.  Many issuers elect to be treated as real estate mortgage investment conduits 
(“REMICs”), which were created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  REMIC status affects 
only the taxation of the issuer and the investors — the securities law and accounting 
requirements remain the same.  Only issuers of securitized mortgage products can elect 
REMIC status. 
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partial pool certificates and other mortgage-related assets that are not 
qualifying interests under Section 3(c)(5)(C).”
512
  In addition to CMOs and 
REMICs, the SEC stated that “exemptive orders have been issued to 
special purpose corporations organized by home builders that wish to issue, 
among other things, bonds secured by pledges of mortgage loans on single 
family residences constructed by the builders, called ‘builder bonds.’”
513
  
At the time of the Protecting Investors report, the SEC noted that “[t]he 
Commission has issued approximately 125 orders under section 6(c) 
exempting structured financings backed by mortgage-related assets.”
514
 
14. Rule 3a-7 
Following the enactment of SMMEA, “the Commission since has 
adopted Rule 3a-7 under the 1940 Act, which provides that structured 
financings, including issuers of mortgage-backed securities, that meet 
specified conditions will not be deemed to be investment companies.”
515
  
Although this article does not contain a detailed discussion of Rule 3a-7, 
there is such a discussion in Ch. 30 of the Rosenblum treatise. 
15. Satisfying the 25% Real Estate Related Assets Test 
As discussed above, the 25% Real Estate Related Assets test may be 
reduced by the amount that the 55% Qualifying Interests test is exceeded.  
“Neither the [SEC] nor the Staff appear to have defined the term ‘real 
estate related assets.’”
516
  Nonetheless, “[t]he Staff has taken the position . . 
. that a loan will qualify as a real estate related asset if at least 55 percent of 
the fair market value of the loan is secured by real estate at the time the 
issuer acquires the loan.”
517
   
 
The [SEC] Staff also has taken the position that agency partial 
pool certificates (that is, certificates issued or guaranteed by 
agencies such as Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, or Freddie Mac that 
representing less than the entire ownership interest in a pool of 
 
 512.  Id. at 73-74. 
 513.  Id. at 74 n.272; see also, e.g., Am. Sw. Fin. Corp., Investment Company Act 
Release No. 12771, 26 SEC Docket 764, 764-65 (Oct. 29, 1982) (describing the attempt of a 
corporation dealing in mortgage-backed securities to seek SEC exemption from the 1940 
Act under section 6(c)). 
 514.  PROTECTING INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 343, at 74. 
 515.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.7, at 427. 
 516.  Id. § 15.4.3, at 422. 
 517.  Id. (citing NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
820 (June 20, 1991)). 
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mortgages) and so-called residual interests—for example, 
interests in securities backed by mortgages or other interests in 
real estate, or interests in companies that invest in mortgages or 
other interests in real estate—are real estate related assets.
518
 
D. Section 3(c)(6) 
Section 3(c)(6) excepts from the definition of an investment company 
“[a]ny company primarily engaged, directly or through majority-owned 
subsidiaries, in one or more of the businesses described in . . . [Sections 
3(c)(3), 3(c)(4), or 3(c)(5)], or in one or more of such businesses (from 
which not less than 25 per centum of such company’s gross income during 
its last fiscal year was derived) together with an additional business or 
businesses other than investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in 
securities.”
519
  Section 3(c)(3) generally relates to banks and savings and 
loans, while 3(c)(4) generally relates to any person who has substantially 
all of his business confined to making small loans, industrial banking or 
similar businesses. 
“The principal effect of this Section is to except from the 1940 Act 
diversified operating and holding companies that otherwise would be 
deemed to be investment companies under any of the definitions in Section 
3(a) of the 1940 Act, as well as bank holding companies, insurance 
company holding companies, and similar holding companies.”
520
  A full 
discussion of Section 3(c)(6) is beyond the scope of this article.
521
 
The SEC has stated that the term “primarily engaged” in a business 
means that “at least 55% of a company’s assets are employed in, and 55% 
of a company’s income is derived from, that business.”
522
  Rosenblum notes 
that the SEC’s current interpretation of Section 3(c)(6) would exempt a 
fund if  
 
that company devotes at least 55 percent of its assets to, and 
derives at least 55 percent of its income from, a combination of 
(1) one or more of the businesses described in Sections 3(c)(3), 
3(c)(4) and 3(c)(5), from which the company derived at least 25 
percent of its gross income during its last fiscal year, and (2) an 
additional business or businesses other than investing, 
 
 518.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4.3, at 422. 
 519.  Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(6) (2006). 
 520.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 16.1, at 431. 
 521.  For a more complete discussion of Section 3(c)(6), see ROSENBLUM, supra note 
204, § 16. 
 522.  Id. § 16.2, at 432. 
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reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities.
523
 
 
With respect to real estate funds, to the extent that an investment 
adviser structured a sufficient part of the fund’s operations so that it did not 
engage in “securities” transactions within the SEC’s current interpretation 
of Section 3(c)(6), but still satisfied the other conditions of Section 3(c)(6), 
the fund could potentially qualify for the Section 3(c)(6) exemption under 
the Investment Company Act even where it could not qualify under Section 
3(c)(5)(C).  Therefore, Section 3(c)(6) could potentially help expand the 
ability of certain real estate funds that were not heavily invested in 
“securities” to achieve an Investment Company Act exemption, in 
comparison with Section 3(c)(5)(C). 
Presumably, Section 3(c)(6) would allow an Investment Company Act 
exemption if the fund devotes at least 55% of its assets to, and derives at 
least 55% of its income from, a combination of (1) 3(c)(5), from which the 
company derived at least 25% of its gross income during its last fiscal year, 
and (2) an additional business or businesses other than investing, 
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities. 
Presumably, under Section 3(c)(6), assuming that the fund was 
invested in an additional business or businesses other than investing, 
reinvesting, ownership, holding or trading in securities, the fund would 
need to own Qualifying Interests equal to 55% multiplied by 55%, or 
30.25%.  Real Estate Related Assets would presumably be adjusted based 
on the 55% multiplier, down to 13.75%.  However, an entity may need no-
action relief to confirm this view.  Finally, whether or not a non-investment 
business existed would most likely be determined in a similar manner as 
under Section 3(b)(1) and Section 3(b)(2), discussed above. 
E. Section 3(c)(9) 
Section 3(c)(9) of the Investment Company Act excepts from the 
definition of an investment company “[a]ny person substantially all of 
whose business consists of owning or holding oil, gas, or other mineral 
royalties or leases, or fractional interests therein, or certificates of interest 
or participation in or investment contracts relative to such royalties, leases, 
or fractional interests.”
524
 
Since most private equity real estate funds are not oil and gas funds, 
this article does not elaborate on the compliance framework for Section 
3(c)(9).  Those interested in using Section 3(c)(9) should see the 
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Rosenblum treatise, Investment Company Determination under the 1940 
Act:  Exemptions and Exceptions.
525
 
CONCLUSION 
The Dodd-Frank Act will regulate many private equity advisers more 
heavily, which private equity advisers will likely argue to be inconsistent 
with the historical reasons for the light regulation of private equity, which 
led to the fluidity of private equity investment strategies and higher 
investment returns. 
This paper argues that the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to prevent 
against systemic risks in response to the financial crisis of 2008, but poses 
over-regulation dangers on private equity real estate, even though 
regulators have acknowledged that an inappropriate level of regulation on 
private equity was not the cause of the financial crisis.  In particular, the 
author presents compelling evidence that private equity real estate does not 
give rise to systemic risk concerns, yet Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act 
threatens to subject private equity real estate advisers to tightened 
regulations, which impose considerable compliance costs and which could 
be particularly burdensome for small and/or start-up firms.  Apart from all 
this, too much regulation could potentially cause private equity funds that 
cannot cope with the compliance costs and efforts to relocate to 
jurisdictions where regulation is less intense, which is not advantageous for 
the U.S. economy. 
Applying the Volcker Rule against PERE would cut off a significant 
source of capital to PERE funds, even though banks aren’t a gigantic 
percentage of PERE’s investors. This is problematic, since PERE has had a 
significant role in paving the way to the recovery of the real estate markets 
after various financial crises.
526
 
In the face of these changes, this paper predicts that private equity 
advisers will not only comply, but also adapt.  This said, this article also 
predicts that traditional private equity investment advisers, who largely 
advise about investments in non-real estate securities and whose funds 
hence rely on (c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act exemptions, will have 
a very limited ability to adapt to Dodd-Frank and will have to comply in a 
rather straightforward way. 
However, this article predicts a more flexible adaptive approach for 
private equity real estate investment advisers, rather than rigid compliance 
 
 525.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 204. 
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with the new rules.  In order to alleviate over-regulation dangers for private 
equity real estate, especially in light of the fact that private equity real 
estate does not pose systemic risk concerns and possesses typically only 
moderate investment risks, this article sets forth new paths for private 
equity real estate advisers navigating through the new regulatory landscape.  
In particular, this article predicts that private equity real estate will 
potentially be able to legitimately (1) sidestep the Advisers Act, the 
Investment Company Act and the Volcker Rule by avoiding advice about 
“securities,” and (2) sidestep Dodd-Frank Act provisions that regulate 
advisers to (c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act exempt funds (notably 
Form PF and the Volcker Rule) by advising non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds.  
The author believes that these new paths will be acceptable to the 
regulators, given the long-standing tradition of regulators classifying non-
securities real estate investments as falling outside the scope of the 
Advisers Act, and given both the absence of systemic risk concerns and the 
typically only moderate investment risks of private equity real estate in 
general.  The absence of private equity real estate systemic risk concerns is 
further evidenced by the gesture of the regulators in finalizing Form PF, 
which exposes certain registered investment advisers to report risk 
exposure statistics.  However, there is no indication that this applies to 
private equity real estate funds that utilize non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions. 
From the angle of policy analysis, this article first examined private 
equity real estate along three axes of potential systemic contributors by 
analogy to a physical network of nodes, and ruled them out one by one.  
The article then compared private equity real estate funds to hedge funds, 
and showed that private equity real estate doesn’t generate systemic risk 
concerns because private equity real estate funds don’t typically invest in 
derivatives, have a relatively small aggregate size, don’t typically use 
banks and investment banks as prime brokers, typically don’t do short 
selling, typically utilize only moderate leverage, typically don’t invest 
heavily in mortgage-backed securities and typically possess only moderate 
investment risks.  These facts support the argument that these new routes 
through the regulatory landscape would be positive for society at large and 
ease over-regulation dangers. 
In regard to the Volcker Rule, the author urges the joint agencies 
charged with issuing a final rule on the Volcker Rule to limit their 
discretion and not apply the Volcker Rule against PERE funds utilizing 
non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act exemptions. 
The article argues that (1) PERE itself carries no characteristics that 
tend to generate systemic risks, (2) the possibility of a risk “ripple effect” 
propagating from PERE through banks to the markets is low, given that, (a) 
PERE investments typically pose moderate investments risks, except for 
investments in land, which not all PERE funds invest in, and (b) the 
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interconnection between banks and PERE is quite weak due to the 
relatively tiny size of the banks’ investments in PERE and the minuscule 
percentage that PERE occupies in the banks’ investment portfolios, and 
isn’t likely to become strengthened in the future.  Although some naysayers 
might believe that leverage and land investments could potentially create 
ripple effects, such effects would clearly be mitigated by the absence of 
other systemic risk concerns, in particular given the fact that the 
interconnectedness between PERE and banks isn’t sufficiently strong to 
give rise to systemic effects. 
Private equity real estate advisers should work with their counsel on 
how to secure compliance with these exemptions.  Private equity real estate 
advisers seeking to explore these trailblazing possibilities may wish to seek 
SEC staff no-action relief to confirm the legal bases for these possibilities, 
but this article asserts that the SEC should accept these possibilities as part 
of the new regulatory landscape for private equity real estate in light of the 
policy reasons expressed in this article.  If the SEC were to formally 
recognize these new paths, it would increase transactional certainty for 
private equity real estate and foster their freedom of choice to select the 
best regulatory path, which would in turn avoid the dangers of over-
regulation for private equity real estate. 
In this stagnant time of our economy, regulators should strive to find 
the optimal balance between business freedom and regulation.  As 
discussed earlier, over-regulation— notably private equity real estate over-
regulation in this case—could potentially harm the economy and have other 
harmful effects on society.  Regulators and society will hopefully recognize 
the absence of systemic risks posed by private equity real estate and the 
great likelihood that the Dodd-Frank Act might over-regulate private equity 
real estate if these new paths through the regulatory landscape are not 
recognized.  The author hopes that this article will lead to a more 
prosperous and more balanced economy, where the true art of building a 
flourishing macro-society lies. 
 
